



C. H. H. Henckell.

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# THOUGHTS OF C I C E R O,

ON THE  
Following SUBJECTS, *viz.*

- |                   |                     |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| I. RELIGION.      | VIII. FRIENDSHIP.   |
| II. MAN.          | IX. OLD AGE.        |
| III. CONSCIENCE.  | X. DEATH.           |
| IV. The PASSIONS. | XI. SCIPIO'S DREAM. |
| V. WISDOM.        | XII. MISCELLANEOUS  |
| VI. PROBITY.      | THOUGHTS.           |
| VII. ELOQUENCE.   |                     |

First published in LATIN and FRENCH  
BY THE  
Abbe' d'OLIVET;

And now Translated into ENGLISH, with  
NOTES.

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L O N D O N,  
Printed for J. NEWBERRY, at the *Bible and Sun*,  
and R. GRIFFITHS, at the *Dunciad*,  
in St. Paul's Church-yard.  
MDCCLI,



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# P R E F A C E

T O T H E

ENGLISH Translation.

*WHERE there is, in the nature of a work, a manifest utility, even the want of a preface might be excused; or, at least, the shortness of one ought to pass for a mark of just respect to the reader. A Book calculated to inspire virtuous and manly sentiments, must be a seasonable present to youth, and not unacceptable to the public in general: and that such is the tendency of*

iv      The TRANSLATOR'S

*the following collection of Cicero's thoughts, cannot be denied.*

*The world is sufficiently acquainted with the Abbé d'Olivet's ability to make a proper choice: and, indeed, his translation is as much a master-piece in the French language, as the original is in the Latin. What his reasons were for this undertaking, appear from his preface. There too may be seen a very plain and obvious demand for an English translation.*

*Here our female readers will meet with precepts of the most exalted piety, benevolence, and virtue, recommended to them by the name of an Author, of whom  
there*

# P R E F A C E. v

*there are few ladies who have not heard enough to raise their curiosity to be acquainted with his sentiments.*

*We shall say nothing of our translation, which is submitted to the judgment of the public, but that all imaginable care has been taken to make it a good one.*





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THE  
ABBE' d'O L I V E T's  
P R E F A C E.

I CAN never forget what happened to me once, as I was engaged in a party for a walk, about fifteen miles from *London*. Being obliged, by bad weather, to take shelter in the first house that presented itself, I was agreeably surprized to find it inhabited by a *Frenchman*, whom I had known in my youth, and who, after various adventures, had procured himself this retreat, where he made a livelihood by boarding children, to whom he taught the *French* language. I had the curiosity to learn what was the method followed in this sort of

schools, which are common enough in *England*. I found that they read *Quintus Curtius*, with *Vaugelas's* translation, and that by the help of the *Latin*, the rudiments of which the children must previously be acquainted with, the master endeavoured to make them understand the *French*; which served at once to exercise them in both languages. In the midst of our conversation, the father of one of the boarders joined us. Some words, which in the way of discourse he directed to me, gave me occasion to tell him, that I should be glad to hear his son explain a page or two, at dipping into the book. And where should the book open, but just at the battle of *Arbella*? But, far the boy's explanation had not proceeded, before the *English* gentleman, the father, interrupted it, by reflections that gave rise to this little collection. After all, says he, What reason is there that my son



son should have his head filled with all these wars? I have no thoughts of making him a general. But was that his destination, are these books fit to teach him his Art? Why not have some other translation, that should contain useful maxims, and principles proper to form a man of honour?

Nothing could be more judicious than this reflection: And from that instant, I formed a resolution to set about such a work, but know not how I came to delay so long the execution of a design, so agreeable to me on more than one account. First, it could not be indifferent to me, considered as a member of our academy, to contribute to the spreading our language through foreign nations. Another motive, still more engaging, was, that a work of this nature, if tolerably executed, might become the most important of all reading to young people,

ple, and the properest to inspire them with a taste for virtue, without which, it is impossible for a man to be happy in himself, or useful to society.

Some translation then was to be thought of, for attaining the double end I proposed to myself; and there was no room to hesitate upon the choice of the original. Where could I have found the beauties of the *Latin* tongue, and the most refined morals, better united than in *Cicero*? But as most of his works include several things, which either exceed the comprehension of children, or are not all alike useful, I thought it would be best to make a choice out of them, and confine myself almost wholly to collect detached thoughts. And indeed, children are hardly capable of taking in the whole chain of a long argument. Neither is it my opinion, that sentences delivered in a laconic way, are fit for them. A thought,  
unless

unless explained, and put in a certain light, appears obscure to them: Or, granting that perspicuity should accompany such a concise method, there is too much room to fear, that what we call sentences, would pass too quickly to fix their desultory imaginations. For this reason alone, was there no other, I should have preferred *Cicero* to *Seneca*. But besides, there was a much finer harvest to be reaped in one than the other: For as the cardinal *du Perron* very justly observes, *there is more in two pages of Cicero*, who thinks a great deal, and whose sentiments always move forward, *than in ten pages of Seneca*, who eternally dwells on a thought, and treats the same thing over and over again.

It may be objected, that *Cicero* loses infinitely, by being thus retailed in scraps. Since the superiority of his merit, and what raises him, perhaps,  
above

above all who ever wrote before, or since, is not only an uninterrupted series of true, solid, and shining thoughts; nor the secret only of expressing those thoughts with graces peculiar to himself: but it is chiefly the art of marshalling, connecting, and forming them into one chain. To this I answer, that the point here is to make *Cicero* subservient to our profit, without being solicitous about his reputation as a writer, which will subsist independent of any liberty we may take with him.

I should, however, do him wrong, with those who know no more of him than by what they will see here, if I neglected to acquaint them, that this volume, so far from comprehending all that he has said worthy of notice, contains only a very small part thereof. It was my business to proportion the work to the wants of children. *Quintilian* compares their understandings to vessels, into which no liquor

liquor can be poured, but drop by drop. Whence little reading is necessary for this age, but that little should be well chosen, and frequently repeated.

I have taken very little out of the *Offices*, because they ought to be read, and seriously considered, from one end to the other. To give them in remnants, would be inexcusable. They are all connected together, all equally beautiful and necessary. One principle infers another, and has often occasion for a third to prove itself, in order to make us sensible, that morality composes only one entire Body; whose parts are so coherent, so inseparable, that, on examining well the nature of our duties, and that of the human heart, if one is not an honest man in every thing, it follows that he is so in nothing.

I own, however, that *Cicero's* system of morals, though it may be  
looked

looked on as an abstract of the most solid and judicious sentiments of the heathens, wants nevertheless to be sometimes corrected, and at other times supported, by the morality of the gospel. Where human reason seems to leave us in a sort of uncertainty, there divine revelation steps in to our assistance. This is what a judicious master will make his pupils sensible of. When, for example, *Cicero* uses the expression of *Gods*: A word thrown in, will make them perceive that this plural offends, not against religion only, but common sense too. When they shall see the judgment that mere heathens have passed on pleasures, the passions, riches, real good, and real evil, it will be well to join to their admirable maxims, the great motives which a christian has before his eyes. When they come to read the dream of *Scipio*, how naturally will the occasion offer to explain

plain to them, what the christian faith teaches of another life?

To form a christian then, it will be necessary to supplement often, and much, to *Cicero's* ethicks. These very morals, however, at the same time that they contribute to form the man of honour, dispose likewise a child to receive, and preserve in his heart, the precepts of religion. You cannot too often repeat to him, that he has a soul, and a conscience; that there is a law of nature, whence result indispensable duties; and that, independently of all revealed religion, if he wants Probity, he becomes in the eyes of all who make use of their reason, an object of horror and contempt. Certainly, the virtues of a *Socrates* cannot alone suffice us; but let us begin with having them. Every edifice built without this foundation, will not be a lasting one. Whereas it is rare for religion to lose its ground,  
in

in a man sincerely virtuous; and rarer yet, for it not to recover its rights, sooner or later, should they happen to be lost.

Though, once more, my design was to be serviceable to such foreigners, as, by the help of the *Latin*, study the *French*; it appears to me, that my labour might even be of some service in our own schools, where *Latin* is studied by the help of the *French* \*. I do not mean our colleges; they are governed by able heads, who know better than me, which method is best. I speak of those little schools, which daily multiply round *Paris*, as well as in the country. Instead of reading treatises in them, which require an acquaintance with the disputes of the

\* This holds equally good of an *English* translation, designed for the use of our schools; by the help of which, both the *Latin* and *French* language may be learned at once; and such an edition, in the three languages, is sold by the proprietors of this translation.



*Athenian* portico and lyceum \*, that are little known in our days; would it not be as advantageous for the student, and no less convenient for the master, to keep to instructive passages, and such as are accommodated to every capacity, either by the help of a translation alone, or a few short remarks? This would be to teach things as well as words; to cultivate reason and memory at the same time; and to make instruction at once useful, and easy. For the great principles of morality have this peculiar property, that, being naturally impressed, or at least traced out, on the hearts of all mankind; when they are pointed out to a child, he thinks he discerns only what he knew before: and thus he

\* *Zeno* had the appellation *Stoic* given him from *στοὰ*, a *portico*, the place where he taught his disciples; who, from him, were called *Stoics*. The *Lyceum* was a place on the banks of the river *Ilissus*, where *Aristotle* used to walk, as he taught his philosophy; whence he and his followers had the name of *Peripatetics*, from *περιπατεῖν*, to walk.

becomes his own best interpreter, as finding an excellent commentary in his own heart.

But let us not confine ourselves to the times of study in our public schools. During the breaking-up season, it is common for children to follow their parents into the country; and it is there that a work of this sort might be of signal service. What duty can a father hold more sacred, what obligation more indispensable, than that of instructing his own child himself? Besides, where is there a more sensible, more lively, or more attracting pleasure, when the bowels of the parent are, what they ought always to be presumed? I am fond to figure to myself a man engrossed by the public throughout the year, excepting for a while in autumn, when restored to himself, and removed at a distance from the noise and impertinence of the world; I am  
fond,

fond, I say, to figure to myself such a man in the bosom of his family, with a *Cicero* in his hand, reading some remarkable passage of antiquity, and taking a pleasure to reason upon it, more, as it were, by chance, than in the form of advice. It is thus the precious seed penetrates into the yet tender soul; whence, in due time, shall spring up the honest and great man, the good magistrate, and the virtuous patriot. All the lessons of a tutor, however learned and diligent, are of little avail, compared with what a father properly inculcates; because a child knows, and knows it so as not to be mistaken, that his father's only aim is to endeavour to make him happy, and deserving to be so. —

I conclude with a passage, that has often presented itself to my memory, but which I will not translate, for fear of offending the age we live in. It is well known, what the morals of  
the

the *Romans* were become in the times that *Cicero* wrote. It is well known, what were the consequences of an ill distributed opulence, an unbounded luxury, too general an impunity, but especially a contempt of all order and decency; which never gains footing, till the duties of morality are quite forgot; and which puts, as it were, the last hand to the depravation of manners. I will not say, that we are come to such a length. All I shall observe is, that whatever measures are taken, in order to prevent the like degeneracy, should neither proceed from a panic terror, nor a premature zeal. But, however that may be, here follows the *Latin* quotation, that I meant to speak of. [*Less scrupulous than the French translator, we give here, in lieu of the Latin, the English translation.*]

“ What greater, what better ser-  
 vice, can we do the common-  
 “ wealth,

“ wealth, than presenting it with any  
“ thing towards the instruction and  
“ tutorage of youth? Especially whilst  
“ the manners, and the times, are  
“ at such a pass of degeneracy  
“ and dissoluteness, that no less than  
“ the united endeavours of all *who*  
“ *love their Country*, is necessary to  
“ restrain, and keep our youth with-  
“ in bounds”.

CICERO, de Div. II. 2.



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THOUGHTS

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# THOUGHTS

## OF

# CICERO.

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### I.

### *On* RELIGION.

**W**HEN\* we view the heavens, and contemplate the celestial bodies, can any thing be plainer, or appear with clearer evidence, than that there is a deity of most consummate wisdom, by whom they are governed?

He that entertains any doubt of this, may, in my opinion, with equal reason, doubt of the existence of the sun. For,

\* De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. cap. 2.

wherein is the one more evident than the other? Had not mankind been thoroughly convinced of the truth of this opinion, it could never have acquired so firm a footing, never have been able to make its way through so many ages and generations, nor to have gained new confirmation by length of time: For we see, that all other vain and fictitious notions are at length quite exploded. Who now believes there ever was an Hippocentaur\*, or Chimera†? Or where is the old wife so stupidly silly, as to dread the infernal monsters‡, that were believed to exist heretofore? For time, which effaces all feigned hypotheses, establishes and confirms the judgments of nature. Hence it is, that the veneration paid the divine beings, and the sacred rites

\* Hippocentaur is a fabulous animal, half man, half horse. The *Theffalians* are said to have been the inventors of the art of breaking horses; and being the first that were seen on horseback, they appeared to make but one body with the horses; which gave rise to the fable of the Hippocentaur.

† Chimera, according to the poets, was a monster, that had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a dragon. *Bellerophon*, mounted upon *Pegasus*, defeated the Chimera. For the different explanations of this, consult the authors who have treated of ancient fables.

‡ Such as *Cerberus*, the *Parce* or sister-fates, the *Eumenides* or furies, &c.



of religion, both with us, and among other nations, daily gain ground and improve.

'Tis\* an excellent supposition of *Aristotle*, that if there were men who had always lived under ground, in splendid and magnificent apartments, ornamented with pictures and statues, and well furnished with whatever abounds with those who are commonly esteemed happy; and that without ever making their appearance on the surface of our globe, these men had, by fame or instruction, been informed that there was a deity, and divine powers: Then, that after some time, a chasm of the earth should open, and make way for them to leave their buried habitations, and mount up to the world which we inhabit: When the earth, the sea, and the heavens, rushed upon their sight; when they observed the extent of the clouds, and felt the force of the winds; when they had cast their eyes on the sun, viewed its magnitude and splendor, and had been told of its great influence, and how, by diffusing light through the heavens, it causes day:

† De Nat. Deor. II. 37, 38.

#### 4 *Thoughts of C I C E R O.*

When, on night's overshadowing the earth, they beheld the firmament bespangled with stars; when they had been made acquainted with the still varying phases of the moon, both in its increase and wane; also with the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, and their stated and unvaried revolutions from all eternity: Certainly, on such a prospect, they would be convinced that there were gods, and that the great things they had seen were their works.

Thus far *Aristotle*. Let us now make another supposition, and imagine such a darkness as prevailed once at an eruption of mount *Ætna*, when, for the space of two days, the adjacent countries were so benighted, that it was impossible for one man to distinguish another; so that on the third day, when the sun appeared with his usual splendor, they seemed risen, as it were, from the dead. But should it happen, that, after being enveloped in eternal darkness, the light suddenly broke out upon us with full glare, how amazing would the prospect of the heavens appear! The daily returns of the same objects to  
our

our view, render them familiar to us ; nor are men inclined to admire or search into the causes of what they are always conversant with : As if the novelty, rather than the greatness and excellence of things, ought to excite us to investigate their causes.

Does he merit the name of MAN, who, after having viewed the stated and invincible motions of the heavens, the regular arrangements and disposition of the stars, and the nice connection and harmony which reign throughout the universe, shall notwithstanding maintain, that all this is the effect of blind chance, and not the work of reason ; though the wisdom, by which they are conducted, far exceeds the power of the human understanding to comprehend ? When we see a sphere, a curious dial, or any other piece of machinery moving artificially ; 'tis never questioned that they are the effects of design : And can we then contemplate that mighty power, whereby the heavens perform their revolutions with such amazing velocity, whence arise the regular vicissitudes of the seasons, so admirably contrived for pro-

## 6 *Thoughts of* C I C E R O.

moting the happiness and preservation of the whole system; and yet doubt that the world is directed, I will not say simply by intelligence, but by consummate and most divine wisdom? Hence then with the subtilities of sophistry; for here we have ocular demonstration of the beauty of those things we attribute to divine providence.

When\* we behold the bright appearance of the heavens, and consider the great, the amazing, velocity of their revolution; the vicissitudes of day and night; the successive change of the seasons, so aptly calculated for ripening the fruits of the earth, and preserving a just temperature in all bodies; the sun which presides over, and regulates all these phænomena; then the moon, whose augmentation and diminution of light seems so well adapted to mark out our calendar†; the five planets likewise revolving through the twelve signs of the Zodiack, and all of them with the

\* Tuscul. I. 28, 29.

† By the *Fasti*, we must understand the days of the month in general. For working-days were, by the *Romans*, called *Fasti dies*, and holidays *Nefasti*.

greatest regularity performing their respective revolutions, though with different motions; to this add the nightly prospect of the firmament, studded and ornamented with stars; then the terrestrial globe, raised above the sea, and fixed in the centre of the universe\*; which in two regions†, distinct from each other, is habitable and cultivated: One of these is that we inhabit, situated towards the north pole, whence

\* It is evident from the expressions here used, that *Cicero* followed the *Ptolemaic* system of the world; which places the earth in the centre of the universe, and makes the heavenly bodies to revolve round it: But this opinion is now given up as erroneous, all the phænomena being accounted for in a much more simple and rational way, by supposing the sun to occupy the centre, and all the planets to revolve round him, *viz.* our earth once a year, and at the same time to turn once every day round its own axis.

† The earth is divided, both by Ancients and Moderns, into five Regions or Zones; that in the middle of the earth was called the *Torrid Zone*, as being directly under the sun, and therefore supposed by the Ancients to be uninhabitable for heat; the two Zones under the Poles were called *Frigid*, because not habitable for cold; and the two remaining Zones, lying between the two Frigid Zones and the *Torrid Zones*, were called *Temperate*, on account of the clemency of their air: And tho' this opinion of the Ancients, both with regard to the *Torrid* and *Frigid Zones*, has long since been found to be erroneous; yet it cannot be denied, but the Inhabitants of the *Temperate Zones* live much more comfortably than those of the other three.

*The blust'ring north-wind brings the gelid  
snows:*

The other lies towards the south, and is called by the *Greeks* 'Αλιχθων: Whilst the remaining parts, by reason of the excessive heats and colds which prevail there, are entirely waste and depopulated: But here, in our happier situation, all in due season,

*The sky grows clear, the trees their foliage  
shoot,*

*The joyous vines luxuriant branches spread,  
The boughs sway down beneath their fruit-  
ful load,*

*The fertile soil a copious harvest yields;  
All nature blooms; up spring refreshing  
streams,*

*And the gay herbage crowns th' enamel'd  
fields:*

When we consider again the multitude of cattle; designed, some for our nourishment, and others to supply us with cloathing; one part for the convenience of carriage, another for the purposes of agriculture;

culture; again, when we reflect on man himself, formed to contemplate the heavens, and pay his devotion to the divine beings; and lastly, when we observe, how the whole earth, and the wide extensive seas, are subservient to his accommodation:

When we consider all these, and the other innumerable objects of the universe, can we entertain a doubt, but that, if they were created, as is the opinion of *Plato*, there presides over them some efficient cause; or if, as *Aristotle* holds, they existed from all eternity, that there is a being, who directs and superintends the mighty fabrick?

Is it not astonishing\*, that ever there was a man† who could persuade himself, that the beautiful, and every way compleat system of the world could be produced by the fortuitous concurrence of certain solid and indivisible bodies, necessarily moved by the force of their natural gravity! He that can bring himself to think

\* De Nat. Deor. II. 37.

† He means *Epicurus*, the chief of a well known sect of philosophers.

in this train, may with equal reason believe, that if a very large number of types, (whether of gold or any other material) representing the letters of the alphabet\*, be thrown any where on the ground, they would form the annals of *Ennius*, so as to make them legible. Whereas I very much doubt, whether the power of chance could reach even so far as to produce one single verse. How then can these men affirm, that corpuscles without colour, without any of that quality† which the *Greeks* call *πικρία*, i. e. plastic, or composing faculty, and without intelligence, should, by only floating about at random, accidentally concur to the formation of the world; nay, of an infinite number of worlds, continually to supply the place of perishing ones? But if this concourse of

\* Some have imagined that this passage of *Cicero* gave the first hint towards inventing the art of printing. In the original, it is *unius & viginti formæ literarum*, i. e. types of the one and twenty letters, which was the number contained in their Alphabet.

† Colour, heat, and such other qualities, according to the *Epicureans*, belong only to compound bodies. Their atoms have naturally no other property but their size, weight, and what necessarily results from their configuration, smoothness, or roughness.



atoms can make a world, why does it never form a portico, a temple, a house, or city; which are certainly much easier to be effected?

Another\* invincible argument, to prove the existence of superior beings, is, that there is no nation so barbarous, no man so savage, whose mind is not imbued with this persuasion. It must be confessed, indeed, that many people entertain very unworthy ideas concerning the gods; which is owing to their bad morals, and the prejudices of education; but all unite in acknowledging a divine and supreme nature. Neither is this persuasion the result of any conference, or concert of mankind; nor does it derive its authority from the power of custom, or the sanction of laws. Now, the common consent of mankind is, in every case, to be esteemed a law of nature.

Should† you ask me to define what God is, I would adopt the procedure of

\* Tuscul. I. 13.

† De Nat. Deor. I. 22.

*Simonides,*

## 12 *Thoughts of C I C E R O.*

*Simonides*, who, when the same task was imposed on him by *Hiero*, king of *Syracuse*, desired one day to consider of it; next day, the same question being again put to him, he requested two days more; then four, and so on for a considerable time, doubling always his demand. At last, when the king with surprize asked the reason of this, he replied, *that the more he meditated on it, the more incomprehensible it appeared to him.* For I suppose that *Simonides* (who was not only an excellent poet, but otherwise a man of extensive knowledge and wisdom) was bewildered in a variety of opinions, each more subtle, and abstracted, than the other; and being uncertain which of them came nearest to truth, he despaired of finding it\*.

Now† we can entertain no other idea of God, so far as his nature is comprehensible by us, than that of a pure and free intelligence, or spirit, entirely distinct from

\* None but Jews and Christians can form a just idea of the divine being: For the ancient philosophers, unapprized of the true system of the creation, and believing the eternity of matter, could not but draw false inferences from so false a principle.

† *Tuscul. I. 27.*

all corruptible matter, perceiving and moving all things, and possessed of self-motion from eternity\*.

From† the consideration of the powers of the human mind, 'tis reasonable, and we ought, to infer, that there must exist a divine mind, far surpassing the activity of ours. For as *Socrates* says in *Xenophon*, *Whence hath man derived his spiritual nature?* As to the constituent parts of the body, the humours, the heat diffused through it, the solids, and the breath we respire; 'tis easy tracing each of them to their respective elements: Thus one proceeds from water, another from fire, a third from earth, and a fourth from air. But what far excels all bodily accomplishments, our reason I mean, or in other words our understanding, judgment, thought, prudence, where have we found it? From what source is it derived?

\* Several moderns have maintained, that the notion of *pure spirit* was not to be found in the writings of the ancients. I would be glad to ask them, if to express that notion, they themselves have terms less equivocal, or more decisive and clear than those we see here?

† De Nat. Deor. II. 6, 7.

That\* there exists an excellent, perfect, and eternal being, worthy of the most exalted respect and admiration of mankind, the beauty of the universe, and the harmony of the heavenly bodies, compel us to confess. Wherefore, as religion, which is intimately connected with the knowledge of nature, ought to be propagated, so every root of superstition should be extirpated. Turn you to which hand you will, the follies of superstition are sure to strike your observation ; whether you listen to a diviner, or attend to an omen ; whether you sacrifice, or observe the flight of a bird ; whether you meet a *Chaldean*†, or soothsayer ; nay, does it but thunder or lighten, is something thunder-struck, or should any monstrous production, or extraordinary accident occur. Now, as incidents of this kind must, in the course of things, frequently happen, the super-

\* De Divinat. II. 72.

† A *Chaldean*, among the *Romans*, was the same with what the *French* call a *Bohemian*, and we a *Gipsy* ; that is to say, a fortune-teller.

stitious person is thereby alarmed, and never enjoys one unruffled hour.

To\* worship the gods, is our indispensable duty; and that worship is best performed, most pure and perfect, and most deserves the name of piety, when it is offered with true sincerity and purity of mind: For not only the philosophers, but likewise our ancestors, have carefully distinguished between religion and superstition.

Let† this therefore be a fundamental principle in all societies, that the Gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things, that all events are directed by their influence and wisdom, and that they are kind and benevolent to mankind; likewise that they know what every person really is, observe his actions whether good or bad, discern whether our professions of religion are sincere, and from the heart or not, and are sure to make a difference between good men and the wicked.

Now who can dispute the utility of these sentiments, when he shall reflect, how

\* De Nat. Deor. II. 28.

† De Legib. II. 7.  
many

many cases of the greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites, performed in making treaties, tend to assure peace and tranquillity; also what numbers the fear of divine punishment has reclaimed from a vicious course of life; and how sacred\* the social rights must be, in a society, where a firm persuasion obtains of the immediate intervention of the immortal Gods, both as witnesses and judges of their actions?

It† is with piety, as with other virtues; it cannot consist in dissimulation: Without piety, neither sanctity of manners, nor religion, can in any wise be supported; and if these are destroyed, what dreadful confusion and disorder must ensue! And indeed, 'tis a question with me, whether, without piety towards the Gods, the mutual confidence and society of mankind, or that most excellent of all virtues, justice, could subsist.

\* Other translators may seize occasions to praise and point out the delicacy of a thought, or the happiness and elegance of an expression. Let me, on juster grounds, admire here the manner in which a Heathen lays down to us that important doctrine of the omni-presence of God, the searcher of hearts.

† De Nat. Deor. I. 2.

## II.

## On M A N.

*MAN*\*, whom we may define to be an animal endowed with forecast, sagacity, wit, penetration, memory, judgment, and prudence, holds, by the singular favour of the supreme being, a very distinguished rank in the creation. For he, of all the different species and kinds of animals, is the only partaker of reason and thought.

'Tis † a matter of the greatest importance, for the human soul to comprehend its own nature: And doubtless, this is the meaning of *Apollo's* ‡ precept, enjoining every one to know himself; for I can't

\* De Legib. I. 7.

† Tuscul. I. 22.

‡ *Pliny*, l. I. c. 32. informs us, that in the temple at *Delphos*, they read three precepts of *Chilon*, one of the seven wise-men; the first of which was that here mentioned; the second was, *that we ought to desire nothing with too great eagerness*; the third, *that it is a misfortune to be in debt, or engaged in law-suits.*

think it directs us to know the different parts of our body, or its stature and form. Our bodies do not constitute our being; nor when I discourse with you, is it to your body I address myself. Wherefore, when the oracle says, “Know yourself,” it certainly intends, know your soul. For in fact, the body is no more than the vessel, or receptacle, of the soul; and the actions of the latter only, can properly be called the actions of the man. In fine, was not the knowledge of the soul an excellent accomplishment, it could not have passed for an apophthegm of such acuteness, as to have been attributed to a deity.

This\* precept, “Know yourself,” was not solely intended to obviate the pride of mankind; but likewise that we might understand our own worth.

Whoever† knows himself, must be conscious that he is possessed of a divine principle; he will look upon his rational part as the resemblance of some divinity consecrated within him; and will always be

\* Ad Q. Fratrem, III. 6.

† De Legib. I. 22.  
careful,



careful, that his sentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be worthy of this inestimable divine present. A serious and thorough examination of all his powers will inform him, what signal advantages he has received from nature, and with what infinite helps he is furnished for the attainment of wisdom: for, from his first entrance into the world, he has faint conceptions\* of all things delineated, as it were, in his mind; by the enlightening assistance of which, and the guidance of wisdom, he may become a good, and consequently a happy man.

What can be conceived more truly happy, than the state of that man, who having attained to an exact knowledge of virtue, throws off all indulgence to body and sense, tramples upon pleasure, as a thing unbecoming the dignity of his nature; is not

\* *Cicero*, here, seems to take it for granted, that our ideas, which have any regard to the law of nature, are innate, or such as we come into the world with. But *Mr. Locke* clearly evinces, that we have no ideas besides those we receive by the senses, and those which the mind forms by its own operation on the former. So that if a man was born without any external sense at all, he could form no idea, not even of reflexion; because the mind would have no subject to ground its reflexions on.

20 *Thoughts of C I C E R O.*

terrified at the approach of affliction, or even of death itself; who maintains a benevolent intercourse with his friends, and in that number includes the whole race of mankind, as being united together by one common nature; in short, who preserves an unfeigned piety and reverence towards the Gods, and exerts the utmost force of his rational powers to distinguish good from evil, just as we strain our eyes in order to view an object with the greater attention?

When this man shall have surveyed the heavens, the earth, and the seas; studied the nature of all things, and informed himself whence they were generated, to what state they return, the time and manner of their dissolution, and what parts of them are mortal and perishing, and what divine and eternal; when he shall have attained, in a great measure, the knowledge of that being, who superintends and governs them; and shall look upon himself, not as confined within the walls of any one city, or as the member of any particular community, but as a citizen of the universe, considered as one state: On such a grand representation

tion of things as this, and on such a prospect and knowledge of nature; how well, O heavens! would such a one understand the precept of Pythian *Apollo*, by knowing himself! How low would he esteem, how thoroughly would he condemn and despise, those things, which by vulgar minds are held in the highest estimation!

All these acquirements he would secure and guard, as with a fence, by the science of distinguishing truth from falsehood, and the art of reasoning, that teaches him to know what consequences follow from premises, and how far one proposition clashes with another. When such a person was convinced that nature designed him for society, he would not rest contented with these subtle disquisitions, but would put in practice that comprehensive eloquence, which is necessary for governing nations, enacting laws, punishing malefactors, defending the honest part of mankind, and publishing the praises of great men; he would likewise use his persuasive eloquence, to recommend salutary maxims to his country-men; to rouse them to the practice of virtue, and turn them from wickedness;

to comfort the afflicted; and in fine, by his writings, to immortalize the wise consultations and noble actions of the prudent and brave, and to publish the shame and infamy of wicked men.

So many, and so excellent, are the things that will be found in man, by those who desire to know themselves; of all which, however, wisdom is the parent and director.

The \* origin of human souls, is not to be met with in any terrestrial matter; there is in them no mixture, or composition of parts; nothing that participates of earth, or consists of water, air, or fire. There is no quality in these substances, that has the least resemblance to the powers of memory, intelligence, and reflection; or that is able to recollect the past, provide against the future, or comprehend what is present. These are all emanations from the divinity. Nor can they possibly be derived to man, from any other source, besides God himself. Whence we may conclude, that the nature and powers of the human soul, are of a

\* *Fragm. de Consol.*

singular kind, and entirely distinct from these common and well known substances. It likewise follows, that a being endowed with perception, understanding, free-will, and a principle of life, is certainly of celestial and divine origin, and consequently immortal.

It \* would be no difficult matter to account for the formation of our blood, choler, phlegm, bones, nerves, veins; and in a word, to point out whence, and after what manner, all the constituent parts of the whole body were produced. Was there nothing in the soul but a bare vital principle, we might suppose that human life was sustained in the same manner as vegetables; for these also are said to live. Besides, was the soul of man possessed of no other faculties, than a mere instinct of appetite and aversion, this would be common to it with brutes.

A distinguishing power of the human soul is memory, and that almost infinite, being capable of containing incidents in-

\* Tuscul. I. 24, and 25.

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numerable\* ; infomuch that *Plato* will have it to be the recollection of what paffed in a former life. For in that treatife of his, intitl'd *Menon*†, *Socrates* is introduced interrogating a child concerning the geometrical dimenfions of a fquare. The child answers in a manner agreeable to his age; and yet the questions are put in fo eafy a way, that he goes on answering one thing after another, till he comes to the fame conclufion as if he had learned geometry. Whence *Socrates* infers, that to learn is only to recollect. This he explains with greater accuracy, in the difcourfe he held the very day on which he fuffered death‡: for he there maintains, that a quite illiterate perfon, by giving proper answers to the questions put to him, makes it evident, that he did not learn thofe things at that time, but only recalled

\* Instances of an extraordinary memory are every where to be met with in hiftory. *Cyrus* knew every foldier in his army by name. *Cyncas*, ambaffador to the *Romans* from king *Pyrribus*, in one day learnt the names of his fpectators fo well, that the next he faluted the whole fenate and populace afsembled, each by his name. See *Seneca*, *Controverf.* lib. 1.

† *Plato* has given the title *Menon* to one of his dialogues.

‡ *Plato* gives an account of this difcourfe in another dialogue called *Phodon*.

them

them to his remembrance. Nor is it possible, that the ideas of so many, and so vast, objects, should in our very infancy be implanted and stamped, as it were, on our minds, and thence called *innate*, had not the soul been possessed of the knowledge of things before its entrance into the body\*. Besides, if, as *Plato* every where maintains, nothing has a real existence that has a commencement of being, or that comes to a dissolution; because true existence is peculiar to what is always the same, and such are our ideas; in this case the soul having no real existence after its union with the body, could not have attained such an extensive knowledge; and therefore must have brought this valuable acquisition along with it. Whence the wonder ceases, how it comes to be ac-

\* This great man seems to have lost himself, in the visionary notion of the pre-existence of the human soul; which, with *Plato*, he endeavours to prove from its innate ideas; but we have remarked before, that Mr. *Locke* has clearly proved, that there are no such ideas, and consequently the pre-existence of the soul must fall of course. And here we cannot but admire, how simple, how natural, how beautiful, Mr. *Locke's* account of the origin of our knowledge is, when set in contrast with this wild notion of the Platonists! See above, page 19.

quainted with such a diversity of things. The soul, indeed, does not perceive all its ideas immediately upon entering so strange and disordered an habitation; it takes some time to recollect and recover itself, and then it regains them by reminiscence. So that learning is nothing but recollection.

The nature and origin of this power within us, I suppose, may be investigated. It is neither the effect of the heart, the blood, the brain, nor of a concourse of atoms. Whether the soul consists of air or fire, I cannot tell: nor am I ashamed, as many are, to confess myself ignorant, when I really am so. And indeed, if it were allowable to affirm any thing, where positive evidence is wanting, I could swear, that the soul is something divine, whether it be made up of fire or of air. For I would ask, is it possible to imagine how so vast a memory could grow, or be any wise produced, either out of the earth, or in this gross and cloudy atmosphere? Tho' its essence be above our reach, yet its qualities are discoverable by us; or if this be denied, its capacity is certainly conspicuous.



ous. What? Shall we suppose that the human mind is like a common vessel of capacity, into which the various notices, which we consign to our memory, are poured, as it were, to be preserved? This would be a glaring absurdity: for what bottom or figure can we conceive of the soul; or how very large must its capacity be? Shall we then imagine the soul to be like wax, and that memory is nothing but the traces or signatures of things upon it? But what traces do words, or even things themselves, leave behind them? And besides, what an immense volume must it be, that is capable of receiving the impressions of so many different objects?

What then is that other power, or faculty, which investigates the secrets of nature; and is called thought, or invention? Can you imagine it to be the effect of the happiest temperament of an earthly, frail, and perishing matter? Can this be the origin of his mind, who first imposed names on all things; which, by *Pythagoras*, was esteemed a work of the greatest wisdom? Or of his, who gathered the scattered in-

dividuals of mankind, and united them in society? Can this be said of him, who taught how to express, by the characters\* of a few letters, the almost infinitely different sounds of the voice? Or of that man, who marked out the courses, progressions, and order of the planets? All these were men of an excellent genius: but they were still greater and more beneficial to mankind, who discovered the arts of agriculture, architecture, and making cloth; who refined human life, and invented new methods of defence against wild beasts: by such men as these, being civilized and polished, mankind left the mere necessary arts of life for those of taste and elegance. For in order to charm the ear, harmony, or the duly-tempered variety and pitch of sounds, was invented. Then followed astronomy, or the study of the stars, as well those called fixed, because seen always in the same situation, as the planets or wandering stars, which are only such in name, and not in fact. The man, therefore, who could fully compre-

\* The art of writing was invented in *Plœnicia*, according to *Lucan*, III. 220.

hend their revolutions and various motions, gave a full proof that his mind was of a similar nature to that of him who formed these heavenly bodies.

As to the senses\*, those interpreters and messengers of things, they are admirably contrived for all the necessary occasions of life, and placed in the head, as in a castle. Thus the eyes are posted as sentinels above all the rest; that by observing a very great number of objects, they may answer the end they were designed for. Then the ears, as being intended to perceive sound, which naturally ascends, were placed erect in the upper parts of the body. The nostrils too have a similar situation, because all scent likewise ascends; but are with good reason placed near the mouth, as by their means we judge of the good or bad qualities of what we eat and drink. In the next place our taste, being designed to give us a relish of the different kinds of food, has its situation in that part of the mouth, where nature has open'd a way for the passage of our meat and drink.

\* De Nat. Deor. II. 56, 57, & 58.

But then the sense of feeling is equally diffused over the whole body, that neither blows, or the too near approach of heat or cold, might escape our notice. And as in building, a skilful architect removes from under the master's nose, and conceals out of his sight, all the sinks of the house designed for the carrying off every thing that is apt to give disgust; so nature has removed at a distance from our senses the like parts in the human body.

Now what artificer but nature, whose penetration and skill nothing can exceed, could have shown so much design and dexterity in forming the senses? In the first place, she has invested the eyes with a covering of very delicate and thin membranes; and these she has formed transparent, that objects might be seen through them, and likewise firm, to preserve the eyes in their proper situation: But then she has made the eyes themselves slippery and moveable, that they might turn away from every disagreeable object, and easily direct their view wherever they pleased. Add to this, that the point of the eye, called the pupil, is so exceeding

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ing small, that it may with great ease escape whatever is hurtful. Then the eyelids, those coverings of the eyes, are of an exquisite softness, lest they should injure the sight; and nicely formed for opening and shutting the eyes, to prevent any thing from falling into them: Now nature has taken care that this might be done with incredible quickness every other instant. They are likewise fortified, as it were, with a palisade of hair; that the eyes, when open, might thereby be secured from any thing falling into them; and in time of sleep, when there is no occasion to use them, they might lie wrapt up, as it were, in bed-cloths. Besides all this, they are commodiously situate in a covert, and are guarded on every side with prominent parts. For above them are placed the eyebrows; which are covered with hair, and serve to defend them from the sweat descending from the head and face. The cheeks on the other hand, rising into gentle hillocks, guard them from beneath. And finally, the nose is placed, as it were a wall, between the two.

As to the organ of hearing, it is always open, that being a sense necessary to us even in sleep; for when it is impressed with the sensation of sound, we are even roused from sleep. Its passage is winding, to prevent things from falling into it; which would happen if it was simple and straight. Nature has also provided a viscid matter, that if any insect should endeavour to get into the ear, they might be caught and entangled in it, as it were with bird-lime. The outer part of the ear, called the auricle, is prominent; as being formed for covering and protecting the immediate organ, and that sounds might not dissipate and be lost before they reach it. Its entrance consists of hard, and, as it were, horny substances, with a great many sinuosities and windings; because hereby the impressed sound is much increased. Hence it is, that we use shell or horn to play on stringed-instruments; and experience shews that sounds returned from close and sinuous places are greatly augmented.

In like manner the nostrils, which for necessary purposes stand always open, have  
their

their apertures narrow, that nothing hurtful may get through them; and are always bedewed with moisture, for repelling dust and many other things. The taste is admirably well secured; for being placed in the mouth, it is finely situate both for its own preservation, and the use it was designed for.

In short, all the senses of mankind are much superior to those of other animals\*. For first the eyes, in those arts of which they are properly judges, as painting, engraving, sculpture, and the motion and gesture of bodies, discern many things with greater penetration. The human eyes judge likewise of the beauty, the order, and, if the expression may be allowed, the comeliness and decency of colours and figures. Besides this, things of much

\* As the truth of this assertion, with regard to the external organs of sense, may be justly called in question; this superiority of mankind must be derived from another source. To what then shall we ascribe it, if not to the internal, the spiritual, the divine part of man? 'Tis the soul gives him this preeminence over the rest of the animal world. Hence it is, he derives this nicety of taste, this discerning faculty, this *internal sense* of beauty and harmony, as Mr. *Hutcheson*, in his excellent treatise on *beauty and virtue*, chuses to call it. The works of this ingenious writer deserve to be read, not only by students, but by all who lay claim to taste, and true delicacy of sentiment.

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greater importance fall under their notice; they discern the virtues and imperfections of others; and can distinguish the passionate from the mild and good-natured person; the joyful from those oppressed with grief; the man of true courage from the dastardly coward, and the bold and daring from those of a timorous disposition\*. Nor is the nice judgment of the ear less admirable; for by its means we distinguish the almost infinite variety of sounds, whether of the voice, or of musical instruments; perceive their intervals and difference; and remark their various kinds, as the high and low, the smooth and harsh, the grave and acute, the flexible and stiff sound; which can only be apprehended by the human ear. Our other senses of smelling, tasting, and feeling, are likewise possessed of very acute discernments; for the gratification and indulgence of which, more arts have been invented than I could wish. 'Tis abun-

\* The art of physiognomy is here pointed at; which judges of the disposition of the mind from the features and external lineaments of the body.



dantly manifest, to what an extravagant pitch the composition of perfumes, the seasoning of meats, and other refinements of sensuality, have been carried.

As\* to hands, with which nature has furnished mankind; how commodious, how subservient, are they to many different arts! By reason of their fine articulations and joints, the fingers with the greatest ease move every way, and may be closed and opened at pleasure. So that by their aid, the hands are formed for painting, carving, engraving, and playing on musical instruments, whether of the stringed or wind kind. But these are only the elegant arts; those of necessary use in life, are agriculture, architecture, the art of making cloth, of preparing proper habits for the body, and working in brass and iron. Hence it appears, that as invention is the peculiar property of the mind, and perception of the senses; so all the accommodations of life are obtained by the ap-

\* De Nat. Deor. II. 60.

plication of the hands of proper workmen: to this we are indebted for our houses, cloaths, and means of safety; also, that we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, is owing to the same cause.

By human labour, or, what is the same thing, the application of the hands, plenty and variety of food is likewise procured: For 'tis to manual culture, that much of the fruits of the earth, whether such as serves for present use, or what is pickled to be preserved for some time, is owing. Land and water-animals, with fowl, make also part of our food; but then they must either be taken, or nourished and brought up by us. We break four-footed beasts, to answer the purposes of carriage, and by their strength and swiftness make up what is wanting in ours. We put burdens on some animals, and the yoke on others. The exceeding acute senses of the elephant, and the sagacity of dogs, are by us turned to our own advantage. We extract iron out of the bowels of the earth, because necessary for the purposes  
of

of agriculture ; and however deeply concealed the veins of copper, silver and gold may be, we find them out, as being fit, not only for use, but likewise for ornament. Again, by felling trees, whether those we plant, or such as grow in the forest, we make them serve either for fuel to warm us and dress our food, or for building houses to cover and defend us from the severities of heat and cold. Another great use they serve for, is the building ships ; by the navigating of which, all the necessities of life are imported from every part of the globe : For we alone, by our knowledge of maritime affairs, are able to give laws to those most violent productions of nature the sea and winds ; and in fact, we have the enjoyment and use of most things the sea produces. Man likewise is absolute lord of all the conveniencies the earth affords. We enjoy the mountains and the champaign country ; the rivers and lakes are ours ; 'tis we that sow all kinds of corn, and plant trees ; we add new fertility to lands, by overflowing them with water ; the chain-

chaining up rivers, and directing or altering their courses, is our work. In a word, by the labour of our hands, we endeavour to introduce another face of things, and another nature, as it were, into the world.



## III.

*On* CONSCIENCE.

I \* prefer the testimony of my conscience, to what all mankind may say of me.

Whatever † is done without ostentation, and without the people's being witnesses of it, is, in my opinion, most praise-worthy: Not that the public eye should be entirely avoided, for good actions desire to be placed in the light; but notwithstanding this, the greatest theatre for virtue is conscience.

That ‖ power of the mind, which incites to good actions, and dissuades from evil ones, is not only more ancient than the origin of nations, but is coeval with that God, who beholds and governs both heaven and earth: For 'tis impossible that

\* Ad Attic. XII. 28,

† Tuscul. II. 26.

‖ De Legib. II. 4.

the divine mind should exist without reason; and divine reason must necessarily be possessed of a power to determine what is virtuous, and what vicious. Nor, because it was no where written, that one man should maintain the pass of a bridge against the enemy's whole army, and that he should order the bridge behind him to be cut down, are we therefore to imagine, that the valiant *Cocles*\* did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the nature and dictates of true bravery. Again, though, in the reign of *Tarquin*, there was no written law concerning adultery; it does not therefore follow, that *Sextus Tarquinius* did not offend against this eternal law, when he committed a rape on *Lucretia*, *Tricipitinus*'s daughter: For even then he had the light of reason, deduced from the nature of things, that incites to good actions and dissuades from evil; and which has the force of a law, not from the time it was written, but from the first moment it began to exist. Now

\* The detail of this affair may be seen in *Livy*, l. 2. c. 10. *Horatius Cocles* had the *agnomen Cocles* given him, because he had only one eye, the other being lost in the engagement.

its existence must be equal to that of the divine mind.

Right\* reason, or that which is agreeable to nature, invariable, eternal, and with which all mankind are impressed, is in every respect a true law. It expressly commands our duty, and strictly forbids all treachery: 'Tis only on the virtuous, however, it has this good effect, for on the vicious it makes no impression. Nothing can supersede† this law, nothing re-trench it, or make it void. It is neither in the power of the senate or people to dispense with it. It requires no comment, it wants no interpreter. This law differs nothing at *Rome* from what it is at *Athens*, nor is it any other at present from what it will be hereafter; it is an eternal and immutable law, that is universally binding over all nations and at all times. Hence it is, that God becomes, as it were, the common instructor and governor of man-

\* Fragm. lib. III. de Rep.

† *Obrogare* signifies, to make a new law directly contrary to a former one; *derogare*, to repeal some clause or part of it only; and *abrogare*, to repeal or make void the whole, without excepting any part.

kind. It was He who composed, examined, and promulged it. Whoever therefore acts contrary to this law, opposes his own interest, and spurns at the true dignity of man; and by this very means, will be sure to suffer the greatest of all punishments, though he should escape what commonly goes under that name.

The\* punishments they undergo are not so much those inflicted by courts of justice, (which formerly were not in being, nor are, at present, in many places; and even where established, are frequently biased and partial) as what they suffer from conscience. The Furies pursue and torment them, not with their burning torches, as the poets feign, but by remorse, and the tortures arising from guilt.

I† would not have you credit, what you see so often represented in the drama; that those who have been guilty of any impiety or wickedness, are continually pursued and terrified by the Furies with their

\* De Legib. I. 14.

† Pro S. Roscio Am. cap. 14.



burning torches. 'Tis guilt, and the consternation thence arising, that torments every wicked man, disturbs his rest, and even drives him mad: His own evil thoughts, and conscious heart, fill him with terror. These are the constant, the domestic Furies of the wicked.

Was \* it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself, that ought to restrain mankind from wickedness; what, I would, ask, could give villains the least uneasiness, abstracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but endeavoured to justify what he had done by some law of nature, denied the fact, or else pretended a just sorrow for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to these laws, with how profound respect ought good men to treat them?

If either punishment, or the fear of it, was what deterred from a vicious course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself; then none could be guilty of injustice,

\* De Legib. I. 14.

the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.

On the other hand, if we are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but out of a view to some private advantage, we are cunning and not good men. What will not the man do in the dark, who fears nothing but a witness and judge? Or, should he meet a single man in a quite desert place, with a large sum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed; how would he behave? In such a case, the man whom we have represented to be honest from principle, and the nature of the thing itself, would converse with, assist, and show him the way: But as to the man who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures every thing by the advantage it brings him; it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one would act. Now should he deny that he would kill the man, or rob him of his treasure, his reason for this cannot be, that he apprehends there is any natural turpitude in such actions; but only because  
he

he is afraid of a discovery, and the bad consequences that would thence ensue. A sentiment this, of which, I shall not say that men of learning, but even clowns themselves, have reason to be ashamed!

We \* must be fully persuaded, if our progress in philosophy be any wise considerable, that we ought not to be guilty of avarice, injustice, sensuality, and intemperance, even allowing that we could conceal it both from Gods and men. To this purpose *Plato* brings in the story of *Gyges*, who having gone down into a fissure of the earth, occasioned by violent rains, observed, if we can give any credit to fables, a brazen horse with doors in its sides: Upon opening these, he discovered the body of a dead man of extraordinary size, with a gold-ring on his finger: this he pulled off, and having put it upon his own, went to rejoin his companions; for he was one of the king of *Lydia's* shepherds. By turning the stone of this ring towards the palm of his hand, he became invisible to

\* *Offic.* III. 9.

others,

others, yet saw every thing distinctly himself; and by turning the ring to its proper place, he became visible again. Wherefore, embracing the opportunity the ring afforded him, he lay with the queen; by whose assistance he killed the king, his sovereign, and dispatched all who he thought would oppose him: nor in perpetrating these villanies, could he be seen by any one. Thus, by the help of his ring, he in a short time commenced king of *Lydia*. Now though this very ring was in the possession of a wise man, he would think himself no more authorised to commit a bad action, than if he was without it: For good men consider only the intrinsic excellence and beauty of an action, and not whether it can be concealed.



## IV.

## On the PASSIONS.

**Z**ENO\* defines all passion to be a *commotion of the soul, opposite to right reason, and contrary to nature*. Others, in fewer words, that it is *an excessive appetite*, or such as exceeds the bounds prescribed by nature. Now, according to these men†, there are two kinds of good, and as many of evil, whence arise so many passions‡. Those arising from good, are joy and desire; the former resulting from a good in possession, and the latter from that in expectation. The passions supposed to spring from evil, are sorrow and fear; sorrow regards present evil; and fear that which is to come: For whatever excites fear

\* Tuscul. IV. 6.

† The Stoics.

‡ Virgil, *Æneid* VI. 733, gives the same division of the passions in four words:

Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent gaudentque.

Hence their fear, desire, joy and sorrow spring.

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when in prospect, naturally raises sorrow when present.

All\* the passions, according to the Stoics†, spring from our judgment and opinion of things. Hence they give a more precise and determinate definition of them, in order to make it appear, not only how exceeding blameable they are in themselves, but likewise how entirely subject to our will. Sorrow then is the opinion of a present evil, on account of which it seems just that the mind should be contracted, as it were, and depressed; joy, the opinion of a present good, for which 'tis reasonable our spirits should be elated; fear, the opinion of an impending evil, that appears intolerable; and desire, the opinion of a future good, the presence and fruition of which seems to promise great advantage.

I observed above, that the passions are owing to our sentiments and opinion of things: And to these, according to the

\* Tuscul. IV. 7.

† The Earl of Shaftsbury agrees with them, in this respect. "Here therefore, says he, arises work and employment for us *within: to regulate FANCY, and rectify OPINION, &c.*" See *Miscel.* 4. chap. 1.

Stoics, the effects of passion must likewise be attributed ; as, the biting anguish which proceeds from grief ; the retreat, as it were, and flight of the soul, occasioned by fear ; the excessive vivacity of joy ; and the unbridled lust of desire.

Now the opinion, which we have supposed to be included in all the above definitions, is by them called a weak assent, or persuasion of the mind.

Certainly \* then the reasoning of the Peripatetics, who affirm that our minds are necessarily subject to passions, and yet prescribe certain limits to them which they ought not to exceed, must be trifling and ridiculous†. I would ask any one who sets bounds to vice, whether to act contrary to the dictates of reason, does not deserve

\* Tuscul. IV. 17.

† It is a famous question in our schools even at present, whether the passions be natural and serviceable to mankind. But would men explain themselves, and define what passion is, they will find that the thing won't so much as bear a question. However, be this as it will, those who have recourse to what *Muret* has writ on this subject, in his Commentary on *Aristotle's Ethics*, will at least be charmed with his eloquence, tho' they should not be convinced by his arguments. The reader may likewise consult the ingenious Mr. *Hutcheson's* treatise on the passions.

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that name? Now does not reason abundantly evince, that what you eagerly covet, or are proud to have acquired, is not a substantial good; that what you succumb under the weight of, or become, in a manner, stupified lest it overtake you, is not a real evil; and lastly, that all excess, whether of joy or grief, is the genuine effect of prejudice and error? If then this wrong judgment of things is corrected by time, even with regard to persons of small discernment; so that notwithstanding the object remains the same, yet their sentiments concerning it are very different from what they formerly were; it follows, that men of prudence must be wholly free from its influence.

Whoever\* therefore endeavours to set bounds to vice, acts like one who should imagine, that a person who had thrown himself from the precipice of *Leucas*†

\* Tusc. IV. 18.

† Near to *Leucas*, a town of *Epire*, there was a very high rock, the point of which hung over the sea. We learn from *Ovid's* heroic epistles, in the last verse of *Sappho's* letter to *Phaon*, that the leap of *Leucas* was the last resource of unfortunate lovers, whence it was called the *Lover's-Leap*.



could stop his career when he pleased : For as that is impossible to be effected, so neither can the mind, when ruffled with passion, restrain itself, or stop where it pleases.

All things that are pernicious in their progress, must be evil in their birth. Now grief, and every other passion, if carried to an immoderate height, have undoubtedly very mischievous consequences ; and therefore, from their very rise, must be tainted with a great part of the lurking mischief. For no sooner is the government of reason thrown off, than they rush forward of their own accord ; weakness takes a pleasure to indulge itself ; and having, if the expression may be allowed, imperceptibly launched out into the main ocean, can find no place where to stop.

Hence, in fact, there is no difference between the approving of moderate passions, and the approbation of moderate injustice, moderate cowardice, or moderate intemperance : For he that prescribes limits to corrupt affections, admits them in part. A conduct this, which, besides its intrinsic deformity, is the more intolerable, because they are always in a

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precarious situation; vice being like heavy bodies, which, once set a going, fall down the precipice with impetuous motion, so that it is impossible to stop them.

To \* cure a man of love, he should above all things be made sensible how great a madness it is. Now of all the passions of the soul, it is unquestionably the most outrageous: For should we impute to it neither debaucheries, intrigues, adulteries, or incests, all which are crimes of the first magnitude; besides these, I say, the excessive disorder of the mind in love is a deformity of itself. Not to insist then on the above excesses of its madness, what levity appears in its ordinary and most innocent effects!

*The † quarrels, jealousies, and brawls of  
love,  
Its truce, its war, or peace, uncertain  
prove:  
As justly search for reason in a fool,  
As try such whimsies to confine to rule.*

\* Tuscul. IV. 35.

† Terent. Eunuch. Act. I. Sc. 1.

Who then can help being startled at the natural deformity of such an inconstant and fickle temper of mind? What we wanted to demonstrate is, that all the passions are voluntary, and entirely dependent upon opinion and judgment. For example, was the passion of love natural to mankind, they would always be in love, and that too with the same object \*; nor should we find love cured by shame in one, reflexion in another, satiety in a third.

Shall † I esteem the man to be free, who is the slave of a woman, that imposes laws on him, commands, forbids, and regulates his conduct at pleasure; who neither can refuse what she requests, nor dares disobey her orders? If she asks any thing, it must be given; does she call, he must answer: when shut out, he must

\* *Plutarch* makes the difference between love and friendship to consist in this, that if people of honour are once friends, they will always be so; because the mutual esteem that gave rise to this relation, and serves to support it, can, in such persons, receive no diminution. But love, on the contrary, is the effect of principles that do not always appear in the same point of view, and which depends entirely on opinion. Whence it is, that love is reckoned a passion; but friendship ranked among the virtues.

† *Parad.* V. 2.

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quietly be gone; in a word, if she threatens him, he must of course be filled with terror. Such a man, let his birth and family be ever so illustrious, deserves, in my opinion, not simply the appellation of slave, but that of the most servile of all slaves.

They \* who are said to be naturally inclined to anger, compassion, envy, and the like, are persons who constitutionally, if the expression may be allowed, labour under a disease of the soul; but not an incurable one, as appears from what is related of *Socrates*. *Zopyrus*, a physiognomist, who professed to know every one's natural disposition by their appearance, having in a public company laid a great many vices to his charge, was laughed at by those present, because they knew that *Socrates* was guilty of none of them. *Socrates*, however, saved his credit, by declaring he was naturally addicted † to

\* Tusc. IV. 37.

† Instead of *signa*, able critics have proposed to read *infirmitas*, or some term of the like import. *Cicero*, in his treatise concerning fate, chap. 5. joins the following example to that of *Socrates*. It is related of *Stilpo*, says he, a philosopher of *Megara*, even by his  
all

all these vices; but that, by the aid of reason, he had subdued them. Wherefore, as a man in the highest health may appear sickly, and be really more inclined by nature to one disease than another; in like manner, the mind may be more addicted to one vice than another.

As\* we consist of soul and body, to what cause can it be owing, that the art of restoring and preserving the health of the latter is cultivated with such care, and its usefulness so much valued, as to be attributed to the invention of the immortal Gods? Whereas the art of curing the diseases of the mind, was neither so much sought after before its discovery, nor so carefully improved, when known; it is less acceptable to many, and by the greater part of the world is suspected and hated. Is it because the mind judges of bodily

own friends, that he was naturally a drunkard, and incontinent. Now this they write, not out of reproach, but rather in praise of him: For his corrupt nature was so thoroughly subdued and kept under by philosophy, that none ever saw him over-taken with drink, or observed the least trace of unclean desire in his behaviour.

\* Tuscul. III. i.

pain and diseases, while the body remains entirely insensible of those of the mind: so that the mind passes no judgment concerning its own state, till after the judging faculty is disordered?

There \* is this difference between our souls and bodies, that the latter may be seized with distempers in their most flourishing state, but the former cannot. The diseases of the body, indeed, may happen without any fault of ours, but not so of the mind; for every indisposition and disorder of this last, is occasioned by a disregard of reason; and therefore can only take place in the human species: for brutes, however they may have something analogous, are not subject to passions.

Let † us now consider, what excellent remedies philosophy has provided against the diseases of our minds: for certainly such there are; nor has nature been so malevolent and unfriendly to mankind, as to produce such a variety of things con-

\* Tuscul. IV. 14.

† Tuscul. IV. 27.

ducive to the health of the body, and nothing at all for that of the soul. No, in this respect she has been still more favourable; for whatever contributes to the health of the soul is found within itself, whereas the remedies for the body must be prepared from without. Now the greater the excellence and dignity of human souls, the larger share of attention they require. Hence reason, if duly improved, discovers what is best; but if neglected, is lost in a labyrinth of errors.

It \* remains then, that you keep a constant guard over yourself. Though I can't say but the propriety of the expression may be questioned, as if we were made up of two persons, the one to command, the other to obey. The observation, however, is entirely just; for the mind is divided into two parts, the one endowed with reason, and the other not. When, therefore, we are commanded to keep a guard over ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain the blind propensities of our nature. The souls of most men carry

\* *Tuſcul.* II. 20, 21.

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about with them some alloy, something naturally mean, languid and enervate: and did this constitute the whole of our nature, man would be the most despicable creature in the world. But he has likewise reason, the mistress, the queen, of all his other powers; which, by her own natural force, still makes advances in improvement, till she arrives at perfect\* virtue. 'Tis the duty, therefore, of every man to be careful, that she effectually governs that part of the soul, which ought to be under her direction.

\* *Cicero*, in numberless places, defines virtue to be, *A conformity to right reason*. And in *Tuscul. IV. chap. 15.* he says expressly, *ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest.*





## V.

## On WISDOM.

WHAT \* so desirable as wisdom? What more excellent in itself, so useful to man, or better deserving his pursuit? Hence they who are possessed with an earnest desire to acquire it, are called *Philosophers*; for *Philosophy*, in the precise meaning of the word, signifies the love of wisdom. Now wisdom, as defined by the ancient sages, is the knowledge † of things

\* *Offic.* II. 2.

† By things divine and human is understood all things, without excepting any. Thus the perfect Sage is one who knows every thing. There is a necessity for admitting this principle of the Stoics, with the consequences they draw from it; as that none but fools could be guilty of vice; that those could not commit the least mistake, who saw clearly whence they went, and whither they were going; that in such a case, they could offend neither in respect of morality or policy; and so of the rest. But, in fact, this sage of the Stoics never existed except in idea. However, be this as it will, nothing but an absolute impossibility of attaining perfection in virtue, should hinder us from aspiring to it. Let us here follow the prudent advice of *Horace*,

*Non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus,*

*Non tamen idcirco contempnas lippus inungi.*

What though you cannot hope for eagle's eyes,

Will you a lenient, strength'ning salve despise?

*Francis. Hor.*

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divine and human, with their efficient causes. Whoever despises this study, I know not what he can think worthy of his approbation : for whether an agreeable amusement, or freedom from care, be the object of his desires ; what is comparable to those studies, which are always taken up in searching after the means of attaining a good and happy life ? Or, is he desirous of learning the principles of virtue and true courage ; here, or no where, is to be found the art of acquiring them ? They who affirm that there is no art in things of the greatest moment, while nothing, however small and trifling, is performed without its aid, are guilty of the grossest error, and must be men of no consideration. Now if there be any science of virtue, where shall it be learned, if not in the school of philosophy ?

Sight \*, says *Plato*, though the acutest of all our senses, is too dull to present us with a view of wisdom. With what ardent desires after her would she inflame us, could she become visible ?

\* De Finib. II. 16.

Nature \*, from the first origin of things, has endowed every species of animals with an instinct of self-preservation, by which they not only avoid what would be destructive of their being, or any wise injurious to them ; but likewise make provision of the necessaries of life, as food, a place of retreat, and the like. Another instinct, common to all animals, is the desire of copulation for the propagation of their kind, and the care they take of their offspring. But between a man and a brute, there is this difference ; that the latter, being directed entirely by sense, is wholly attached to the present, and very little sensible either of what is past, or of futurity. Man, on the contrary, comprehends the whole course of his life, and prepares all things necessary for his future subsistence : And this he is enabled to do, as being partaker of reason, by which he sees the causes and consequences of things, notes their rise and progress, compares things of a like nature, and connects the future with the present.

\* Offic. I. 4.

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The desire of truth, and the power of investigating it, are, in a special manner, peculiar to man. Hence it is, that when freed from the necessary employments and cares of life, we are extremely desirous to see, hear, or learn something; and look upon the knowledge of abstruse things, or such as raise admiration \*, to be a necessary ingredient of a happy life.

So † deeply are mankind impressed with the love of knowledge and learning, that by this very propensity of their nature, they would doubtless be engaged in the pursuit of them, though there was no advantage annexed to the attainment. Do we not see, that even chastisements are not sufficient to restrain children from con-

\* It is evident, that the *admiration* here mentioned, is that arising from ignorance, which makes us desire or fear things with which we would be no wise affected, if we knew their true value. *Horace* has the same thought in the beginning of one of his epistles, which he has expressed almost in the same terms:

*Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,  
Solaque, quæ possit facere & servare beatum.*

Not to admire, is of all means the best,  
The only means, to make, and keep us blest.

*Francis's Hor.*

† De Finib. V. 18.

sidering

sidering and enquiring into things; that though you beat them, they will persist in making further enquiry? Nay, how overjoyed they are with their little acquirements of knowledge? How delighted to communicate them to others; and how charmed with the sight of any solemnity, the public games, and shows of the like nature; insomuch, that on this account they will endure both hunger and thirst? Besides, do we not observe, that those who take pleasure in the liberal arts and sciences, are regardless of their health and domestic affairs; endure the greatest hardships for the sake of acquiring their beloved knowledge; and think themselves abundantly recompensed for all their vast labour and application, by the intellectual joys that spring from learning?

'Tis probable that *Homer* had something like this natural propensity in view, when he composed his fiction of the Sirens\*: for

\* The Sirens were a kind of fabulous beings, with the face of a woman, and the tail of a fish, according to *Ovid*; but others have deck'd them with a plumage of various colours. They are supposed to have been the three daughters of the river *Achelous*, and were called *Parthenope*, *Ligea*, and *Leucosia*. *Homer* makes mention only of two Sirens; but others reckon five. *Virgil* places them on rocks where vessels are in danger of splitting.

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it was not so much the melody of their voice, or the novelty and variety of their notes, as their pretensions to an extraordinary knowledge, which attracted and charmed those who sailed that way ; whose desire of learning kept them, as it were, fixed to the rocks. This is their invitation to *Ulysses* ; for among other passages of *Homer*, I translated the very place that mentions it.

*Thou ornament of Greece, Ulysses, stay!  
Why from our tuneful songs thus haste  
away?*

*None ever sail'd along this beach before,  
But with our music charm'd, made for  
the shore.*

*When stor'd with learning, homeward they  
proceed ;*

*And bless their friends with knowledge,  
they much need.*

*O stay! the Trojan war we fully know!  
Stay! We'll inform you of all things be-  
low!*

*Homer* was sensible, that if he had suffered his hero to have been detained by the charms

charms of music only, the fiction could not have passed; but they promise him knowledge, and 'twas no wonder that the desire of wisdom should get the better of that of his native country.

Now \* the ancient philosophers represent to us, what the life of wise-men will be in the islands † of the blessed, by supposing that they shall be freed from all anxious care; and having no occasion to make any kind of provision for their subsistence, shall spend their whole time in the delightful employment of studying and searching into the knowledge of nature.

Had || I not been fully persuaded, as well from the books I have read, as by the precepts I received in my youth from many great men, that nothing in human life is truly desirable but honour and virtue; and that neither bodily torture, nor

\* Ibid. cap. 19.

† Nothing can come up to the description *Muret* gives of these islands; not all the colours of painters, or figures of poets, are able to add the least improvement to it. *Var. Lect.* V. 1.

|| *Pro Archia*, cap. 6.

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the most formidable dangers, even those of death and banishment, ought to have any weight with us, when put in competition with the pursuit of them; I had never sustained so many and so great conflicts in defence of your safety, or have exposed myself to continual insults from the most profligate of mankind. But all the books, as well as discourses, of the sages, are full of such precepts; and antiquity lays before us innumerable examples to that purpose, which would have been all buried in darkness, had not the light of learning been called to their assistance. How many portraitures of great men have been drawn by the *Greek* and *Latin* writers, and transmitted down to us, not solely to feast our eyes, but to serve as patterns for our imitation? By keeping these always in view, during the whole of my administration of public affairs, I endeavoured to bring myself, both in courage and prudence, to a conformity with the sentiments of such illustrious men \*.

\* *Cicero* speaks here of what he had done with regard to *Catiline's* conspiracy, during his own consulship. The resolution he took to put the principal conspirators to death, was no less dan-

Should



Should any one ask me, What, were all these great men, whose virtues are celebrated in history, eminently skilled in the literature you so highly praise? It is a difficult matter to make this appear of them all. My answer, however, to the above question, is this; that I confess there have been many men of the greatest courage and virtue, who, by the natural force of their almost divine genius, and without the assistance of learning, have behaved themselves with moderation and gravity: nay, I will add too, that nature exclusive of learning is often more prevalent, than learning without the aid of nature, to excite mankind to the pursuit of virtue and honour. But this I steadily maintain, that where learning is superadded to a mind naturally endowed with great talents, there results from such a combination, I know not what surprizing excellence, and peculiar beauty of character. Of this number was that divine man

gerous to himself, than necessary for preserving the state. He acted the part of a politician, as well as in conformity to the dictates of the most refined virtue; and happy had it been for the *Romans*, had the like conduct of *Brutus* and *Cassius* been attended with the same success.

*Africanus,*

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*Africanus*\*, who adorned the days of our fathers; also *C. Lælius* and *M. Furius*, the perfect patterns of moderation and continency; with these likewise *M. Cato*† the elder is to be ranked, a man of true bravery, and, for the times in which he lived, well skill'd in every part of learning. Now it is a thing past all doubt, that these great men would never have applied themselves to the study of letters, had they found no assistance from them, as to the knowledge or practice of virtue.

But admitting that letters did not produce such advantage, and that pleasure was the only benefit arising from the study of them; it will notwithstanding be allowed, I suppose, to be an amusement of the noblest kind, and every way best suited to the nature of man. Other relaxations are peculiar to certain times, places, and stages of life; but the study of letters is the nourishment of our youth, and the joy

\* *Africanus* the second, son of *Paulus Æmilius*, is here meant. He was adopted by the son of the first *Scipio*, to whom the surname of *Africanus* had been given: we shall have occasion to speak of him hereafter.

† See *Cicero's* dialogue on old age.

of our old age ; they throw an additional lustre on prosperity, and are the resource and consolation of adversity ; they delight at home, and are no embarrassment to us when abroad ; in short, they are company to us at night, our fellow-travellers on a journey, and attendants in our rural recesses.

What \* then are the pleasures of a luxurious table, of games, shows, and sensuality, when compared with those resulting from the study of letters ? A study, that in men of sense and good education, still increases in charms with their years : whence that commendable saying of *Solon*, in a certain verse † of his, that in growing old he daily learned a great deal. Now this pleasure of the mind is one of the most refined enjoyments we are capable of.

In ‖ this no less natural, than truly com-

\* De Senect. cap. 14.

† *Plutarch*, in his life of *Solon*, has preserved this verse :

Γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ καινὰ διδασκόμενος.

Which may be rendered in *English* as follows,

*Life's eve I spend in learning what is new.*

‖ *Offic.* I. 6.

mendable,

mendable, disposition of mind, there are two inconveniencies to be avoided: one is\*, not to confound what we are ignorant of, with those things we know; or rashly build our opinion on such precarious principles. Whoever is desirous to escape this mistake, and certainly it is the duty of every man, will spare neither time, nor pains, in the study of truth. Another error is, when people spend too much study and labour upon subjects, not only obscure and intricate, but likewise unnecessary. Let us but keep free of these inconveniencies; and whatever diligence and application we bestow on things in them-

\* We shall here insert a short extract of the speech of M. d'Aguesseau, at the opening of the parliament of *Paris*, in 1704, who was then advocate-general, and is now chancellor of *France*; as being very pertinent to the subject here treated of. “To think  
 “ little, talk of every thing, doubt of nothing, use only the ex-  
 “ ternal parts of the soul, and cultivate the surface, as it were,  
 “ of the judgment; to be happy in expression, to have an agree-  
 “ able fancy, an easy and refined conversation, and to be able to  
 “ please without acquiring esteem; to be born with the equivocal  
 “ talent of a ready apprehension, and on that account to think  
 “ one’s self above reflexion; to fly from object to object without  
 “ gaining the perfect knowledge of any; to gather hastily all the  
 “ flowers, and never allow the fruit time to arrive at maturity:  
 “ All these put together form a faint picture of what the present  
 “ age has been pleased to honour with the name of wit.”

selfes

felves laudable, and worthy our knowledge, merits the highest commendation.

'Tis \*an excellent saying of *Plato*, that happy is the man, who, even in his old age, has the good fortune to attain the possession of wisdom, and sentiments agreeable to truth.

\* *De Finib. V. 21.*



## VI.

*On* PROBITY.

PROFIT\* and honesty sometimes appear to interfere with one another. But the case is otherwise ; for the rule of both is the same. Whoever is not fully convinced of this, must be an arrant knave and villain. By such a train of thought he will be led to say, *this indeed is equitable, but that advantageous*, by such a fatal mistake disjoining things in their own nature inseparable ; which is the source of all manner of treachery, injustice, and wickedness. A virtuous man, therefore, though possessed of a secret to get his name inserted into the last wills of people of fortune, so easily as with a knack of his fingers†, would never put it in practice

\* Offic. III. 18 & 19.

† A proverbial expression, that signifies, to do a thing with the greatest ease in the world, and which entirely depends on our own pleasure.

even though he certainly knew it could never be in the least suspected. A just man, or one who answers to our notion of a good man, will take nothing from another to be applied to his own use. Whoever is surprized at this assertion, tacitly confesses that he is ignorant of what constitutes the character of a good man. But would any one take the pains to revolve this complicated idea in his own breast, he will find that the good man is one, who does good to all he can, and hurts no body, unless first provoked by ill usage\*. What shall we say then? Is he not an injurious person, who, as it were by the power of some drug, has the address to disinherit the true heirs, in order to suc-

\* It would be an injustice to *Cicero*, to believe that he here approves of revenge. Nothing is more clearly established in the writings of the heathen philosophers, than the pardon of injuries. For a proof of this we need only look at *Plato's Criton* and *Gorgias*. And as for instances that their practice corresponded to their principles, they are innumerable. All that *Cicero* would say is, that the law of nature allows us to repel an unjust aggressor, provided that we keep within the bounds prescribed by the same law: with this exception, it is never allowable to offer an injury to any one, nor consequently to return one injury for another. It is a piece of praise full of flattery, which *Cicero* gave to *Cæsar*, when he said, *Oblivisci nihil soles, nisi injurias*, that is, you are wont to forget nothing but injuries.

cee, in their place? Shall a man then, some may object, forbear to pursue what is profitable and advantageous? I would have such a one know, that nothing unjust in itself can tend either to our advantage or profit. He that has not learnt this lesson, can have no pretension to the character of a good man.

There \* are often cases, wherein profit seems to clash with honesty; but then we should examine whether this supposition be real, or if both be consistent together. The following questions may serve as instances of this: whether, for example, a man of probity, who had brought a large quantity of grain from *Alexandria* † to *Rhodes*, at a time when the *Rhodians* laboured under great scarcity, and an excessive dearth of provisions; but who knew that a great many merchants had sailed from *Alexandria*, and had likewise

\* Offic. III. 12.

† *Alexandria* was a town built by *Alexander* the Great, on the banks of the *Nile*. The distance from which to *Rhodes*, a famous island in the Mediterranean, is about an hundred and forty leagues.



seen several ships laden with grain, all bound for *Rhodes*; whether, I say, he would inform the *Rhodians* of what he knew, or, by keeping silence, sell his own at as high a price as he could?

We put the case that he is a wise and virtuous man, who would conceal nothing from them, if he thought such a conduct inconsistent with virtue; but being uncertain whether it be so or not, it is required what the result of his deliberation on such a conjuncture would be.

In questions of this nature, *Diogenes* \* the *Babylonian*, a Stoic of the first class, is of different sentiments from those of his disciple *Antipater*, a man of very bright parts. This last thinks every thing should be discovered, and not the least circumstance concealed from the buyer that the seller knows. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, is of opinion, that the seller ought to declare the imperfections of his commodities, only so far as the civil law ordains;

\* Several philosophers have bore this name. The most famous of whom is *Diogenes* the Cynic, a native of *Sinopsis*. The person meant here was one of the three deputies whom the *Athenians* sent to *Rome*, in the consulship of *Scipio* and *Marcellus*, as we learn in *Cicero's Lucullus*, chap. 45.

and to act in other respects without fraud ; but as selling is his business, he may endeavour to do it on the most profitable terms he can. I have, says he, imported my corn, set it to sale, and here I sell it for no more than others ; nay, perhaps for less, because there is greater plenty of the commodity. Where is the injustice of all this ?

*Antipater*, on the contrary, makes answer thus : What, though it be your duty to consult the welfare of mankind, though you are born to promote the interest of society, and, notwithstanding the very instincts of nature, the direction of which ought constantly to be followed, teach you that your private advantage and that of the public should mutually promote each other ; ought you then to conceal from these men, what plentiful supplies of provisions are coming ?

*Diogenes*, perhaps, will answer to this effect ; that there is a wide difference between concealing a thing, and being silent on it. Nor can I be said to conceal any thing from you, though I don't inform you concerning the nature of the Gods, or  
what

what will be the end of good men ; which it much more concerns you to know, than the small advantage\* arising from the wheat : but the truth is, I am not obliged to tell you every thing, that it might be for your profit to hear. Yes truly, replies *Antipater*, you are certainly obliged to do it : this you must allow, would you but reflect that all mankind are by nature united in one society. I acknowledge it, answers *Diogenes* ; but is the nature of this society such, that no man can have any property of his own ? If this be the case, nothing ought to be sold, but rather given by way of present.

Again †, suppose an honest man was to dispose of his house, for some inconveniences known only to himself : every body thinks it is sound, though it be really infected by the plague : no body knows that all the rooms in the house are infested with

\* All the editions have *Utilitas*, which, being generally received, I would not take upon me to alter. But I am fully convinced that *Vilitas*, a correction proposed in the Dauphin's *Cicero*, is what we ought to read. Very little logic will show the justness, or rather the necessity of this correction.

† Offic. III. 31.

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serpents : the materials are worth nothing, and the whole fabric in a ruinous condition : all this, however, is known to none but the master himself. Now should this man, without acquainting his purchasers with the bad state of the house, sell it for much more than he expected ; I would gladly know, whether this action of his be consistent with justice and honesty, or not ?

He certainly acts a dishonest part, answers *Antipater*, for to suffer the purchaser to fall into a mistake, that will be of the highest prejudice to him ; is not this the very same with not showing the right road to one that has lost his way ; a crime which the *Athenians* punished with public execrations\* ? Nay, it is more than not showing the way, it is a wilful and deliberate design to deceive our neighbour. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, replies : Did

\* 'Tis not certainly known what the *Athenian public execrations* were. But, in general, it is evident that there were certain edicts read, or fixed up, in a public manner ; the observance of which was enforced under the severest penalties. As to the present question, it is a shame that men should need to be put in mind of so plain a duty : and this precaution of the *Athenian* magistrates lets us see, how extensive the humanity of this polite people was.

he force you to buy, who did not so much as advise you to it? He only exposed to sale what did not please him, and you bought what was agreeable to you. Now if those who post up a bill to this effect, "*A house to be sold, well-built, and in good repair,*" shall not be esteemed guilty of any fraud, though the condition of the house be quite the reverse of this character; much less should those be censured, who say nothing in commendation of it; because where the buyer is at liberty to judge for himself, what room can there be for the seller to impose on him? If we are not obliged to make good every thing we say, how can you imagine we ought to perform what we never said? Can any thing be more ridiculous, than for a merchant to decry his own commodities? Or can any thing be imagined more absurd, than for a public cryer, by the owner's command, to make proclamation to this effect, "*An infected house to sell?*"

We come now to the decision of these cases: for it was not our intention to narrate them, by way of proposed difficulties, but in order to resolve them. In a

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word then, 'tis my opinion, \* that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed from the *Rhodians*, nor the feller of the house from his purchasers, what each of them knew. To be merely silent on a thing, cannot indeed be called a wicked concealment of it; for this only takes place, when for the sake of private advantage you designedly conceal what you know from others, whose interest it concerns, that they should be informed of it.

But † if those are blameable who are guilty of a design'd concealment, what shall we think of them who likewise use false commendations?

\* *Grotius, de jure belli & pacis*, l. 2. c. 12. differs from the decision of *Cicero* concerning the corn-merchant. Indeed, says he, the merchant would have done a very commendable thing, if he had discovered all he knew: and in some cases one cannot, without breach of charity, avoid doing so. But there is no necessity, adds *Grotius*, to lay down for a general maxim, as *Cicero* does, that silence is always blameable, when for some private advantage we conceal a thing from those who are interested to know it. This can only happen in certain respects and circumstances, which are necessarily connected with the thing in question. The whole difference then between these two casuists is, that *Grotius* ascribes to charity what *Cicero* attributes to justice. As for my part, I willingly pardon *Cicero*, for having almost confounded these two virtues with one another.

† *Offic.* III. 14.

*C. Canius,*

*C. Canius*, a Roman knight, who wanted neither wit nor learning, having gone to *Syracuse*, not, as he himself used to express it, on account of business, but for retirement, gave out that he wanted to buy some gardens, where he might enjoy himself and the company of his friends, without being interrupted by intruding visitants. When this came to be publickly known, one *Pythius*, a banker of that town, told *Canius* that he had certain gardens, which he did not indeed care absolutely to dispose of, but that *Canius* was very welcome to use them as if they were his own; and at the same time invited him to sup with him in the gardens next day: to which *Canius* having consented, *Pythius* immediately sends for the fishermen; for by virtue of his business he had a great deal to say with all ranks of people: on these he prevails to fish next day before his gardens, and gives them proper instructions how to behave. At the time appointed, *Canius* comes to supper; an elegant entertainment is provided by *Pythius*; and a multitude of fishing-boats made a fine prospect. Every one strives which

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shall be most diligent in bringing their draught, and throwing what fish they had caught at *Pythius's* feet. Hey! says *Caninus*, what is the meaning of this? Whence such numbers of boats, and all this fish? To which *Pythius* replies, Does this cause your surprize? All the fish in *Syracuse* are caught here; 'tis from this place they have all their water; and as for these fishermen, they could not live without it. On this *Caninus*, being mighty desirous to make the purchase, begs of *Pythius* to sell him the gardens. At first he appears very unwilling, but, in short, condescends to it. *Caninus*, being fond of his bargain, and likewise a man of substance, buys them ready furnish'd, and gives him his own price: in short, the writings are drawn, and the whole affair concluded. He invites his friends against next day; but coming rather before the time, and seeing not so much as a single boat, he asks one of his neighbours, whether it was a holiday with the fishermen, because none of them were to be seen? None that I know of, replies the other: but the truth is, they never used to fish here; which  
made



made me the more surpris'd at what happen'd yesterday. *Canius* is vex'd, but what can he help himself? For my friend and colleague, *Aquilius*, had not then published his *formulas* concerning fraud; in which he 'makes answer to one asking a definition of it, *that it was to pretend one thing, and act another*. And, indeed, this is a very clear description, and such as might be expected from a man of his learning. Whence it follows, that *Pythius*, and all who do one thing and pretend another, are without honour, faith, or probity.

Revolve \* and carefully examine your understanding, in order to see what notion, idea, or representation of a good man you find there. Is it consistent with the character of such a person, to lye for his own advantage; to calumniate, supplant, and cheat? Certainly by no means. Is there any thing then so valuable, or any profit so desirable, as to make amends for the loss of honour and reputation in a

\* Offic. III. 20.

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man of probity? Can that which we call profit, if it robs us of honour, justice, and the character of a good man, give us any thing so valuable in their stead? For where, pray, is the difference whether one be actually transformed from a man into a brute; or if, under the external figure of a man, he carry with him all the ferocity of the brute?

It \* is an easy matter to resolve cases of profit and loss. But should one's life be in danger, so that it was absolutely necessary, either to take the advantage of another, or to perish himself; how ought he to behave? The supposition is possible, as in a shipwreck, should one find a weak person sitting on a plank; or in the rout of an army, should he come up with one of the wounded on horseback: would this man, in order to save himself, turn the one off the plank, or pull the other from his horse? Was justice the rule of his conduct, he certainly would do neither†.

\* *Fragm. lib. de Rep. III.*

† Some will think *Cicero* very scrupulous. But let us here remember the fundamental maxim, the *GOLDEN RULE*, of all

*M. Attilius Regulus*,\* in his second consulship, being surprized and taken prisoner in *Africa* by *Xantippus* the *Lacedæmonian* general, was sent to the senate; after having first taken an oath to return to *Carthage*, unless certain prisoners of noble extract were restored to the *Carthaginians*. On his arrival at *Rome*, an appearance of advantage presented itself to his view; which, as appears from the event, he judged entirely void of reality. The advantage was this, to remain in his native country, to stay at home with his wife and children, and, by regarding his misfortune as the common chance of war, to retain the rank of the consular dignity: and will any one deny that these are profitable? But what shall we say? True fortitude and greatness of soul deny it. Now what greater authority would you require? For it is the peculiar property of these two

morality, that forbids to do to others, what we would not have them do to us. *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*. And sure this is enough to support *Cicero's* decision; at least, if people would not, by groundless subtilties, make justice and charity to be essentially different from each other.

\* *Offic. III.* 26, & 27.

virtues, to fear nothing, to look down on all human enjoyments, and to think nothing intolerable that can possibly befall a man. How then did he behave himself? He came into the senate, laid before them his commission, but refused to give his sentiments, as having no title to the character of a senator, while he continued under the sacred obligation of an oath to the enemy; and (though some will certainly call him fool, thus to oppose his own interest!) declared that it was not for the good of the state to restore the prisoners; for that they were excellent officers, and in the flower of their age; whereas he himself was worn out with years. In short, his authority prevailed, the prisoners were detained, and he returned to *Carthage*: neither the affection he bore his native country, nor that of his family and friends, being able to hinder him; and notwithstanding he was sensible, that he was going to put himself into the hands of the cruellest of enemies, and to suffer the most exquisite tortures: but to balance all this, he was persuaded that the obligation of an oath ought to be kept

kept inviolable. Wherefore even then, when undergoing the most tormenting of all deaths\*, his hard fate was more tolerable, than if he had grown old in his own house, cover'd with the shame of having sullied his consular dignity by captivity and perjury.

Although † king *Pyrrhus* had made war on the *Romans* without any provocation, and though the dispute with this magnanimous and powerful king was for no less a prize than empire itself; yet when a deserter from him came into *Fabricius's*

\* In the original it is *vigilando necabatur*, which was very intelligible to those of *Cicero's* time, who knew in what manner *Regulus* had ended his days. *M. Rollin's* account of it, taken from his history of the *Carthaginians*, is as follows:

“ They (the *Carthaginians*) kept him a long time shut up in  
 “ a dark dungeon, whence, having first cut off his eye-lids,  
 “ they dragg'd him, in order to be expos'd to the brightest and  
 “ hottest sun-shine. They next shut him up in a kind of chest,  
 “ all beset with sharp-pointed nails, that allowed him not one  
 “ moment's rest either day or night. At last, after having long  
 “ tormented him with cruel watching, they dispatched him by  
 “ crucifixion; which was an ordinary death among the *Cartha-*  
 “ *ginians*.”

I quote *M. Rollin* preferably to the ancients, from whom he has taken this account, only to have an opportunity to recommend the reading of his works. None have wrote for the benefit of youth, either with better intention, or with greater success.

† *Offic.* III. 22.

camp,

camp, and promised, if he would give him a reward, to return secretly into *Pyrrhus's* camp in the same manner he had come, and dispatch the king by poison, *Fabricius* ordered him to be carried back to *Pyrrhus*; which action of his had the approbation of the senate. But if we regard only what has the appearance of advantage, and what commonly passes for such; this one deserter might have put an end to a very dangerous war, and taken off a very formidable rival for empire: but as the contest was for glory, it would have been a lasting infamy and reproach to have got the better of him, not by valour, but by vile treachery.

I would \* ask what can be the meaning

\* *Tuscul. V. 17. Critolaus* was a Peripatetic philosopher.

To the above account of probity from *Cicero*, I beg leave to subjoin the following beautiful passage of *Musonius*, which, for its excellence, may be called the GOLDEN MAXIM. "Αν τὸ πρᾶξις καλὸν μετὰ πόνου, ὁ μὲν πόνος ὀίχεται, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μένει. Ἄν τὸ πονήσης ἀισχυρὸν μείλ' ἡδονῆς, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ὀίχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀισχυρὸν μένει. *Si quid pulchri feceris cum labore; labor quidem abit, sed pulchrum manet: sin turpe quid feceris cum voluptate; voluptas abit, at turpe manet.* In *English* thus: "Allowing the performance of an honourable action  
" to be attended with labour; the labour is soon over, but the

of the famous balance of *Critolaus*; who is of opinion, that if the goods of the mind be cast into one scale, and those of the body, with all external advantages, into the other, nay though the whole earth and seas were added to the latter, yet the former would preponderate.

“ honour immortal: whereas, should even pleasure wait on the  
‘ commission of what is dishonourable; the pleasure is soon  
“ gone, but the dishonour eternal.”



## VII.

*On* ELOQUENCE.

THERE \* is nothing, I think, more truly excellent, than for a man to be able to attract, by his eloquence, the attention of a whole assembly; to charm their understandings; and to direct, or restrain, their inclinations at pleasure. This single art hath always, among free people, and especially in times of public peace and tranquillity, not only met with the highest encouragement, but reigned, as it were, paramount. Now is there any thing so deserving our admiration, as that amidst an infinite number of men, there should be found only one, or at least but few, who are able to exercise those talents, which nature has bestowed on all? Or, can any thing convey so sincere a pleasure to our understanding or ear, as a discourse, which, to the wisest sentiments, adds the

\* De Orat. I. 8.



lustre and embellishment of expression? What greatness, what power, can compare with his, who, by a single speech, can direct the caprices of the people, the consciences of judges, and even the majestic gravity of the senate? Besides, can any thing be more generous, more like a king, or more truly denote a great soul, than to lend assistance to those who desire it, relieve the oppressed, communicate happiness, protect from dangers, and preserve citizens from exile? What, on the other hand, so necessary, as to have arms always about us to annoy the malefactor, protect us from being insulted, and avenge ourselves when we are injured?

But not to dwell on the forum\*, the bar, the rostrum, and the senate; what is more agreeable to human nature, or so delightful an amusement in our recesses from business, as the graceful sprightliness of polite conversation? In this consists our characteristic preheminance over the rest of

\* *Forum* was the place where the Prætors distributed justice; *Subsellia*, the benches, or seats, where the judges sat; *Rostra*, the tribunals, whence they harangued the people; and *Curia* the place where the senate assembled.

the animal world, that we converse together; and, by language, are able to express our latent ideas. Wherefore, to endeavour to excel other men in that very thing whence they derive their superiority over brutes; who would not be charmed with the thought, and think no pains too much, in order to attain the dear accomplishment?

But let us come to the principal advantage of eloquence. What power, but hers, could have collected the scattered individuals of mankind, or have made them change their savage and wild manner of living, for the polished and civilized life of society? For\* there was a time, when men, like so many wild beasts, wandered up and down in the fields, and supported themselves with the same food that these did: nor had reason and contrivance any part in their actions, as being almost wholly performed by main strength of body. In those days, neither the study of divine religion, nor that of moral duties, was cultivated: legal marriages were not heard

\* De Invent. I. 2.

of: none could be sure which were their own children: nor had they learned the many advantages resulting from the law of equity. Whence the passions, by reason of ignorance and error, maintained a blind and tyrannic sway, abusing the powers of the body, those dangerous partizans, for their own purposes. In this period, some great man of superior penetration discovered, that the human mind was possessed of talents sufficient for executing the greatest enterprize, could any one find a method to set them on work, or improve them by instruction. In order to this, he, by some contrivance, convened and brought mankind together; who had been dispersed in the fields, or lurking in the wild recesses of the forest. Upon his endeavouring to make them sensible of whatever was useful or honourable, they at first proved refractory, as being unaccustomed to such truths; afterwards, moved by reason and eloquence, they heard with greater attention; till at last, from fierce and savage monsters, he brought them to be gentle and good-natured.

And,

And, indeed, it appears evident to me, that without the aid of eloquence, it was not in the power of wisdom itself to induce men to change, all of a sudden, their manner of life, for what was just the reverse of it. Nay, even when cities were built, what but the powerful persuasion of eloquence could enforce the dictates of reason, establish the observance of good faith, maintain justice, bring mankind to pay a willing obedience to their magistrates, and persuade them that it was their duty to spare no labour, and even to lay down their life, for the public good? Certainly no man of great power, if not prevailed on by some elegant and convincing speech, would condescend to submit his affairs to the determination of law, without being compelled to it; would put himself on an equal footing with those over whom it was easy to keep up his superiority; or willingly recede from a custom, of all others the most delightful; especially, since by reason of its long continuance, it had acquired a force equal to that of nature itself.

It is \* said that orators, like poets, are of different kinds. But the case is otherwise; for of these last there are several sorts, distinct from each other, as the Tragic, Comic, Epic, and Lyric. Whence in tragedy, the least mixture of the comic is insufferable; and 'tis no less blameable to mix any thing tragic with comedy: and so in the rest, each has its proper tone, which is easily distinguished by people of taste. But should any person thus enumerate different kinds of orators, as the sublime, the grave, and the copious; the low, the subtle, and the concise; or imagine others holding a middle rank between these: all this he may affirm of orators, but not of the art itself†. For with re-

\* Ibid. cap. 21.

† Aristotle defines rhetoric, or the art of oratory, to be the faculty of discovering, on every occasion, what is proper to persuade. It consists of four parts, 1. *Invention*, called by the Greeks *Ευρεσις*, is the finding out, or selecting, such arguments as are most conducive to prove the question in hand, or work upon the auditory. 2. *Disposition*, in Greek *Τάξις* or *ὀργανομεία*, is the marshalling, or properly disposing the several parts of a discourse; by which means, the things proposed are heard with greater attention, better understood, and longer remembered. These parts are commonly reckoned four, the *Exordium*, the *Narration*, the *Confirmation*, and the *Peroration* or conclusion. 3. *Elocution*, called by  
gard

gard to the latter, we look for it in its utmost perfection; but with respect to orators, we declare what they really are.

He \* is the most compleat orator, who instructs, delights, and sensibly touches the hearts of his auditory. To instruct is indispensable; to delight, desirable; and to touch, necessary. It must be confessed that some perform these better than others; but then this inequality consists not in the kind, but degree. Every orator, therefore, is reputed good, bad, or indifferent, in proportion as these qualifications unite in him: yet all are called by the name of orators, as painters, however bad, are still called painters. 'Tis by different abilities, and not by different arts, they are distinguished from one another. None therefore can deserve the name of orator, who has not the ambition to vie even with *Demosthenes*.

the *Greeks* *Λέξις* or *Ἑμπνεΐα*, is the using such terms and expressions as are suitable to the subject to be discussed; and differs nothing from propriety of diction. 4. *Pronunciation*, call'd in *Greek* *ὑπόκρισις*, is the regulating and adapting the voice and gesture agreeably to the matter. It is otherwise call'd *Actio*. See *Vossii Rhetorica*.

\* De opt. gen. orat. cap. 1.

*Menander*

*Menander* \*, on the contrary, would not aspire to the perfection of *Homer* for this reason, because he employed himself in a quite different kind of poetry. But this takes no place with respect to orators; or allowing that one should use a strong pathetic stile, free from obscure subtilties; another delight more in argument and witticisms, than purity and beauty of expression: yet such peculiarities, though they may be found in an indifferent orator, cannot certainly enter the character of a compleat one, in whom all good qualities must unite.

Upon † a review of the greatest and most able men, it has often indeed appeared a question with me, why fewer have distinguished themselves for eloquence, than in any other art. Turn your attention which way you please, you will find many who have excelled, not only in inferior arts, but in those too of the greatest consequence. Now what person, if he

\* *Menander*, the *Athenian*, wrote nothing but comedies, at which he excelled.

† *De Orat.* I. 2, 3, 4, 5.

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estimates the abilities of great men by their extensive usefulness, but would prefer the general to the orator? And yet who will call in question, that in this one city we have had almost innumerable instances of great and excellent generals; while scarce any can be mentioned that have excelled in oratory? There have been many in our days, and more in the time of our fathers and ancestors, who, by their prudence and wisdom, were well qualified to govern the state: whereas for many ages\*, there were none at all that could be called great orators; and indeed, it would be difficult to instance a tolerable one for every age.

Now that none may think the comparison unfair, between eloquence and the renown of a general, or the prudence of a good senator; and that eloquence ought rather to be compared with those studies which have some connection with the sciences, and other branches of literature;

\* *Cicero*, in his book *de claris oratoribus*, chap. 15. goes no farther back than *Cethegus*, who was consul in the year of Rome 550.



let us take a view of these very sciences, and observe what great numbers of eminent men have flourished in each of them, and then we shall be able to judge how inconsiderable the number of orators has been in former times, or is at present.

You are not ignorant, that what the *Greeks* call philosophy, is esteemed by men of the greatest learning to be, as it were, the parent and mother of all the liberal arts: and yet it is a difficult matter to enumerate, how many of its professors have been remarkable for their great learning, and the variety and copiousness of their studies; who have not confined their researches to one single branch of knowledge, but by an indefatigable application to study, and the sound deductions of reason, have extended their views to every thing. None, sure, is ignorant, how abstruse, intricate, subtle, and perplexing, the study of mathematics is; and yet so many have been eminent for their knowledge in this science, that it should seem, no man ever heartily applied himself to attain it, who did not gain what he proposed. Who ever set himself se-

riously to study music, or those branches of literature called grammar \*, and did not acquire a thorough knowledge of the almost infinite number of things, whereof these arts consist?

This, I think, I may truly affirm; that there have been fewer who have excelled in poetry, than in any other science within the whole compass of liberal arts. But however scanty the number of good poets is, yet if you carefully reckon up those that *Greece* and *Rome* have produced, you will find them far more numerous than the good orators.

What makes this appear still more extraordinary is, that the knowledge of the other sciences is deduced, for the most part, from abstruse, and not commonly known, principles; whereas eloquence lies open to the views of every body, and employs only such reasons and expressions as are made use of in common life. In other arts, what is most raised above the

\* By the word *Grammarians*, the ancients understood a learned man; or one who was perfectly well skilled in all those branches of literature, that, among the *French*, go by the general name of *Belles Lettres*.

comprehension and understanding of the ignorant, is esteemed most excellent; but in oratory, it is a fault of the highest kind, to depart from the usual forms of speech, or the received maxims of common sense\*.

Now it cannot be said, with any appearance of truth, that more people apply themselves to the cultivation of the other sciences, or that they are encouraged in the pursuit of them by more exalted pleasures, greater hopes, or more ample rewards. For not to mention *Greece*, which has always been desirous to excel other nations in point of eloquence; or *Athens*, that parent of all learning, where the art of oratory was first practised and brought

\* Mr. Locke, *Essay on Hum. Understand* B. III. chap. 10. Sect. 34, passes a severe judgment on the whole art of oratory, as founded on the very fault here condemned. Would we speak of things as they are, says he, we must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.

to perfection ; certainly no study ever flourished so much in this city, as that of eloquence. For after an universal empire was obtained, and the continuance of peace had afforded leisure, every youth, who was any wise ambitious of glory, thought no pains too much, in order to acquire the art of speaking. At first, indeed, being wholly ignorant of method, unacquainted with the great advantage of exercise, and not imagining there were any rules belonging to this art ; the progress they made in it, was entirely owing to the strength of their own genius and reason. But how soon they had heard the *Greek* orators, read their books, and taken masters to instruct them, 'tis incredible with what vehemence our countrymen thirsted after eloquence. The importance, the variety, and great number of causes afforded every man an opportunity of adding frequent practice, which far exceeds all masters, to what he had learned by study. Besides, the greatest rewards, as public favour, riches, and honour, were then, as well as at present, annexed to this profession. And as to genius, it is evident from many considerations,

siderations, that the *Romans* were much superior in this respect to all other nations.

All this being taken into the account, is there not great reason to admire, that the number of orators have at all times and places of the world been so very few? But in truth, the art of oratory is more noble, and requires the knowledge of more arts and sciences, than is commonly imagined. For what other reason, but the greatness and difficulty of the undertaking, can be assigned, why in such vast numbers of students, endowed with excellent natural parts, so few succeed; though there be no want of able masters, an infinite variety of causes, and the greatest rewards annexed to the attainment?

To form an orator then, besides an extensive knowledge, without which the easiest flow of language will appear trifling and ridiculous; I say, besides this, the stile must likewise be embellished by the justest arrangement, as well as choice of words; a perfect knowledge of all the affections\*, which nature has bestowed on

\* Affections are either public or private, benevolent or selfish; the former are excited by shewing, that the thing in question has a manifest tendency to promote the happiness of others; and the

mankind, is also necessary; because the whole power of eloquence ought to be exerted, in order to calm and rouse the minds of the auditory. To this must be added, a certain gracefulness, an enlivening raillery, a gentleman-like learning, and a ready talent for repartee, and attacking an adversary in a delicate and polite manner. One must likewise be acquainted with antiquity, and have a great many examples to produce: nor is the study of laws and jurisprudence to be neglected. What occasion for me to enlarge on action itself, which must be regulated by the motion of the body, the gesture, the countenance, with a due command, and suitable changes, of voice\*? The great difficulty of this

latter, by proving that an object or event would occasion the greatest quantity of pleasure to the individual. The exciting truths about means, would be only those which pointed out some means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with less pain or trouble to the agent. See *Hutcheson* on the Passions, p. 224.

\* *Horace*, in his *Art of poetry*, v. 101. & seq. observes what surprizing influence this has on an auditory.

With those who laugh, our social joy appears;  
 With those who mourn, we sympathize in tears:  
 If you would have me weep, begin the strain;  
 Then I shall feel your sorrows, feel your pain.

*Francis's Hor.*  
 alone,

alone, plainly appears from the frivolous art of comedians, and representations on the stage; where, though every one strives to regulate his countenance, voice, and gestures in a becoming manner; yet who is ignorant, how few there are, or have been, whom we can behold with patience? Need I to mention memory, that treasury of all knowledge; to whose keeping unless the inventions, reflections, and expressions of the orator are committed, they must, however excellent in themselves, be infallibly lost?

Wherefore, since eloquence consists of all these accomplishments put together, the study of each whereof singly is a matter of the greatest difficulty; let us cease to wonder, why good orators are so few in number.

## VIII.

*On* FRIENDSHIP.

**I**F we except Wisdom, I know not if the immortal Gods have bestowed so excellent a gift on mankind, as Friendship. Some give the preference to riches, some to health, some to power, others to honours, and not a few to pleasures. This last, indeed, constitutes the happiness of brutes; and even the former are frail and uncertain, depending, not so much on our prudence, as on the caprice of fortune.

Those, on the other hand, who place their chief happiness in virtue, act an excellent part: but then this virtue begets and maintains friendship, which, without it, could by no means subsist.

We take virtue in the meaning put upon it in common life, and our own language; nor, with some learned men\*, do we measure it by superb epithets: we like-

\* The Stoics. For the idea they give of their wise men, see page 59.



wife look upon those as good men, who are commonly esteemed such; as the *Paulus's*, the *Cato's*, the *Gallus's*, the *Scipio's*, the *Philus's*. Greater models of virtue than these are not required in common life: whence we make no mention of characters, that are no where to be found.

Now the advantages arising from friendship among men of this cast, are greater than I can well express. And first, who can have any relish for life\*, as *Ennius* expresses it, that cannot repose himself on the mutual benevolence of a friend? What pleasure so exquisite, as to have one you can talk with as freely as with yourself? Where would be the boasted advantages of prosperity, had we not a friend to share it with us? And as for adversity, it would be almost insupportable, without one to ease us of the greater part of the grief attending our misfortune.

In short, every other object of man's desire is useful only for some particular purpose; riches, to be used; power, to command respect; honours, to be the sub-

\* The expression of *Ennius* is, *vita vitalis*, which cannot be rendered literally in *French*, or *English*.

ject of applause; pleasures, to be enjoyed; health, to be free from pain, and in condition to discharge such duties as depend on the body.<sup>1</sup> But as for friendship, its advantages are innumerable; which way soever you turn, it is present; it is admitted every where, is never unseasonable, never troublesome. Whence, as the saying is, we can no more be without friendship, than without water and fire.

I am not now speaking of common and ordinary friendship, though that too has its pleasure and use; but of that which is real and perfect, such as existed between those few great men mentioned above. For it not only adds new charms to prosperity, but, by communicating and sharing it, renders even adversity itself less intolerable. Now among the many and great advantages of friendship, I take this to be the most essential, that it gives us good hopes of what is to come, and suffers not our minds to be dejected, much less to succumb under afflictions\*.

\* *Cicero* had experience of this, during his banishment, from *Atticus*: whence it is plain, that his design here was to testify his remembrance and gratitude, by dedicating a dialogue on friendship to him.

Besides,

Besides, he that takes a view of a friend, beholds, as it were, the perfect resemblance of himself. So that absence cannot separate, want impoverish, sickness weaken, or, what is still more astonishing, death put an end to their life. So constant is the remembrance, so sincere the affection, and so elevated the esteem which are entertained for the deceased by their surviving friends, that the death of the former seems a happiness, and the life of the latter a merit.

In my frequent meditations on friendship, there is one thing appears chiefly to deserve consideration; and that is, whether it be courted merely to supply the weakness and wants of mankind; that, by a mutual exchange of good offices, every one may receive from his friend, what is wanting in himself; and make up, in his turn, the defects of his friend? Or, allowing this to be, indeed, a property of friendship, whether it has no other cause, that is more ancient, more refined, and nearer allied to nature itself?

'Tis love (whence, in *Latin*, the word friendship is derived) that chiefly conciliates benevolence. Favours, indeed, may be obtained even of those for whom friendship is only pretended, and who are courted merely to serve a present interest. But in true friendship, there can be no imposition, or deceit: whatever makes a part of it, must be sincere, and from the heart. On this account, therefore, friendship appears to me, to be derived rather from nature, than the indigence of mankind; and to be owing rather to the benevolent affections of our mind, than to any consideration of the great utility attending it.

As to the nature of this sensation, we may observe a resemblance of it even in some beasts; which love their offspring, and are beloved by them, with so sincere a regard, for some time at least, that it manifestly appears to be the dictate of nature. This instinct is still more visible in man. As first, from the strong affection which subsists between children and their parents; that cannot be dissolved, without incurring the guilt of the most odious  
of

of all crimes\*. Again, when we meet with one whose nature and manners tally exactly with our own, we are affected with a similar sensation of benevolence towards him ; because in such a one we seem to discover the bright effluence, as it were, of virtue and goodness. For there is nothing more amiable than virtue, or a stronger incitement to love : inasmuch that on account of their virtue and probity, we in a manner love those whom we never saw. Who is there but has a peculiar respect and veneration for the memory of *C. Fabricius* †, and *M. Curius* ‥ ; though he never had any personal know-

\* However general a truth this may be, there are particular exceptions to it, as in the case of *Abraham*'s designing to sacrifice his son *Isaac* ; and that of *Brutus*, the first consul of *Rome* ; who, when his two sons had engaged in a conspiracy to restore the *Tarquins*, ordered them both to be beheaded. But then private ties of blood are of no force to supersede the divine command, in the former case ; nor to cancel a crime against the commonwealth, in the latter.

† We have mentioned *Fabricius*, and *Pyrrhus* king of *Epirus*, already. See p. 87.

‡ *M. Curius Dentatus* is equally famous for his frugality, valour, and victories. 'Tis of him *Juvenal* speaks, in the well-known verse against hypocrites,

*Qui Curios simulant, & Bacchanalia vicant.*  
At distance, they like *Curius* appear ;  
But are true Bacchanals, when you come near.

ledge

ledge of them? And who, on the contrary, but detests *Tarquin the Proud*, *Sp. Cassius*\*, and *Sp. Mælius*†? There have been two generals, *Pyrrhus* and *Annibal*, who contended with us for empire in the heart of *Italy*: one of these, by reason of his generosity, was never greatly the object of our aversion; whereas the cruelty of the other has rendered him obnoxious to the constant abhorrence of this state. Now if the power of virtue is so very great, that we love it even in those whom we never saw; or, what is still more, in one who is our professed enemy; is it any wonder, that the affections of mankind are strongly wrought on, when virtue and goodness are discovered in those, with whom a social intercourse may be enjoyed?

True affection, however, is much confirmed by good offices, by marks of e-

\* *Sp. Cassius Viscellinus*, after having been three times consul, and twice honoured with a triumph, was impeached for aspiring to be king: in consequence of which, he was thrown headlong from the *Tarpeian* rock, in the year of *Rome* 270.

† *Sp. Mælius*, accused likewise of aspiring to be king, was killed by *Servilius Abala*, general of the horse, in the year of *Rome* 315.

esteem, and intimate acquaintance; and if these concur with inclination, that first movement of the heart, there results, from such a conjunction, a height of benevolence not to be expressed. Should any one imagine, that all this is the effect of the natural weakness of mankind, in order to supply their mutual wants and indigence; this would be to debase friendship, and to assign its origin to a principle, which, I may venture to say, is far from being generous. If this was the case, he who is most sensible of his own imperfections, would be best qualified for friendship; but, in fact, 'tis quite the reverse: for in proportion as every man is confident of his own ability, and has such a stock of virtue and wisdom, with every other necessary qualification, within himself, as to need no foreign assistance; so much keener will his desires be for friendship, and his care the greater in cultivating it. Did *Africanus*\* stand in any need of me? By no means. Nor, indeed, had I any occasion for his aid. However, being charmed

\* *Lælius* says this of *Scipio Africanus*, who has been mentioned above. See p. 68.

with his virtues, I loved him ; and he, on the other hand, had an affection for me, occasioned, perhaps, by the good opinion he had conceived of my manners. Our mutual benevolence increased as we became better acquainted. Now though many and great advantages resulted from our friendship, yet certainly it was not the prospect of them that gave rise to it.

For as we do acts of kindness and generosity, not with any prospect to have a return, such a conduct being inconsistent with the nature of a favour, but from our natural propensity to beneficence ; in the same manner, friendship, in my opinion, ought not to be cultivated for mercenary views ; but because the cordial affection whereon it is founded, is, of itself, advantage enough. We are of quite different sentiments from those who refer every thing to pleasure\* : and no wonder,

\* The Epicurean doctrine, which makes the happiness of mankind to consist in pleasure, has been greatly mistaken by ancient and modern philosophers : and the reason is, because they have given the name of happiness, not to the thing itself, but to its efficient cause. Hence as the fancy took them, they placed it in riches, knowledge, honour, reputation, virtue, &c. *Epicurus*, on the other hand, considers the formal cause of happiness, or the state of one who is actually happy. He examines wherein the



for they whose thoughts are wholly taken up with so groveling and contemptible an object, can never have any taste for what is sublime, excellent, and divine. Therefore let us make no further mention of them. But as to ourselves, it is fit we should know, that the endearing affections of love and benevolence naturally arise from a discovery of virtue. Those who are affected in this way, draw near, and unite themselves, in order to enjoy the company and social virtues of the person beloved; they aim at an equality of friendship; and are more solicitous to do good offices, than about a return. Whence arises a laudable emulation between them. Thus the advantages of friendship will be very considerable; and its origin, deduced from nature, not only more agreeable to truth, but likewise more solid and durable, than that from the indigence of man-

thing itself consists; and finds it to be in the sensation of pleasure, or the sentiment of a mind that is pleased, satisfied, and contented. It cannot be hence inferred, that *Epicurus* made human happiness to consist in good cheer, or sensuality; for these are only efficient causes, and consequently foreign to his enquiry. Mr. *Bayle* thinks such a method of considering happiness the most exact and philosophical of all others. See his *Dict. Hist. Crit.* article *EPICURUS*, Remark (H).

kind:

kind: for was interest the only bond of friendship, a change in the former could not fail to dissolve the latter. But since nature cannot be changed, true friendship must of consequence be eternal.

Some \* men, who in *Greece* are ranked, as I am informed†, among the wisest sages, have taken up very extraordinary notions on this subject; but then there is nothing can escape their sophistry. They maintain, that too extensive friendships ought not to be entered into, lest one man involve himself in the disquietudes of a multitude; that every one has business enough, and perhaps too much, of his own; that it is extremely troublesome to be too deeply interested in the affairs of other people; and that it is most eligible to hold the reins of friendship in such an unconfin'd manner, as to have it always in our power to streighten or slacken them, as

\* *De Amicitia*, cap. 13.

† In the time of *Lælius*, whom *Cicero* introduces speaking in this place, the *Grecian* literature was not become common at *Rome*; which is the reason that *Cicero*, to keep up the *decorum* of the dialogue, makes *Lælius* say, that he had only *been informed* concerning the opinions that prevailed among their philosophers.

we shall see occasion. For tranquillity, with these men, makes the principal ingredient of a happy life ; and this the mind can never enjoy, while one person is in labour, if the expression may be allowed, with the concerns of many.

Others are said to affirm, what is still more unworthy of a man, and has been slightly touched on above, that friendship ought to be contracted for self-defence and mutual aid, and not out of affection and benevolence. Hence it is, say they, that the desires of friendship in every man are greater, in proportion as his ability and strength is less ; also, that women court the aid of friendship more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the afflicted more than those who are esteemed happy.

Excellent wisdom ! They might as well take the sun out of the world, as deprive mankind of friendship ; which is the best, the most delightful, gift of heaven.

Should \* men intoxicated with pleasure take upon them to reason about friendship,

\* De Amicitia, cap. 15.

which they neither know by experience or theory, they don't merit our attention; for who, in the name of goodness! would chuse to live in the greatest affluence and plenty, on condition neither to love, or be beloved by any one? This is the life of a tyrant, utterly inconsistent with fidelity, sincere affection, and all solid assurance of benevolence; in which every thing gives suspicion, causes anxiety, and banishes friendship: for who can love a man whom he is afraid of, or one by whom he imagines himself dreaded? An hypocritical regard is only paid them for a time; but should fortune frown on them, as is often the case, it will then appear, how destitute of friends they were.

*Tarquin* is reported to have said, that it was only in his exile he understood who where his faithful, and who his treacherous, friends, when he could reward neither of them according to their merits: though I should be greatly surpris'd, if a man of his haughty and imperious temper could find a real friend in the world. And as a man of his character could not make friends, so the power of many great men  
is

is an insuperable obstacle to true friendship : for fortune is not only blind herself, but for the most part makes those likewise so, to whom she is favourable. Hence it is, they are commonly puffed up with arrogance, and self-conceit : and, indeed, nothing can be more insufferable than a fortunate fool. Instances also may be seen of those, who formerly were of an obliging and courteous behaviour, that on being promoted to power and authority, or better circumstances, have despised their old friends, and courted new ones.

Now what can be more unreasonable, than for those who are possessed of all the affluence of a great fortune, to provide themselves with whatever can be got for money, as horses, slaves, fine cloaths, and costly plate ; but make no friends, who, if the expression may be allowed, are the best, the most splendid, furniture in life ? As to other things, they are ignorant for whose sake they take so much pains to get them, since they fall to the share of whoever is strongest ; but the possession of friendship is lasting and sure. Besides, al-  
 lowing

lowing all the enjoyments in the disposal of fortune to be durable, yet life without friends to adorn it, could yield little satisfaction.

One \* point to be settled is, what limits, what bounds ought to be prescribed to friendship and benevolence. Concerning this, I know there are three different opinions, none of which has my approbation. One is, that we should love our friend as ourselves: another, that our benevolence to our friends should exactly correspond to theirs for us: and the third, that we ought to esteem our friends according to the value they set on themselves. To none of the three can I thoroughly assent.

As to the first, that every man should be affected in the same manner towards his friend as to himself, it is very remote from truth; for how many things do we for them, which we would never do for ourselves? Thus, to turn suppliant, and petition a man of no worth; also, to attack any one with bitter expressions of reproach,

\* De Amicitia, cap. 16, 17.

and rail at him immoderately ; are what cannot be done with a good grace in our own case, but with regard to our friends are highly commendable. There are likewise many cases, wherein good men detract much from their own interests, or suffer it to be done, in order to promote the welfare of their friends.

The next position defines friendship to be an equality of good offices, and benevolent affections. But thus to balance the kindnesses on both sides, is to make too mean, too particular an estimate of it. True friendship appears to me more noble and generous ; and is not over scrupulous, lest more favours be returned, than have been received. For there is no occasion to fear that any part of our good offices should be lost, or fall to the ground ; or that more than what is reasonable be expended on friendship.

But the third opinion, that the value which every man sets on himself ought to be the standard of the esteem paid him by his friends, is worst of all : for it is a frequent case to find some of too humble a spirit, whose hopes of bettering their

circumstances are too languid. It cannot therefore be the part of a friend, to regulate his behaviour by the notions which a man of this character has of himself. He ought rather to raise the drooping mind of his friend, and make him entertain more elevated prospects, and better thoughts of himself.

We must therefore find some other definition of friendship: but let us first premise, what *Scipio* used highly to condemn; which was, that no tenet could be more opposite to true friendship, than the sentiments of him who affirmed, *that a man ought to love, as if he was sure he should one day hate.* He could not be persuaded that this was an apophthegm of *Bias*, one of the seven wise-men, as was commonly thought; but rather the maxim of some debauchee, a person fired with ambition, or one who makes every thing subservient to his own interest. For how can any man be a true friend, that supposes it possible he may become an enemy? Besides, at this rate, we must wish that our friend may fall into frequent mistakes, in order to give us the more opportunities of  
reproving



reproving him: and, on the other hand, one must be vexed and grieved at the virtuous behaviour of his friends, and envy their good success. This maxim therefore, whoever is its author, strikes at the very root of friendship. The following precept ought rather to have been given, “ that we ought to use such caution in  
“ contracting friendships, as never to al-  
“ low our affections to settle on one who  
“ afterwards may incur our hatred.” But farther, should we even prove unfortunate in our friendships, ’tis *Scipio*’s opinion, that we ought to bear our misfortune with patience, rather than entertain a single thought of a rupture.

The bounds then which, in my opinion, ought to be prescribed, are these; that among friends of refined morals, all things should be in common, and their several desires and intentions imparted without reserve: also allowing that the pursuits of our friends may happen to clash a little with strict justice\*, yet, if their life or

\* It is evident from several passages of *Cicero*, that all he means here is only that an orator may undertake the defence of his friend, though he be persuaded in his own breast that his

reputation be at stake, they ought to be supported, though we should strain a point for their service, provided the basest dishonesty be not the consequence: for friendship itself will excuse us only to a certain degree.

Men \* of resolution, constancy, and a steady temper, should be chosen for friends: but those of this character are few in number; and it is a difficult matter to form a true judgment in this respect, till experience has proved them. Friendship, however, must be commenced, before this can be done; for which reason, all previous opportunities of trying them are impossible to be obtained.

friend is not altogether innocent. This he practised himself in the affair of *Milo*. To be convinced that he allows of no greater liberty to depart from the path of justice, one needs only read his *Offices*, lib. III. cap. 10. “ A good man will neither be  
“ guilty of an offence against the state, or break his oath or  
“ promise, even to serve his friend, and though he were ap-  
“ pointed his judge: for at the time he puts on the character  
“ of a judge, he lays aside that of a friend. He owes, indeed,  
“ so much to friendship, as to wish that his friend’s cause was  
“ just; and to allow him as much time as the laws permit, for  
“ pleading it.”

\* *De Amicitia*, cap. 21.

It therefore becomes a prudent man, like an able charioteer, to restrain the impetuosity of his benevolence \*; that friendship, to use the expression, may be proved in the same way as horses of manege, by putting the morals of our friends to the test in some particular point. Some will discover their inconstancy on account of a small sum of money; others, who cannot be wrought on by a small sum, will show themselves for a greater. But admitting that some should be found, who think it base to prefer money to friendship; yet where shall we meet with any, who do not prefer honours, magistracies, power, dignity, and riches, to it; or, if all these be proposed on the one hand, and the duties of friendship on the other, that do not readily give the preference to the former? For our nature is too weak to resist the temptation of power; and men think themselves very excusable, though they acquire it even at the expence of friendship; because 'tis not without great cause they do so. Whence it is next to impos-

\* An allusion to a verse quoted in his letters to *Atticus*, XIII. 21.

fible to find true friendship among the votaries of ambition, and ministers of state. For where is the man to be found, that takes more concern for the preferment of his friend than that of himself?

There \* is likewise a cruel necessity sometimes for dropping friendship; for I am now speaking of that in ordinary life, and not such as takes place among wise men. Our friends are frequently guilty of offences both against ourselves and others, the scandal whereof chiefly lights on us. Such as these, therefore, must be dropped, by neglecting all friendly intercourse; and rather by little and little, as I have heard *Cato* say, than abruptly: unless some very heinous crime be committed, so that it is neither right, honourable, or even possible, for us to defer one moment to break with the guilty person.

Most † people are so unreasonable, not to say shameless, as to desire their friends should be what they themselves cannot at-

\* *De Amicitia*, cap. 21.

† *Ibid.*, cap. 22.

tain to ; and expect more from them than they are willing to give in return. In justice, however, one should first be a good man himself, and then cultivate friendship with those of his own character. Among such as these, the friendship we have been recommending may be established on a solid basis ; because men united by benevolence will not only triumph over those passions which enslave the rest of mankind, but likewise take a pleasure in justice and equity, and readily do all kind of good offices for one another : nor will they ever require any thing, but what is just and honourable ; and, besides love and esteem, will have a mutual reverence for each other. To deprive friendship of this reverence, is to rob it of its greatest ornament ; and for any to suppose, that all manner of licentiousness and offences are allowable among friends, is a pernicious error. Friendship was given by nature, not to favour vice, but to be an aid to virtue.

Friendship \* is the only thing in the world, concerning the usefulness of which all mankind are agreed. Even virtue itself is despised by many, and called a sort of vanity and ostentation. Many, who are content with little, and pleased with frugality in meat and dress, look down on riches with contempt. And as to honours, which are so earnestly desired by some, there are others, and they not a few, who have so low an opinion of them as to think nothing so insignificant and empty. Thus it is likewise in other cases; what raises the admiration of some, is by many others reckon'd good for nothing. But the whole world is, to a man, of the same sentiments about friendship: statesmen and philosophers, the men of business, and those who are entirely devoted to pleasures, all are agreed that there is no living without friendship, at least in such a way as is not altogether unbecoming a gentleman.

\* *De Amicitia*, cap. 23.

Friendship insinuates itself, I know not how, among all ranks of men; nor is there any condition of life free from its influence: nay, could we suppose a man of so surly and savage a disposition, as to hate and avoid human society, like a certain fellow of *Athens* called *Timon*; yet even one of this complexion cannot live at ease, till he has found a person on whom he may vent his spleen and ill humour.

Of this we would be more fully convinced, should some God, if the supposition may be allowed, transport us from the society of mankind; and placing us in a desert, there supply us with all the necessaries of life in great abundance, but make it impossible for us to see the face of a man. Who could be so hard-hearted, as to be able to endure this way of life; and whose pleasures of every kind would not be rendered insipid by such a solitude?

Nothing therefore is more true, than the saying of, I think, *Archytas* of *Tarentum*, as I have heard it told by our fa-

thers\*, who had it from theirs; *that could a man ascend into heaven, and there observe the structure of the universe, and the beauty of the stars; yet, if he has no friend to relate it to, that which otherwise would have been most delightful, will prove insipid to him.* Hence it appears, that nature has an invincible aversion to solitude, and always leans, as it were, against some prop; which support yields us most pleasure, when proceeding from our best friends.

The † case of that man is certainly desperate, whose ears are shut against truth, so that he cannot endure to hear it even from the mouth of his friend. For it is wisely remarked by *Cato*, *that some men are more beholden to their bitterest enemies, than to friends who appear to be sweetness itself. The former frequently tell the truth,*

\* Between *Archytas* and *Lælius*, who speaks here, there was about the space of two centuries; for *Archytas* was co-temporary with *Plato*. See *De Senectute*, chap. 12. But, as we have already observed, 'tis to keep up the *decorum* of the dialogue, that *Cicero* does not make *Lælius* speak with more exactness, which would discover too much knowledge,

† De Amicitia, cap. 27.



*but the latter never.* It is certainly a great absurdity in those, who being put in mind of their duty, give themselves no trouble about what they ought chiefly to lay to heart, and are vexed where there is no sufficient cause. They are not grieved at the commission of a fault, but at being reproved for it: whereas they ought to be sorry on account of the fault, and well pleased with the admonition.

Wherefore, as it is a peculiar property of true friendship, both to give and take advice\*; and as the one ought to be done

\* It is an easy matter to lay down a beautiful theory of friendship, set forth its usefulness, and prescribe rules to those who enter into it. The description charms our fancy, and fills us with a kind of enthusiastic warmth. All pay homage to the enchanting idea of friendship, acknowledge its usefulness, and are ravished with the thoughts of its refined pleasures. But where is the thing itself to be found? Is there such a thing as perfect friendship in the world? Or, allowing there is, how few are qualified to act the part of a true friend? What delicacy is necessary to form such a character? Nothing is more difficult than to comply with the precept here mentioned, of giving and taking advice. However, as this must be allowed to be an essential part of friendship, I shall subjoin the *Spectator's* advice concerning it, as the most proper that can be followed.

“ The most difficult province in friendship is the letting a  
 “ man see his faults and errors, which should, if possible, be  
 “ so contrived, that he may perceive our advice is given him

with

with freedom, not ill-nature; the other received patiently, and not with reluctance: so it should be laid down for a maxim, that nothing can happen in friendship so pernicious as flattery, and a complaisant cajoling behaviour. For though several names are necessary to express the vice of those trifling deceivers, whose whole conversation is in order to please, and not to be subservient to truth; yet as dissimulation is, in every case, faulty, because it corrupts and hinders us from discerning truth, so it is in a singular manner repugnant to friendship: for it destroys truth, without which the bare name of friendship will signify little.

Now since the power of friendship consists in forming, as it were, several minds into one; how can this be done, where

“ not so much to please ourselves, as for his own advantage.  
 “ The reproaches therefore of a friend should always be strictly  
 “ just, and not too frequent. The violent desire of pleasing,  
 “ in the person reproved, may otherwise change into a despair  
 “ of doing it, while he finds himself censured for faults he is  
 “ not conscious of. A mind that is softened and humanized by  
 “ friendship cannot bear frequent reproaches; either it must  
 “ quite sink under the oppression, or abate considerably of the  
 “ value and esteem it had for him who bestows them.”

every

every particular person has not always one and the same mind, but is fickle, inconstant, and double\*? For can any thing be so wavering and unnaturally pliant, as the mind of one who conforms not only to the sentiments and desires, but even the least look and nod, of another?

*Does he affirm a thing, or it deny?  
I do the same; and still, you're right, I cry.*

As *Terence* † has it: but this he puts into the mouth of *Gnatho*, a parasite; which kind of friends it would be the height of imprudence to have any connexion with. There are many, however, not unlike *Gnatho* in manners, though they may be much superior to him in birth, fortune, and reputation. The flattering complaisance of such men is the more troublesome, as their vanity is supported by the

\* *Martial* has given us a fine description of a friend of this stamp, in the following epigram:

*Difficilis, facilis, jucundus, acerbus es idem,  
Nec tecum possum vivere, nec sine te.*

† *Eunuch*, Act II. Sc. 2.

authority

authority due to their rank. But the cajoling friend may, with a little attention, be as easily distinguished from a true one, as things counterfeited and painted from those that are true and natural.



## IX.

## On OLD AGE.

EVERY\* stage of life is a burthen to those who have no fund of happiness within themselves: but they who derive all their felicity from this source, cannot possibly think any thing grievous, that proceeds from the stated order of nature. In which class old age may, in a special manner, be ranked: the attainment whereof is the universal wish of mankind; who make it no less the subject of complaint, when obtained. So great is the mutability of their folly and perverseness. It has stolen upon us, say they, sooner than we could have imagined. But then who obliged them to make a false computation? For what faster, pray, does old age creep upon youth, than youth upon infancy? Again, what less burthensome would old

\* De Senectute, cap. 2.

age be, should they live to eight hundred years, than it is at eighty? For the past part of life, however long that may be, can afford no satisfaction to comfort an old age ridiculous in itself.

Now \* if it be true that you are charmed with my wisdom, (and I wish it may be answerable to your good opinion, and the surname I bear!) it consists in this, that I have followed nature, the best of guides; and obeyed her precepts, as I would those of a God: nor is it probable, that after having acted the former parts of my life as I ought, nature should, like a bad poet, quite neglect the last act of the piece. In a word, like the fruits of the earth arrived at full maturity, 'tis necessary there should be a last period of life, that withers, as it were, and drops down of itself; which a wise man ought to bear with patience: for what else is it to wage war with the Gods, after the manner of the giants†, if it be not to resist nature?

\* He who speaks here, and through the whole of this article, is *Cato* the elder: whose life is written by *Plutarch*.

† The giants are feigned by the poets to have been men of a monstrous size. *Typhon*, the chief of them, according to *He-*

Upon || serious examination, then, I find four causes why old age appears miserable. The first is, that it disqualifies us for business; the second, that it enfeebles our bodies; the third, that it deprives us of all pleasure; and the fourth, that it borders upon death. Let us examine then, if you please, what justice and weight there is in each of them.

Does \* old age render us unfit for business? For what business, pray? Is it such as requires the strength and vigour of youth? Are there then no occupations proper for old age, that may be managed by the rational part of man, even though the body be weakly?

*Jod*, was the son of *Tartarus* and *Terra*: But *Homer* will have him to be the son of *Juno* alone. His stature was so prodigious that he reached the east with one hand, the west with the other, and the stars with his head. By this fable, the poets represent the winds: for as they blow from all parts of heaven, so in a storm they agitate and drive the clouds with extreme violence; which gave rise to the fable of the giants making war upon heaven.

|| De Senectute, cap. 5.

\* De Senectute, cap. 6.

To

To affirm that old age is incapable of business, is the same as to maintain that a pilot is of no use in navigation; because, whilst some mount the shrouds, others run on the deck, or work at the pump, he sits quietly at the helm. An old man, indeed, cannot perform such actions as requires youth; but he does what is much greater, as well as better. It is neither by strength, swiftness, or agility of body, that affairs of great importance are transacted; but by prudence, authority, and good advice; which, far from being lost, are even much improved, for the most part, by age. Unless, perhaps, you think that I, who have acted the part of a soldier, a tribune, a lieutenant-general, and a consul, am now become wholly useless, because I can no longer bear a part in all manner of warlike expeditions, as formerly. But then I inform the senate what is fit to be done, and after what manner.

Would you but consult the accounts left us of foreign transactions, you will find that the greatest states have been ruined by young men; but supported and restored  
by



by the old. Thus, in a play of the poet *Nævius*, it is said,

*Sudden the fall of your once mighty state!  
Unfold, I pray, the cause of its dire fate.*

The answer to which is chiefly what follows ;

*Its counsellors were men of no repute ;  
Or unfledg'd striplings, that were fools to  
boot.*

For rashness is the true characteristic of youth, as prudence is of old age.

But memory decays. This may indeed be the case, if it is neglected, or naturally a bad one.

I \* never heard, however, of an old man, that forgot where he had hid his treasure. They easily remember all that nearly concerns them, as obligations entered into, their own debtors, or those to whom they themselves are indebted.

What shall we say of lawyers, priests, augurs, and philosophers, who, though

\* De Senectute, cap. 7.

advanced in years, have remembered a vast multiplicity of things? Old men never lose their abilities, if diligence and application to study be not wanting: nor speak I this of men of fame and renown only, but likewise of those who live in a private and undisturbed retirement. *Sophocles* continued to write plays to an extreme old age; and because he seemed, for the sake of study, to throw off all regards for his domestic affairs, he was sued at law by his sons; that, according to our own usage of removing from the management of an estate such fathers as are unfit for discharging that trust to advantage, the judges might restrain him in the same manner, as being turned a dotard. On which the old man is said to have read to his judges the play of *Oedipus Coloneus*\*, which happened to be in his hand, and had been but lately finished: this done, he asked his judges if that poem could be

\* *Oedipus Coloneus*, or more clearly, *Oedipus retired to a bill*. There are two tragedies, written by *Sophocles*, called *Oedipus*; to distinguish which, the title of this one, here mentioned, comprehends the place where the scene is laid.

the work of one that had lost his senses; who unanimously stopped any farther prosecution against him.

I \* could name old country gentlemen† in the *Sabine* territories, who are my friends and neighbours, and our own fellow-citizens, that were never absent from their farms when any work of consequence was to be done, as sowing, reaping, and gathering the corn into barns. This, however, is no wise surprizing in them: for there are none so old, but think they may live a year. Nay, these very men take a great deal of pains about what they very well know can never be of any service to themselves.

*His trees he plants, the future age to serve.*

As our countryman *Statius* has it, in his *Synephebi* ||. Now should any one ask an

\* De Senectute, cap. 8.

† In the *French* it is *in the country*, in general: but the original has it, *in the country of the Sabines*. It was here that *Cato*, though born at *Tusculum*, used to reside and pass his time, before he went to serve in the army, on some lands and possessions, which his father, according to *Plutarch* of *Amyot*, had left him.

|| *Synephebi*, or *The young Companions*, was a *Greek* comedy of *Menander*, translated, or rather imitated in *Latin* by *Cæci-*  
old

old farmer for whom he plants, he will make no scruple to answer, for the immortal Gods, whose pleasure it is that I should not only receive these from my ancestors, but likewise perpetuate them to posterity.

At \* present, indeed, I no more desire the strength of a young man, for that is the second objection to old age, than I desired that of a bull or elephant when young. Whatever ability a man possesses, he ought to make a good use of it, and in all his actions exert himself accordingly.

The want of bodily strength, however, is more frequently owing to the vices of youth, than to old age itself. For intemperance and debauchery in the former render the body exhausted and feeble before the latter arrives.

You † have heard, *Scipio*, I dare say,

*thus*, who is called *Staius* in the original. *Staius* is the name of a slave, and was a kind of nick-name given him on account of his former slavery.

\* De Senectute, cap. 9.

† Ibid. cap. 10.

how

how *Masiniſſa*, the dear friend of your ancestors\*, paſſes his time, who is now ninety years of age: if he begins a journey on foot, he can by no means be prevailed on to make uſe of a horſe; and if he ſets out on horſeback, he never alights: rain and cold, however tempeſtuous, cannot hinder him from going bare-headed: his body is abſolutely firm, and free from humours: in a word, he diſcharges all the duties and buſineſs incumbent on a king. Hence we ſee that exerciſe and temperance may tranſmit ſomething of our former vigour to old age.

I could never approve of the old proverb, ſo much in repute, that adviſes, if we would live to be old, to begin early to be ſo. As for my part, I had rather my

\* We ſhall ſee hereafter, in *Scipio's* dream, how intimate a friendship ſubſiſted between *Masiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, and the family of the *Scipio's*. At the beginning of the ſecond Punic war, he had joined the *Carthaginians*; but one of his nephews being made priſoner, and ſet at liberty by *Scipio* the elder without any ranſom, he was ſo ſenſibly touched with this generoſity, that he declared himſelf wholly for the *Romans*. He was far from being uſeleſs to them, and for a reward of his ſervice they not only confirmed him in his own kingdom, but gave him ſome other lands, which they had taken from the *Carthaginians*.

old age be the shorter, than to act the old man before I really was so.

We \* ought to hold out against old age with courage, and compensate, by our diligence, for its inconveniencies. We should struggle with old age, as with a disease. The preservation of health demands our utmost attention. In order to which, we should use moderate exercise, and take so much meat and drink as is necessary to refresh and recruit, and not to oppress, our strength. Nor is the body alone to be cared for; much more concern ought to be taken about our mind, and rational part. For even these will be extinguished by old age, unless, like a lamp, you feed them with oil. As to those whom *Cæcilius* calls *old comic fools*, he means such as were credulous, forgetful, and indolent; which are not properly the vices of old age, but rather the effects of laziness, inactivity, and sluggishness.

As I approve of a youth that has something of the old man in him, so I am no

\* De Senectute, cap. 11.

less pleased with the old man that has something of the youth. He that follows this rule may be old in body, but can never be so in mind.

Next \* follows the third objection to old age, *viz.* that it has no relish for pleasures. Excellent advantage of age, since it frees us from what is most blameable in youth!

For attend, ye best of youths, to what *Archytas* of *Tarentum* has said on this subject, who was one of the greatest and most renowned men that ever lived. I had it related to me when a young man at *Tarentum* with *Q. Fabius Maximus* †. Sensual pleasure, said he, is the most pernicious endowment that nature has bestowed on mankind; for in order to gratify it, we give a loose to our most inordinate passions, which carry all before them. Hence proceed treasons against our

\* De Senectute, cap. 12.

† *Cato*, in this dialogue on old age, chap. 5. tells on what occasion, and character, he was at *Tarentum* with *Fabius* the Great, who was surnamed the *Temporiser*.

country, the subversion of states, and clandestine conferences with the public enemy\*: in short, there is no crime so heinous, no villainy so base, which the lust of pleasure will not make people commit: as for rapes, adulteries, and such-like base actions, it is to the insinuating blandishments of pleasure they are entirely owing. Again, though reason be the most excellent gift that nature, or rather some God, has bestowed on man; yet nothing is such an enemy to this divine present, this blessing of the Gods, as pleasure: for there can be no room for temperance, where lust bears an uncontrouled sway; nor is it possible for virtue to have any residence, where pleasure reigns. And in order to make this still better understood, he bids us figure to ourselves a man under the influence of as exquisite pleasure as the imagination can possibly conceive: there are none, he thinks, but will allow, that while this transport lasts, such a man could not

\* This is a satirical touch on what likewise happen'd at the siege of *Tarentum*, where *Fabius* had the address to carry on an intrigue of gallantry, in order to serve his own purposes.



do one single action with judgment, reason, or reflection. Wherefore nothing is so detestable and hurtful as pleasure; because, should it prevail in any high degree, or considerable length of time, it would quite extinguish every spark of intellectual light in the soul\*.

It † was admirably well answered by *Sophocles*, when asked if he had any commerce with women now in his old days: *Heaven forbid*, says he. *No, I have with*

\* Pleasure, no less than our ideas, may be distinguish'd into that which is apprehended by means of our bodily senses, and that which proceeds from reflexion. The former comprehends whatever is pleasing to animal nature; the latter, whatever is agreeable to right reason. The one is limited to the correspondence between external objects and our organs of sensation, the other unbounded as the universe. They differ also in degree; for on comparing the pleasures of the palate and smell, or even those arising from a fine prospect or concert of music, with that we feel from the reflexion of having discharged the duties of an affectionate parent, of a grateful child, of a sincere friend, of a generous patriot, in short, of one who has acted as he ought both towards God and man; what a disparity shall we find between them! How low and groveling the one! How exalted and rational the other! Besides, sensual pleasure is fleeting and momentary, but that of reflexion durable and lasting as our existence. Now though old men lose, in a great measure, the pleasures of the former; yet they enjoy those of the latter in a superior degree to the young. So that, by remembering this distinction, the objection vanishes of course.

† De Senectute, cap. 14.

*pleasure made my escape from all desires of this kind, as from a savage and furious tyrant.*

There \* remains a fourth objection, that renders our advanced state of life full of anxiety and concern, *viz.* the approach of death; which cannot, in the nature of things, be far removed from old age. How wretched is the old man, who, in the whole course of his long life, has not learned that death is to be despised!

Besides, who is there, though in the very flower of his youth, so infatuated, as to promise himself one single day's existence? And, indeed, this age is much more subject to mortal accidents, than ours. Young men fall into distempers more easily, are sicker under them, and cured with greater difficulty. Hence few arrive at old age; which is one reason why mankind live not better and more prudently: for good sense, understanding, and prudence, are only to be found in old men.

\* De Senectute, cap. 19.

Ay, but a youth may hope to live for a considerable time, which an old man cannot. Such hopes are folly : for what is more inconsistent with reason, than to hold uncertainties for certain, and falsehoods for truth? An old man, indeed, has nothing to hope for. But even in this respect he has the advantage of a young man, as having already obtained what the other only hopes to arrive at. The latter wishes to live long, the former hath actually done so.

However short the duration of life, 'tis abundantly long if spent agreeably to the dictates of virtue and honour. But should it be spun out longer, there is no more reason to be grieved on that account, than the husbandmen have, when after the sweet season of spring is past, they see the summer and autumn advance. For the spring is a kind of emblem of youth, and exposes to our view the buds of the future fruit ; for the reaping and in-gathering of which the other seasons are accommodated. Now the fruit of old age, as I have often observed, is the remembrance of our ma-

ny brave and virtuous actions in the former part of life.

All \* men, however, cannot be *Scipio's* or *Maximus's*, to have their memories filled with sieges of cities taken, with land and sea engagements, with wars they had happily finished, or triumphs they had been honoured with. But if life is spent in an easy, innocent, and genteel manner, old age will not fail to be calm and serene. Such was that of *Plato*, who, though he lived to be eighty-one years old, yet continued his studies to the last. Such also was that of *Isocrates*, who is said to have writ the treatise called *Panathenaicon* † in the ninety-fourth year of his age, and to have lived five years afterwards. His preceptor *Leontinus Gorgias* lived no less than an hundred and seven, and yet never gave over his study and occupation. Being asked, what pleasure he could take in life at those years: *I have no reason*, says he, *to complain of old age.*

\* De Senectute, cap. 5.

† This is the title of a long discourse in praise of the *Athenians*.

An answer truly excellent, and worthy of a learned man: for it is ignorant fools alone, who throw the blame of their own vices, and bad conduct, on old age. *Ennius* acted in another manner, who compares his own old age to that of a victorious race-horse.

*As the brave steed, who oft th'Olympic prize  
has won,  
Rests from the glorious toil when feeble age  
comes on.*



## X.

*On* D E A T H.

WE \* esteem nothing to be an evil, that is the appointment of the immortal Gods, or of nature the common parent of all things. For we were not created and formed by chance, or at random: no, there certainly was some powerful being, that took care of the interests of mankind, and would never have given them existence, or furnished them with the means of life, if, after having struggled with the various misfortunes attending it, they were at last to be swallowed up by, that worst of evils, everlasting death †.

\* Tuscul. I. 49.

† According to the idea which the natural reason of the Pagans formed of a supreme being, they looked upon his character to be made up of infinite goodness alone. But religion teaches us, that the goodness of God is inseparable from his justice; and as there are eternal rewards for good men, so there are eternal punishments for the wicked. Whence the certainty of a future state is proved to a demonstration; because necessarily connected with the existence of a good and just God, who will reward the virtuous, and punish the wicked. See p. 15.

Let us rather account it a haven, or place of refuge, prepared for us; and oh that we could fly thither with full spread sails! But should we be detained by contrary winds, 'tis absolutely certain, however, that we shall arrive at it, only somewhat later. Now how can that be a hardship to any one person, which all must necessarily undergo?

In \* *India*, where a plurality of wives is allowed, when a husband happens to die, they all make their appearance in a court of justice, and have a hot dispute, which of them was most beloved by the deceased. She that gets the better is escorted thence by her friends, and joyfully mounts the funeral pile, to be placed beside her husband: whereas she that is cast, departs quite overwhelmed with grief. No custom sure could thus brave nature, which always maintains its superiority.

Hence † then with these womanish complaints, that it is a great misfortune to die

\* Taseuk, V. 27.

† Ibid I. 39.

before our time. I would ask what time? Is it that of nature? But she, indeed, has lent us life, as we do a sum of money, only no certain day is fixed for the payment. What reason then to complain, if she demands it at pleasure; since it was on this condition you received it?

Such men as these think the death of a young boy ought to be born with patience; but should an infant in the cradle happen to die, there is not the least ground of complaint. And yet, in this last case, nature exacts her loan more rigorously than in the other. Ay, but say they, the latter had not as yet tasted the sweetness of life; whereas the other had entertained very great expectations, and had even begun to enjoy them. In other matters, however, 'tis thought much preferable to receive a part, rather than none at all; and why not so with regard to life? Though it is a true enough observation of *Callimachus*, that *Priam wept much oftener than Troilus*\*.

\* *Priam* having lived to be an old man, and suffered such a number of misfortunes, must certainly have had many more occasions to weep than *Troilus* his son, who was slain by *Achilles* in the flower of his age.



On the other hand, the good fortune of those who die of old age, is highly celebrated. For what reason? 'Tis my opinion, indeed, that was the life of old men protracted longer, it would be the most agreeable of all others: for certainly there is nothing yields a man more satisfaction than prudence; and though old age deprives us of other comforts, yet it is sure to bring this one along with it.

But what age deserves to be called long? Or is there any thing at all, which concerns man, that merits to be called so? Are we not hurried on from infancy to youth, and from youth to old age, which, pursuing invisibly, overtakes us in the middle of our career, and before we are aware? But because we have nothing beyond, we account it long. All these stages of life, in every individual, are said to be either long or short, only in regard to their stated and usual length. *Aristotle* tells us, that on the banks of the river *Hypanis*\*,

\* A river of ancient *Sarmatia*, now called the *Bog*; which running through the east part of *Poland*, falls into the *Pontus Euxinus*, or Black-Sea, to the north of the *Niester*.

which.

which on the side of *Europe* falls into the Black-Sea, there are found certain insects, which live but the space of one day. Such of these therefore as die at the eighth hour\*, arrive to a considerable age; but those which die at sun-set live to be decrepid; and the more so, if it happens to be one of the longest days in summer. Now our longest life, if compared with eternity, will be found to differ almost nothing from the short duration of these insects.

Though † death, by reason of many unforeseen accidents, daily hangs over us; and cannot, considering the shortness of human life, be far remote; yet it never deters a wise man from consulting the future welfare of his country and family, and interesting himself for posterity, of whom

\* The eighth hour of the *Romans* answered nearly to our two o'clock in the afternoon: for they divided the day, *viz.* from sun-rising to sun-set, into twelve hours; which though always equal among themselves, yet varied in length according to the different seasons of the year; and therefore could not correspond exactly to our hours, except at the two equinoxes. Their night was divided after the same manner.

† *Tuscul. I.* 38.

he shall have no knowledge. Wherefore should one even believe the soul to be mortal, he may mind things of eternal consequence, and that not from a desire of glory, whereof he can have no sense; but from a principle of virtue, which is necessarily attended by real glory, notwithstanding he should have no such view.

But \* certainly we suffer death with greatest resignation, when we can solace our dying minutes with reflections of self-approbation. No man hath lived too short a time, who has fully discharged the duties of an exalted virtue.

As † to the knowledge of the soul, if we be not perfectly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot entertain a doubt, that it is absolutely simple, free from all mixture, and no wise compounded, joined, or made up of different parts. Since this then is the case, surely it can neither be separated nor divided, and consequently

\* Tuscul. I. 45.

† Ibid. 29.

must be immortal. For death is, as it were, the separation, division, and disunion of those parts, that formerly were somehow united.

Induced by these, and the like reasons, *Socrates* neither desired an advocate to plead his cause, nor turned suppliant to his judges : but shewed a free and generous boldness, that proceeded from true greatness of soul, and not from pride. On the day of his death, he held a long discourse on this very subject. Though he might have been easily rescued from prison some days before this happened, he refused to comply. Nay, when he was just going to lay hold of the deadly cup, he talked in such a manner, as if he was not about to suffer a violent death, but to ascend into heaven.

For thus he thought, and constantly maintained, that there are two different ways, and two opposite courses, taken by souls at their departure from the body. Such as have polluted themselves with the common vices of mankind, devoted their whole powers to the gratification of their  
lusts,

lusts, and stained their characters with private crimes, or been guilty of irreparable injustice against the state, follow a by-path, directly opposite to that which leads to the mansions of the Gods. But they, on the contrary, who have preserved their innocence and purity entire, kept themselves as free as possible from the contagion of bodies, acted always as distinct from them, and though united to human bodies, have imitated the life of the Gods; these, I say, have an easy return to the immortal beings, from whom they came.

I \* can, by no means, assent to those † who have lately attempted to prove that the soul perishes with the body, and that the whole of man is absorbed by death. The authority of the ancients, and of our own ancestors, is of more weight with me, who have ordained sacred rites to be performed for the dead; which certainly they

\* De Amicitia, cap. 4.

† The *Epicureans*. Cicero, in his dialogue on *friendship*, makes *Laelius* speak in this manner, in regard of whom *Epicurus* was only a modern. *Laelius* was born about thirty or forty years after the death of *Epicurus*,

would never have done, had they believed that the dead are no wise interested in them. I likewise prefer the opinion of those, who formerly taught their doctrines in that part of our own country called the *Greater Greece* \*, which though now destroyed, was then a flourishing state : or the sentiments of him †, who was declared the wisest of men by the oracle of *Apollo*. However undetermined he might be in other matters, yet he never fail'd to assert, that our souls are of a divine nature ; and that, on leaving the body, they return to heaven, and have a passage thither, so much the more expeditious as they themselves have been good and upright.

*The || whole life of philosophers, says Socrates, is one continued meditation on death. For what else do we, when we call off our attention from sensual pleasure, and all do.*

\* They called that part of *Italy* the *Greater Greece*, which now makes the kingdom of *Naples*. It was in it that *Pythagoras*, the first who assumed the name of *Philosopher*, taught his doctrine in the reign of *Tarquin* the proud.

† *Socrates*.

|| *Tuscul. I. 31.*

mestic concerns, those servants of the body ; when we detach our mind from public business, and every kind of embarrassment ? What is this, I say, but to call the soul home, to make it keep company with itself, and draw it off from the body as far as possible ? Now to abstract the soul from the body, is nothing else, but to learn to die.

We ought therefore, take my word upon it, seriously to consider this, that by disuniting ourselves from bodies, we may render death familiar to us. By which means, we shall lead a heavenly life, even while on earth ; and when the soul is freed from these fetters, her flight will be the more speedy.

Whether \* it be better to live or die, is only known to the immortal Gods : for no man, I verily believe, has any certain knowledge of the matter.

\* Tuscul. I. 41.

## XI.

## SCIPIO'S DREAM.

AS \* soon as I arrived in *Africa*, in quality of tribune † of the fourth legion, as you know, to *M. Manilius* the consul, I was above all things solicitous to wait upon king *Masiniſſa* ‖; who, for very good reasons, was most steadily attached to our family.

When I came into his presence, the good old prince embraced me with such tenderness as drew tears from his eyes; and after a short pause, looking up to heaven, Sovereign son, says he, and all ye other

\* *Fragm. lib. vi. de rep. cap. 1.* It is *Scipio* that speaks; but as the whole discourse concerns another *Scipio*, 'tis absolutely necessary to distinguish them well from one another. They both had the surname of *Africanus*. He that speaks here was the son of *Paulus Emilius*, and has been mentioned already.

† *Tribune*, an officer in the *Roman* army, who commanded a division of a legion; and not unlike our *Colonel*, and the *French Mestre de camp*. There were six of them in every legion.

‖ *Masiniſſa* king of *Numidia*, of whom we have spoken already. See p. 143.

heavenly



heavenly powers, I thank you, that before departing this life, I here behold in my own kingdom, and under this roof, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, whose very name inspires me with fresh vigour; so deeply rooted in my mind is the memory of that best and most invincible of men!

After this I enquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom: he, on the other hand, questioned me about the state of our republic; and in this kind of conversation we passed away the day. Towards evening, being entertained in a manner worthy the magnificence of a king, we carried on our discourse for a considerable part of the night: all which time the good old king spoke of nothing but *Africanus*\*,

\* I say *Africanus* by way of distinction, that the *Scipio* here meant may not be confounded with another of that name, whom I shall mention by and by. This *Africanus*, after a great many other exploits, carried the war into *Africa*; where proving victorious against *Asdrubal* and *Annibal*, he obliged *Carthage* to demand peace, on which account he was surnamed *Africanus*. He was the first of the *Romans*, that was honoured with a surname derived from his conquests. But afterwards a great many other generals had their pride flattered with the like titles, without having either the virtues, or success, of *Scipio*. “In imitation  
“of him, says *Livy*, those who were by no means comparable  
“to him for victories, transmitted titles of renown and honour-  
“able surnames to their family.”

whose

whose actions, and even remarkable sayings, he remembered distinctly. At last, when we retired to bed, I fell into a more profound sleep than usual, both on account of my journey, and because I had sat up a great part of the night.

Here I had the following dream, occasioned, as I verily believe, by our preceding conversation ; for it commonly happens that the thoughts and discourse which employ us in the day time, produce in our sleep a somewhat similar effect to that which *Ennius* writes happened to him about *Homer* ; of whom, in his waking hours, he used frequently to think and speak. *Africanus*, I thought, appeared to me in a shape, with which I was better acquainted from his picture, than any personal knowledge of him \*. When I perceived it was he, I confess I trembled with consternation : but he addressed me, saying, Take courage, my *Scipio*, be not afraid,

\* Though the original seems to say, *less for having seen himself, than for having seen his picture* ; yet this must not be taken in a strict sense, for *Sigonius* assures us that the young *Scipio Africanus*, the person who speaks in this place, was born the same year, and what is more, the same day, that the other died.

and carefully remember what I shall say to you.

Do † you see that city, (pointing to *Carthage* from a bright and glorious place of the firmament, that was all studded with stars) which though brought under the *Roman* yoke by me, is now renewing the former wars, and cannot live in peace? 'Tis to attack it you are this day arrived, in a station not much superior to that of a private soldier. Before two years, however, are elapsed, you shall be consul, and compleat its overthrow; whence you shall obtain, by your own merit, the surname of *Africanus*, which as yet belongs to you no otherwise than as derived from me.

After the destruction of *Carthage*, you shall receive the honour of a triumph, be advanced to the censorship, and, in quality of legate, visit *Egypt*, *Syria*, *Asia* and *Greece*: you shall be elected a second time consul, in your absence\*; and by utterly

† Fragm. lib. iv. de rep. cap. 2.

\* In the text it is, *deligere iterum consul absens*. But the authority of *Valerius Maximus*, VIII. 15. does not permit the word *absens* to be taken literally. It does not mean that *Scipio* was absent from *Rome* the day on which the consuls were to be elected; destroy-

destroying *Numantia*, put an end to a most dangerous war.

But on entering the Capitol in your triumphal car, you shall find the republic all in a ferment through the intrigues of my grandson \*. 'Tis on this occasion, my dear *Africanus*, that you must show your country the greatness of your understanding, capacity, and prudence.

The destiny, however, of that time, appears uncertain, as it were, which way it shall take : for when your age shall have accomplished eight times seven revolutions of the sun, and your fatal hours shall be marked out by the natural product of these two numbers †, each whereof is esteemed a perfect one, but for different reasons || ;

but as he did not appear in the *Campus Martius*, dressed in a white robe, according to the custom of those that stood candidates for the consulship, it was the same thing as if he had been really absent.

\* *Tiberius Gracchus*, who being tribune, excited the people to revolt against the senate. His mother, the illustrious *Cornelia*, was a daughter of the elder *Scipio*; and was the ornament of her age for wit, and the glory of her sex for virtue.

† Fifty-six years. He actually died at this age; and not without the suspicion of having been poison'd by his wife, who was the sister of *Tiberius Gracchus*.

|| What, pray, can these reasons be? If they are those mentioned by *Macrobius*, in his commentary on *Scipio's* dream, they  
then

then shall the whole city have recourse to you alone, and place their hopes in your auspicious name; on you the senate, all good citizens, the allies, and people of *Latium*, shall cast their eyes; on you the preservation of the state shall entirely depend; in a word, if you escape the impious machinations of your relations, you must, in quality of dictator, establish order and tranquillity in the commonwealth.

Here *Lælius* \* wept bitterly, and the rest of the company gave vent to their sorrow by deep groans; on which *Scipio*, with a gentle smile, says, “pray gentle-  
“men don’t wake me out of my dream,  
“have patience†, and hear the rest.”.

deserve only to be considered as the chimeras of a wild imagination; and being of no manner of use to us, don’t merit to be explained.

\* *Lælius*, whose intimate connexion with *Scipio* is so well known from the dialogue on *Friendship*, was one of the interlocutors in the dialogue on a *Commonwealth*, of which *Scipio*’s dream is the conclusion. As to the other interlocutors, their names may be seen in the epistles to *Atticus*, IV. 16.

† It is plain that in the words, *Et parum rebus*, there is something either altered, or omitted. Concerning which the critics have proposed different conjectures, none of which has all the evidence that could be wished.

Now \* in order to encourage you, my dear *Africanus*, to defend the state with the greater chearfulness, be assured, that for all those who have any wise conduced to the preservation, defence, or enlargement of their native country, there is a certain place in heaven, where they shall enjoy an eternity of happiness: for nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the supreme governor of the universe, than the assemblies and societies of men united together by laws, which are called states: it is from heaven their governors and defenders came, and thither they return.

Though at these words I was extremely troubled, not so much for fear of death, as at the perfidy of my own relations; yet I recollected myself enough to enquire, whether he himself, my father *Paulus*, and others, whom we looked upon as dead, really enjoyed life.

Yes truly, replied he, they alone enjoy life, who have escaped from the body, as from a prison; but as to what we call life, 'tis no more than a state of death. Nay

\* Fragm. lib. iv. de rep. cap. 2.

see, here comes your father *Paulus*\* towards you.

As soon as I observed him, my eyes burst out into a flood of tears; but he took me into his arms, embraced me, and bid me not to weep. No sooner were my first transports subsided, and I had regained the liberty of speech, than I addressed my father thus, Thou best and most venerable of parents, since this, as I am informed by *Africanus*, is the only substantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haste to come hither where you are?

That, replied he, is impossible: for unless the God, whose temple is all that vast expanse you behold, shall free you from the fetters of the body, you can have no admission into this place. Mankind have received their being on this very condition, that they should labour for the preservation of that globe, which is situate, as you see, in the middle of this temple†, and

\* *Paulus Emilius*, surnamed *Macedonicus*, as having overcome *Perseus* king of *Macedon*, and reduced his kingdom into the form of a Roman province.

† *Viz.* of the world. We have already remarked that *Cicero* follows the *Ptolemaic* system of the world. See p. 7.

is called earth. They are likewise endowed with a soul, which is a portion of the eternal fires, that you call stars and constellations; and these being round spherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their revolutions with amazing rapidity. 'Tis therefore your duty, my *Publius*, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to preserve the union of your soul and body; nor without the express command of him who gave you a soul, should the least thought be entertained of quitting human life, lest you seem to desert the post assigned you by God himself. Follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me your father, in paying a strict regard to justice and piety; the influence of which towards parents and relations is great indeed, but that to our country greatest of all. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of those, who after having lived on earth, and been disunited from body, inhabit the place you now behold.

Now



Now\* it was that shining circle or zone, whose remarkable brightness distinguishes it among the constellations; and which, after the *Greeks*, you call the *milky orb*†:

From which, as I took a view of the universe, every thing appeared beautiful and admirable: for there, not only those stars were to be seen, that are never visible from this globe‡; but all of them of such magnitude as we could not have imagined. The least of all the stars was that removed farthest from the heavens, and situate nearest the earth; which shone with a borrowed light. Now the globes of the stars far surpassed || the magnitude of our earth;

\* Here *Scipio* begins to speak, and 'tis not known what became of his father afterwards.

† Hence its appellation, among us, of the *milky way*; which is a vast collection of stars, that by their nearness and arrangement, trace a kind of road in the heavens. See the different opinions of the ancients on this subject, in a work ascribed to *Plutarch*, *de placit. philos.* III. 1.

‡ There are stars so remote, that 'tis impossible to discern them with the eye. As a proof hereof we need only mention the modern invention of telescopes, by the assistance of which a great many stars have been discovered, that were not known to the ancients.

|| One cannot precisely determine what the magnitude of a star is. To judge of it by the help of optics, its exact distance from

which at that distance appeared so exceeding small, that I could not but be sensibly affected on seeing our whole empire no larger, than if we only touched the earth, as it were, in a single point.

As \* I continued to observe the earth with still greater attention, how long I pray, says *Africanus*, will your mind be fixed on that object? Why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples whither you are arrived? The universe is composed of nine circles, or rather spheres†, the uppermost of which is this celestial one, that comprehends all the rest, and where the supreme God resides, who bounds and contains the whole. In it are

the earth must be known. The learned Mr. *Huygens*, in his *Cosmothecoros*, pretends that a cannon-ball would be about 70,000 years in reaching the fixed stars; and he supposes that the said ball, moving always with the same velocity, passes over about 100 fathoms in a second of time. Whence it will move 360,000 fathoms in an hour; so that the whole distance of the fixed stars, according to the above supposition, will be 220,752,000,000,000 fathoms, or 250,854,545,454, and a half miles.

\* Cap. 4.

† The best commentary to explain this passage, is to have an armillary sphere to look at.

fixed

fixed those stars, which revolve with never-varying courses. Below this are seven other spheres, which move backwards, or with a contrary motion to that of the heavens: one of these is taken up by the globe, which the inhabitants of the earth call *Saturn*. Next to that is the star of *Jupiter*, so benign and salutary to mankind. The third in order is that fiery and terrible planet, called *Mars*. Below this again, almost in the middle region, is the sun, that leader, governor, and prince of the other luminaries, that mind and temperament of the world, whose bulk is so vastly great, that he fills and enlightens all things with his rays. Then follow *Venus* and *Mercury*, that attend, as it were, on the sun. Lastly, the moon, which shines only by the reflected rays of the sun, moves in the lowest sphere of all: below which, if we except that gift of the Gods, human souls, every thing is mortal, and tends to dissolution; but above it all is eternal\*.

\* It may be concluded from this passage, that *Cicero* was not for a plurality of peopled worlds; for if all things above the moon be free from corruption, there can be no generation, and consequently no animals. As to the moon herself, several of the ancients believed she was inhabited like the earth. See *Acad.* II. 39.

For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the centre, is immoveable, and to it all heavy bodies naturally tend, as being the lowest place in the universe.

After \* recovering myself from the amazement, occasioned by such a wonderful prospect, I thus bespoke *Africanus*. What, pray, is this sound, that strikes my ears in so loud and agreeable a manner? To which he replied, it is that produced by the impulse and motion of the spheres; and being formed by unequal intervals †, (but

\* Cap. 5.

† I am indebted, says the *Abbé d'Olivet*, for this and the following remark, to M. *Burette*; whom I have consulted on this subject, as being better acquainted with the music of the ancients, than any other of our learned men.

“ *Cicero*, agreeably to the imaginary system of *Pythagoras*, compares in this place the motions of the seven planets, and the orb of the fixed stars, which makes up the number of eight, to the vibratory motions of eight strings, which composed the ancient instrument called *Octachord*, that was formed of two separate *Tetrachords*, or of eight strings in all, which, in the Diatonic system of music, gave the following eight sounds of our music, *mi, fa, sol, la, si, ut, re, mi*; so that the moon, as being the lowest of the planets, corresponds to *mi*, the greatest of the eight sounds; *Mercury*, to *fa*; *Venus*, to *sol*; the *Sun*, to *la*; *Mars*, to *si*; *Jupiter*, to *ut*; *Saturn*, to *re*; and the orb of the fixed stars, as being the highest of all, to *mi*, which is the acutest  
such,

such, however, as are divided according to the justest proportion) it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave sounds, various concerts of music. For it is impossible that motions so great should be performed without any noise; and it is agreeable to nature, that the extreams on the one side should produce sharp, and on the other flat, sounds. For which reason the sphere of the fixed stars being highest, and carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a shrill and acute sound: whereas that of the moon being lowest, moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth sphere, it remains immoveably fixed in the middle or lowest part of the world. Now the revolutions of these eight orbs, every two of which have the same force \*, give seven distinct

“ sound, and makes an octave with the gravest. These eight  
 “ sounds, then, are separated by eight intervals, according to cer-  
 “ tain proportions; so that from *mi* to *fa*, is an hemitone; from  
 “ *mi* to *sol*, a third minor; from *mi* to *la*, a fourth; from *mi* to *si*,  
 “ a fifth; from *mi* to *ut*, a sixth minor; and from *mi* to *re*, a  
 “ seventh minor; which together with the octave make seven  
 “ consonances in all.”

\* “ *Cicero* says, *illi autem octo cursus, in quibus eadem vis est duor-*  
 “ *um, &c.* On which we remark, that the two words, *eadem vis,*  
 I 4 sounds;

sounds; which number is the measure of almost all things in the world.

This celestial harmony has been imitated by learned musicians\*, both on stringed

“ may be taken in two different senses, either for the revolutions  
 “ of two stars, the inequality of which is so small, that they may  
 “ well enough correspond to the vibrations of two strings of the  
 “ octachord tuned unisons; or for the revolutions of two stars, one  
 “ of which is twice as rapid as the other, whereby it resembles the  
 “ vibrations of the two extreme strings of the octachord, or those  
 “ marked *mi*, that are at the interval of an octave from each  
 “ other. It is in this last sense that the *Latin* phrase *eadem vis*  
 “ *est duorum*, ought to be taken; and thus it is in the edition of  
 “ *Gravius*, agreeable to what is found in several manuscripts. In  
 “ this case, all the principal consonances are taken into the com-  
 “ parison; whereas if *Mercurii & Veneris* be added to the *eadem*  
 “ *vis est duorum*, as may be seen in some editions, supported like-  
 “ wise by the authority of some manuscripts, we must give it the  
 “ first sense, by causing the octave to make way for the unison,  
 “ which is not a consonance. In fact, if this was the case, the  
 “ sphere of the fixed stars would not be an octave to that of the  
 “ moon, but only a seventh to it; because, say some interpreters,  
 “ *Mercury* and *Venus* being almost unisons on account of the in-  
 “ considerable inequality of their revolutions, they must  
 “ both of them be only about a hemitone from the moon; and  
 “ consequently the system of the stars would answer, not to an  
 “ octachord, but to an heptachord, or an instrument with seven  
 “ strings, composed of six consonances, or intervals, and wholly  
 “ destitute of the octave, which nevertheless is one of the prin-  
 “ cipal consonances, and the complement, as it were, of the  
 “ harmoniac system. This has made some people conjecture, that  
 “ the words *Mercurii & Veneris* may be only a gloss, which, tho’  
 “ at first only written in the margin, might afterwards have  
 “ crept into the text.”

\* *Amphion, Linus, Orpheus, &c.*

instru-

instruments and with the voice ; whereby they have opened themselves a way to return hither : as have likewise many others, who have employed their sublime genius, while on earth, in cultivating the divine sciences.

By the stupifying noise of this sound, the ears of mankind have been rendered deaf ; and, indeed, hearing is the dullest of all the human senses. Thus the people who inhabit near the cataracts of the *Nile*, are by the excessive roar which that river makes in precipitating itself from those vastly high mountains, entirely deprived of the sense of hearing. Now so inconceivably great is the sound produced by the rapid motion of the whole universe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it, than the eye is able to look steadfastly and directly on the sun, whose beams easily dazzle the strongest sight.

While \* I was busied in admiring this scene of wonders, I could not help casting

\* Cap. 6.

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my eyes every now and then upon the earth. On which, says *Africanus*, I perceive you are still taken up in contemplating the feat of mankind: now if it appears to you so small as in fact it really is, despise its vanities, and fix your attention for ever on these heavenly objects. Is it possible you should attain any human applause, or glory, that is worth the contending for? The earth, you see, is peopled but in very few places, and those too of small extent; so that they appear like so many spots, as it were, scattered through vast uncultivated deserts: its inhabitants are not only so remote from each other, as to cut off all mutual correspondence; but their situation being either oblique, on contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps diametrically opposite to yours, all expectations of universal fame must fall to the ground. You may likewise observe that the same globe of the earth is girt and surrounded, as it were, with certain zones; whereof those two which are most remote from each other, and lie under the opposite poles of heaven, are congealed with frost; but that one in  
the



the middle, which is by far the largest, is scorched with the intense heat of the sun. The other two only are habitable\*, one towards the south, the inhabitants of which are your Antipodes, with whom you have no connexion: the other towards the north is that you inhabit, whereof a very small part, as you may see, falls to your share. For the whole extent of what you possess is but a small island, narrow at both ends and wide towards the middle, which is surrounded by the sea, called on earth the Atlantic, the Great Sea, and the Ocean. You cannot but remark how exceeding small it is, notwithstanding its pompous titles. Now I would ask if it be possible for your fame, or that of any other *Roman*, to be carried from these known and cultivated parts of the earth, over mount

\* Virgil, *Georg.* I. 233; Ovid, *Metam.* I. 49; Pliny, II. 69; in a word, all the ancients were persuaded that only two of the five zones were inhabited, or even habitable. Their ignorance in this respect would cease to occasion our surprise, did we but reflect that even at this day, and notwithstanding the great helps we draw from commerce and navigation, we are far from knowing all the countries that are inhabited. Discoveries of this sort are the work of time and chance, and not of human wit. See *Remark*, p. 7.

*Caucasus*\* yonder, or cross the *Ganges*†? Who in the remotest places of the east and west, or those of the north and south, shall hear your name so much as mentioned? And if these are left out of the account, you see within what scanty bounds your ambition would exert itself. *A*

Now || as to those very persons who shall speak of you, how long, pray, will they do it? Besides, allowing that the succeeding generations of men were desirous to transmit down to posterity the fine things they have heard their fathers tell of us; yet by reason of inundations and conflagrations, which must unavoidably happen at certain periods, 'tis impossible our reputation should be of any considerable, much less of an eternal duration.

Again, what great matter is it, to have your praise celebrated by those who come after you; when they that preceded, whose

\* *Caucasus*, a mountain of *Colchis*, towards the mouth of the river *Phasis*.

† *Ganges*, a river of the *East-Indies*.

|| Cap. 7.

number was not perhaps less, and merit certainly greater, were not so much as acquainted with your name?

And the more so, that not one of those who shall hear of us, is able to retain in his memory the transactions of one year. The bulk of mankind, indeed, measure their year by the return of the sun, which is only one star; but the true and compleat year is when all the stars shall have returned to the place whence they set out, and after long periods shall have again exhibited the same aspect of the whole heavens: and, indeed, I scarcely dare attempt to enumerate the vast multitude of ages contained in it. For as the sun was eclipsed, and seemed to be extinguished, at the time when the soul of *Romulus* penetrated into these eternal mansions; so when all the constellations and stars shall revert to their primary position, and the sun shall at the same point, and time, be again eclipsed, the grand year shall then be compleated. Be assured, however, that the twentieth \* part of it is not yet elapsed.

\* By supposing the date of this dream to be in the year of the consulship of *Munilius*, and that *Romulus*, according to F. *Petau*,  
Now

Now had you no hopes of returning to this place, where great and good men enjoy all that their souls could wish; of what, pray, would be the signification of all human glory, which can hardly endure for a small portion of one year\*?

Wherefore if you desire to entertain exalted expectations, and keep in view this eternal place of residence; let not the discourse of the vulgar make any impression upon you, nor place your utmost hopes in human rewards: virtue alone, by her own proper charms, ought to allure you to true honour. What others shall talk of you, for talk they will, is their concern. All discourse, however, of this nature is confined within the narrow limits of the countries you now behold; with regard to every man they are but of short duration, decrease in proportion as the present gene-

died in the 38th year of *Rome*, there are 568 years between them; and since this space of time does not make the twentieth part of a grand year, it justifies what is reported of *Cicero* in the dialogue *de Caufis corr. Eloq. cap. 16.* that according to him this grand year is not completed till 12854 years.

\* How agreeable are the sentiments of this great philosopher to the doctrines of Christianity! The apostle *Peter* tells us, that  
ration

ration die, and are quite forgotten by posterity.

After \* these words, I thus addressed *Africanus*. Though from my infancy I have closely followed my father's and your illustrious example, and never degenerated from it; yet since all those who have deserved well of their country have free admission into heaven, I shall redouble my efforts, now that I have the prospect of so ample a reward.

Do so, replied he, and be assured that nothing of you, except the body, is mortal. For it is not this external form, or figure, that falls under the notice of our senses, which constitutes your being; 'tis the soul, and not the body, that makes the real man. Know then that you are a

*all the glory of man is as the flower of grass; and St. Paul desires the Colossians to set their affection on things above, not on things on the earth.* This is an ambition more than heroic. To aspire after eternal happiness, purifies the soul from every low passion, and exalts it to a pitch above the herd of mankind: and yet we see an heathen animated with this divine ambition. A thought which should make worldlings blush, who assume to themselves the sacred title of Christians!

† Cap. 8.

God,

God, if he can be said to possess divinity, who has life, intelligence, memory, and foresight in himself; and who rules, governs, and moves the body allotted him, as the supreme God does the universe: and as God, who is eternal, gives motion to the world, which is in part mortal\*; so the immortal soul moves the body, that is subject to corruption.

For whatever is always in motion, is eternal; but that which communicates motion to another, and is itself impelled by some external agent, must necessarily cease to live, when the motion ceases. That therefore alone, which moves itself, can never cease to move, because it is never deserted by itself†. Besides, such a mo-

\* All the ancients believed the universe incorruptible, as to its matter; that is, they were persuaded that the matter of which it is composed could not be annihilated. But the greater part of them, and especially the Stoics, were of opinion, that it was corruptible and perishable, with regard to its form.

† All the natural arguments, adduced to prove the immortality of the soul, may be reduced to the two following heads, *viz.*  
1. The nature of the soul itself, its desires, passions, sense of moral good and evil, increase in knowledge and perfection, principle of self-motion, &c. 2. The nature of God, as a wise, just, and good creator and governor of the world.

tion must be the source and principle of all others whatever.

Now a principle has no origin: for from it all things are derived; yet is itself derived from nothing, otherwise it would be no principle. And if it has no beginning, it consequently must have no end; because being once extinct, it could neither be reproduced by another, or of itself give birth to any thing, since all things must necessarily spring from some principle.

*Cicero*, we find, draws the most of his arguments from the former of these topics; which, to men of a philosophical turn, will appear perfectly conclusive, because nature, or rather the God of nature, does nothing in vain. But arguments drawn from the latter head, are not only better adapted to convince men unacquainted with abstract reasoning, but equally certain and conclusive with the former: *Shall not the judge of all the earth do right*, is a question which all mankind will resolve in the affirmative. And therefore arguments drawn from the manifest and constant prosperity of the wicked, and the frequent unhappiness of good men in this life, must convince every candid and thinking person, that there is a future state wherein all will be set right, and God's attributes of wisdom, justice, and goodness fully vindicated. Had the virtuous no hope of a future state, *they would be of all men most miserable*; but as this is absolutely inconsistent with the character of God, the certainty of such a state is clear to a demonstration.

Hence

Hence it is, that the principle of motion is in that Being, which moves by an intrinsic power of its own, and can neither have a beginning or end; otherwise the whole heavens would go to wreck, and all nature be at a stand, without a possibility of recovering any power, whereby she might be set in motion, as at first.

Since \* then it is manifest, that whatever moves of itself is eternal; who can deny that the human soul is endowed with this power? For whatever being is set in motion by external impulse, is inanimate, or without a soul. But an animated being is moved by a proper intrinsic motion of its own; for this power is natural and peculiar to the soul. And since it alone, of all other beings, moves itself, we may fairly conclude that it never had a beginning, and that it will continue for ever.

Let it then have full employment in matters of the highest importance; and such are all efforts in defence of our coun-

\* Cap. 9.



try. The soul that exercises and exerts itself, in actions of this kind, will have a more speedy flight to this blessed abode, its true home.

This it will do with still greater swiftness, if even while shut up in the body, it free and abstract itself as much as possible from the body, in order to contemplate external objects.

For the souls of those who have devoted themselves to, and become the slaves of, sensual pleasures; and by blindly following the impulse of such passions as are subservient to sensuality, have violated all laws divine and humane; such souls as these, I say, are tossed to and fro about the earth; nor do they return to this place, till after they have been tormented in this manner for many ages.

On this he withdrew, and I awoke from sleep.

## XII.

## MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS.

**H**AD \* nature formed us in such a manner, as to be able, at first sight, to discover and fully comprehend herself, and, under her infallible conduct, to regulate the whole affairs of life, there would have been no need of reason and instruction. But in fact, she has only endowed us with faint glimmering sparks; which by our immorality and depraved opinions are so extinguished, that the light of nature nowhere appears. The seeds of virtue, 'tis true, are blended with our very constitution; and were they suffered to grow up to maturity, nature could not fail to lead us to happiness. But as the case now stands, from our very first appearance in the world, we are constantly engaged in all manner of wickedness, and entertain

\* Tuscul. III. 1.

the most grossly absurd notions that can be imagined ; so that we may be said to suck in error with our nurse's milk. When brought home to our parents, and placed under the care of preceptors, then it is we imbibe such a variety of erroneous sentiments, that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself yields to confirmed prejudice. To these the poets may be added ; who, carrying a great shew of learning and wisdom, are listened to, read, studied, and imprinted, as it were, on our minds. Now if we add to all this the populace, which, though a multitude universally agreed in every thing that is wrong, is notwithstanding the greatest of all other directors of opinion ; when this, I say, is taken into the account, no wonder if we lose sight of nature, and are quite bewildered in the most pernicious errors :

*Be a pattern to others* \*, and then all will go well ; for as a whole city is infected by

\* De Legib. III. 13, 14. 'Tis to *Atticus Cicero* addressed himself.

the licentious passions and vices of great men, so it is likewise reformed by their moderation. *I Lucullus*, a man of the first rank, being raised for the magnificence of his seat at *Tusculum*, is said to have made the following extremely suitable answer; that he had two neighbours, the greater of whom was only a *Roman knight*\*, and the other the son of one who had been once a slave: and as each of them had magnificent villa's, it could not be thought an extravagance in him, what was lawful for those of inferior rank. Alas! *Lucullus*, you are not sensible, that it was you gave rise to their ambition; were it not for your example, such an action in them would be looked on as criminal. Who could bear that people of

\* There were three orders, or ranks, of people among the *Romans*; the *Patrician*, which comprehends the Nobles; the *Equestrian*, that consisted only of Knights; and the *Plebeian*, or that of the Commons.

To be a knight, it was necessary they should have a certain revenue, that their poverty might not disgrace the order; and when they fell short of the said revenue, they were expunged out of the list of knights, and thrust down among the *Plebeians*. Ten thousand crowns is computed to have been the revenue required.

this sort should have their villa's crowded with statues and pictures, relating either to public, or, what is more, to sacred and religious subjects? Who would not join in demolishing the monuments of their vanity and pride, if those who ought to exert themselves on such an occasion, were not guilty of the same extravagance? For the mischief necessarily attending the vices of the great, though that must be allowed to be very considerable, is but small when compared with the ill consequences, which arise from the multitude of those who will certainly follow their example.

Would you but look into the history of former ages, you might plainly see, that the manners of the people were always regulated by those of the leading men of a state; and that whatever change took place in the latter, the same always happened in the former. Now this observation is much more certain than that of *Plato*, who pretends that a change in the songs of musicians is able to alter the manners of a nation: whereas my opinion is, that the manners of mankind change  
with

with those of their superiors. Whence great men of a vicious life are doubly pernicious to the state, as being not only guilty of immoral practices themselves, but likewise the authors of spreading them among their fellow-citizens. The mischief they do, is owing not only to their being debauched themselves; but also to their debauching of others. In a word, they do more harm by their example, than by the crimes they commit.

*Plato*\*, that prince of genius and learning, was of opinion that states would never be happy, till either wise and learned men took the government upon them; or those who governed applied themselves to the study of wisdom and knowledge. Such a conjunction of power and wisdom, was, in his mind, abundantly capable of promoting the happiness of public communities.

The † question being put to *Socrates*, whether *Archelaus* the son of *Perdiccas*,

\* *Ad Q. Frat. I. ep. I. cap. 10.*

† *Tuscul. V. 12.*

who

who in the estimation of the world passed for the happiest man alive, was, in his opinion, 'really so, or not. He replied, *I know nothing of the matter, for I never had any conversation with him.* What? Is there no other way of coming at the knowledge of it? *None at all.* Cannot you then positively say, whether the great king of *Persia* himself be happy? *How should I, who am ignorant how learned and virtuous he is?* Is it in this then you imagine the happiness of life consists? *Yes truly, it is my opinion, that the good only are happy, and the wicked miserable.* Is *Archelaus* then unhappy? *Certainly, if he is unjust.*

What \* greatly detracts from the magnificence and sumptuousness of entertainments is, that nature loves simplicity and plainness: for who does not perceive, that all things of this nature owe their relish to appetite? *Darius*, in his flight, being obliged to drink water, which was not

\* Tuscul. V. 34.

only muddy, but likewise stained with dead bodies, affirmed he never before had drank with such pleasure: for this plain reason, because he never had done so when thirsty. Nor had *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, ever eaten with an appetite; but being on a progress through his dominions without his ordinary retinue about him, he happened to go into a cottage, where he met with no other entertainment than plain household bread; which proved the sweetest refreshment he ever tasted.

Though \* every branch of knowledge be attended with many difficulties, though such the obscurity which envelopes things themselves, and so great the uncertainty of our determinations concerning them, that it was not without reason the most learned men of antiquity had little hopes of finding out the great object of their researches; yet they were not wanting on their part, nor shall we so far lose courage, as to give

\* Academic. II. 3. *Cicero* speaks here of the Academics opposed to the Dogmatists; and were there nothing else, this passage alone is sufficient to overturn the sentiments of some moderns, who take the Academics for Pyrrhonists.



up our enquiries. Now the only design of these disquisitions, is by arguing on both sides of the question, to force, as it were, a discovery of the truth, or something as near it as possible: nor is there any difference between us and those who imagine they possess the knowledge of things, unless it be, that they are fully persuaded of the truth of their opinions: whereas we hold many things to be only probable; which may very well serve to regulate our conduct, though we cannot positively say they are certain.

In this however we have greatly the advantage of them, as being more disengaged, more unbiaſſed, and at full liberty to determine as our judgment shall direct. We lie under no obligation to maintain whatever sentiments are prescribed, and in a manner commanded.

As for others, they engage themselves to one side, before they are able to judge which is best: and either take up with the opinions of a friend, at an age capable of nothing, or, charmed with the discourse of the first person they hear, pretend to judge

of matters far above their knowledge; and to whatever sect chance unites them, they embrace it as a man in a storm would do the first rock he is thrown upon.

They reply, indeed, that they put such an entire confidence in none but one they know to be a wise man; and this conduct of theirs should have my approbation, were it possible for persons void of all learning and education, to form such a judgment: for it is certainly the chief characteristic of a wise man, to be able to determine who are so. But in order to this, they ought not only to have examined every circumstance, but likewise to know the opinions of others; whereas they have given their judgment on a single hearing, and sheltered themselves under the authority of one man. But the generality of mankind, I know not how, are fond of error, and rather strenuously defend the opinion they have once embraced, than with candour and impartiality examine what sentiments are most agreeable to truth.\*.

\* How similar, alas! are the present times to those of *Cicero*! We pretend, 'tis true, to have many advantages over former

\* As the laws are above magistrates, so are the magistrates above the people: and it may truly be said, that the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate.

There † are three things necessary to form a good senator: that he be always present; for when an assembly is numerous, it adds weight to their deliberations: that he speak in his turn, that is, when the question is put to him: that he do it in a becoming manner, and know when to leave off; for brevity is not only a merit in a senator, but even in an orator.

The ‡ more virtuous any man is, the more difficult is it for him to harbour a suspicion that others are wicked.

age, but where does this appear? If we know human nature better, how comes it that the same absurd customs, and that with some aggravating circumstances, still prevail?

\* De Legib. III. 1.

† De Legib. III. 18.

‡ Ad Q. Frat. 1. ep. I. cap. 4.

It \* is certainly no small superiority of nature and understanding, that, of all the animal world, man alone has any idea of order, decency, and a due mean necessary to be observed both in his words and actions. Hence with regard to the objects of sight, he is the only animal which is sensible of their beauty, gracefulness, and symmetry of parts; and this similitude of visible things being by reason applied to the mind, he is convinced that beauty, constancy, and order ought much more to take place in our designs and actions: he is likewise careful to do nothing in an unbecoming and unmanly way: also, that his sentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be free from the influence of all unruly passions.

*Sp. † Carvilius* being much lamed by a wound he had received in the service of the commonwealth, was on that account ashamed to appear in public: *My Spurius,*

\* *Offic. I. 4.*

† *De Orat. II. 61.*

said his mother to him, *why don't you appear abroad, that every step you take may remind you of your virtues?*

Cato \* has left it on record, that the elder Scipio, who first had the surname of *Africanus*, was wont to say, *he was never less at leisure, than when at leisure; nor less alone, than when alone.* This excellent saying, and truly worthy of a great and wise man, plainly shews that he spent even the usual times of relaxation in some valuable employment; and, in his retirement, used to converse with himself; so that he was never idle, nor had always occasion to be entertained by the conversation of others. Solitude, therefore, and leisure, two things which render other men indolent, gave him new life and activity.

I † never accounted treasures, splendid palaces, posts of dignity and power, nor even the pleasures of sense, to which some

\* Offic. III. 1.

† Parad. I. 1.

men are entirely devoted, among the number of things really good in themselves, and worthy our pursuit ; because I observed, that they who possessed the largest share of them, had by far the most craving appetite for more : for the thirst of avarice is never quenched or satisfied ; nor are persons of this complexion only tormented with the pain of acquiring, but likewise that of losing, their wealth. Tho' our ancestors were, in this respect, men of the greatest temperance, yet I am frequently at a loss to account for their prudence, in giving the name of *Goods* to insignificant and perishing riches ; when, in fact, they had very different sentiments of them, as appears from their actions. Can a wicked man possess any thing that is good ? Or, is it possible for one to have great plenty of things really good, and not be good himself ? And yet we see all such pretended goods pressed into the service of wicked men, to the prejudice of the good. Let therefore any person ridicule me that pleases, I shall always pay a greater regard to the dictates of right reason, than  
to

to vulgar prejudices: I shall never say of one who has lost his cattle or furniture, that he has lost his goods; nor shall I be sparing in my praises of *Bias*, one of the seven wise men; who, when his native country *Priene*\* was taken by the enemy, being admonished to imitate others that were betaking themselves to flight, and carrying off a considerable part of their effects; *I do so*, replied he, *for I carry every thing that is mine about me*. He looked on whatever is the sport of fortune, as no wise belonging to him; and yet we call them goods. Some will ask, what then is good? I answer, that, in my opinion, nothing is good but what is agreeable to justice, honour, and virtue.

First † of all, we ought to determine under what character, and in what station, we are to appear in the world. To fix this point, is a matter of the utmost difficulty: for at our first entrance upon youth, a time when we are the least capable of forming

\* A city of *Lidia*, near the mouth of the river *Meander*.

† *Oslo*, I. 32

a judgment with propriety, every one makes his choice according as fancy directs him ; so that he is actually engaged in some particular course of life, before he is able to judge which is best. It is related indeed by *Xenophon*, that *Hercules* of *Prodicus* \* being arrived at manhood, a season when it is natural for every one to chuse what course of life he shall pursue, retired into a desert, where sitting himself down, he continued for a long time much perplexed which way he should take, there being two paths then in his view, one leading to pleasure, and the other to virtue. This might possibly do well enough for *Hercules*, the son of *Jupiter* ; but not so for us, who imitate such persons as hit our several tastes, to whose studies and manner of life we naturally attach ourselves.

Since then our natural disposition has the greatest influence on our way of living, and, next to it, the situation of our fortune ; we ought, by all means, to have regard to both these in determining this af-

\* That is to say, according to what is related of *Hercules* by *Prodicus* the Sophist,



fair; but principally to our natural genius, as being far more certain, and less liable to change.

*Philip* \* king of *Macedon*, 'tis true, was inferior to his son in glory and military achievements; but in humanity and courteous behaviour, his superior. Hence the one was always great, the other frequently brutal to the highest degree. So that it is an excellent advice, that the more elevated our situation, the more submissive should be our demeanour.

We † ought to respect all men, not only the virtuous, but others too; for to have no concern what the world thinks of us, besides its being extremely arrogant, is the sure characteristic of a person lost to all virtue.

Tho' ‡ *Xerxes* enjoyed all that fortune could bestow; yet, not satisfied with be-

\* *Offic.* I. 26.

† *Offic.* I. 28.

‡ *Tufcul.* V. 7.

ing master of powerful armies, numerous fleets, and immense treasures, he offered a reward to the man who should invent some new delight. Nor did even that content him ; for thirst of pleasure is insatiable. As for me, I should be glad we could, at any price, engage some person to find out a new reason, which should more strongly convince us, that virtue alone is sufficient to make us live happy.

What \* means, I pray, this extravagant vanity in recounting your riches? Are you the only rich man in the world? O heavens! What do I hear? Shall I not rejoice at every addition to my knowledge? Are you alone then rich? But what if you are not? Nay what if you be even poor? For whom, I would ask, do we call rich ; or, to whom does this epithet properly belong? I suppose 'tis one who has enough to make him live genteelly ; and being satisfied with this, neither desires or wishes for any more. 'Tis not your possessions, or what

\* Parad. VI. 1. 'Tis thought by some, that *Craffus* is here meant, who was the richest man of his time.

mankind may say of you, but your mind alone, that can determine whether you are rich or not. Are you fully satisfied with what you have ; supplied with every thing your heart could wish ; and even content with your present supply of cash ? Then you are a rich man, I allow. But, on the contrary, if you are such a slave to avarice, as to think no sort of gain dishonourable ; whereas every kind of it, in a man of your rank \*, must be so ; if you are every day guilty of fraud, deceit, exaction, dishonest bargains, theft, or robbery ; if you plunder the allies, or rob the public treasury ; if you expect great things from the wills of your friends, and not only so, but even forge them yourself : are these, I pray, the signs of a rich, or poor, man ? 'Tis the mind, not the coffer, of a man that can be said to be rich. Though the latter should be ever so full ; yet, if empty yourself, I shall never think you a rich man. Wealth is measured by the necessities of mankind. Have you a daughter ?

\* A senator was not allowed to deal in any kind of traffic.

Then

Then doubtless you have occasion for money. Have you two? You need a greater sum? Have you several of them? Then a still greater. And if you have fifty of them, as *Danaus* is said to have had, so many portions require a large estate: for, as I said before, the standard of riches is regulated according to every man's necessity. Can he, therefore, be called rich, who, instead of many daughters, has appetites without number, capable of soon exhausting the greatest estate? No, he himself is sensible of his poverty.

Let \* our conversation, like that in which the followers of *Socrates* excel, be free from noisy impertinence and obstinacy; let it be graceful, and full of spirit; and let us by no means exclude others from their share, as if it made part of our property: but as in other social matters, so in conversation, let every one be contented to speak in his turn†. The first

\* Offic. I. 37.

† *Vicissitude*, says the Earl of *Shaftsbury*, is a mighty law of discourse, and mightily longed for by mankind.--To be obstructed  
thing

thing to be considered, is the subject to be spoke to: if it be serious, it should be handled with gravity; if of a merry and gay turn, with wit and pleasantry; but above all things, we must be extremely cautious, that our discourse betray no defect in our morals. This last chiefly happens, when the absent are purposely defamed, ridiculed, and their character handled with severity, contempt, and ill-nature. Now the topics of conversation are, for the most part, private and domestic concerns, the affairs of the public, or some point of learning. If therefore the discourse happens to deviate from these to something else, we should by all means endeavour to bring it back: but whatever turn the conversation shall take, (for all men are not pleased with the same things, and in such as they like, the degrees of ap-

therefore and manacled in conferences, and to be confined to hear orations on certain subjects, must needs give us a distaste, and render the subjects so managed, as disagreeable as the managers. Men had rather reason upon trifles, so they may reason freely, and without the imposition of authority, than on the usefulest and best subjects in the world, where they are held under a restraint and fear. See *Essay on Wit and Humour*.

probation

probation are very different, and not the same at all times) we ought to be particularly attentive, how far it may with pleasure be persisted in; and as good sense should direct us when to speak, so let moderation teach us when to leave off.

*Themistocles* \* being asked, whether he had rather marry his daughter to a poor man with an unblemished reputation, or to a rich one whose character was not altogether so perfect: he replied, *I had rather have a man without money, than money without a man.*

It † is an admirable observation of *Socrates*, that the nearest and most compendious way to glory, was for a man to be in reality what he would have others think him. But if there are any, who think to acquire solid glory by mere ostentation and vain pretence, by a studied speech, or even a formal look, they are very much mistaken. True glory takes deep root, and

\* *Offic.* II. 20.

† *Ibid.* c. 12.

is productive of fruit : whereas all fiction, like the blossom of trees, quickly falls to the ground, it being impossible for any thing of that nature to be lasting.

*Philip* \*, in a letter to his son *Alexander*, takes an excellent method to reprove him, for endeavouring to gain the affections of the *Macedonians* by base prodigality. *On what grounds, says he, can you expect that they will prove faithful to you, whom you have corrupted by bribery? Is it your intention that the Macedonians should look upon you, not as their king, but as their treasurer or steward?*

Though † the laws of the twelve tables have made very few offences punishable by death; the following one, however, they thought proper to rank in that number, *viz. if any person sung, or composed, a poem tending to defame or abuse another* : And that with very good reason; for it is to courts of justice, and the

\* Offic. II. 15.

† Frag. lib. VI. de Rep.

lawful proceedings of magistrates, not the fancies of poets, that we ought to be accountable for our behaviour: nor is it fit we should hear ourselves defamed, unless where we are allowed to answer to the charge, and defend our reputation by a fair trial.

To \* desire what is wrong, is of itself no small unhappiness; nor is it so great a misfortune, not to obtain our wishes, as to wish to obtain what is improper.

A † quarrel falling out between *Themistocles* and a man of the island *Seriphos* ||, who had reproached him, that he owed his renown, not to his own virtues, but the glory of his country; the former replied, *I am sensible if I was a native of Seriphos, I should not be noble; nor would you, though an Athenian, ever be illustrious.*

\* Fragm. Hortens.

† De Senect. cap. 3.

|| *Seriphos*, a small island in the *Archipelago*, called at present *Serfina*.



*Dionysius* \* having usurped the throne of *Syracuse* at the age of twenty-five, continued his tyrannic government for thirty-eight years. How beautiful, how opulent, the city thus enslaved by him! Now it is related of him by authors of good credit, that he was a man of the greatest temperance with regard to diet, and in managing business, active and bold; but withal naturally mischievous and unjust. Whence in the eyes of all who see things in a true light, he must appear wretched to the highest degree.

Even when in possession of the sovereign power, he was far from enjoying the happiness he had so passionately coveted: For though descended of virtuous parents and an honourable family, and blessed with an extensive acquaintance among those of his own rank, yet he put no confidence in any of them; but chose foreigners, fierce barbarians, and a certain number of slaves selected from the most wealthy families of *Syracuse*, for his life-guard. Thus he, in

\* Tufcul. V. 20, 21.

a manner, shut himself up in a prison, for no other reason but the lawless thirst of tyrannic power. Nay, what is still more, that he might not trust his throat to a barber, he taught his own daughters to shave; so that these young princeesses, reduced to the most fordid employment, were obliged to perform the office of barber to their father, by shaving his beard and hair. Notwithstanding all this caution, he would not trust a razor even with them, when grown up to years of maturity; but taught them to singe off his beard and hair with the burning coals of walnut-shells.

As he had two wives, *Aristomache* a native of *Syracuse*, and *Doris* a *Locrian*, he never visited either of them by night, without first having their apartments thoroughly searched. And as he had caused his bed-chamber to be surrounded with a broad moat, over which lay a small wooden draw-bridge; this, on shutting the door, he drew up towards the chamber.

It was his custom to harangue the people from a high tower; because he durst  
not

not trust himself in the places commonly used for that purpose.

One day having a mind to play at Tennis, a game he was mighty fond of; and stripping for that purpose, he is said to have delivered his sword to a youth, who was greatly in favour with him. Upon which one of his intimate friends said by way of jest, *Here then is one with whom you can trust your life*; and the young gentleman having smiled, he commanded them both to be put to death: the one, because he had pointed out a way of dispatching him, and the other, for having by his smile approved of the hint. This action, however, gave him the most uneasiness he ever suffered in his life; for he had the most tender affection for the young gentleman, whom he had thus put to death. In this manner are weak men distracted between opposite passions. If you indulge the one, you must offer violence to the other.

Was this tyrant happy? Hear his own judgment of the matter: for one of his parasites, called *Damocles*, having launched  
out

out in praise of his forces, power, sovereign majesty, riches of all kinds, and the magnificence of his palaces, and affirming that never man was so happy; *Will you then*, says the Tyrant to *Damocles*, *taste this life you are so much delighted with, and take a trial of my lot?* Upon his replying that nothing could be more to his wish, he ordered him to be placed on a sofa of gold with most splendid coverings, that were beautified with magnificent works of embroidery; he likewise caused several buffets to be furnished with gold and silver plate of curious workmanship. Some young slaves, of incomparable beauty, were appointed to wait at table; who had orders to watch his very looks, and serve him at a nod. Nor were the choicest ointments and garlands wanting; the sweetest perfumes were burnt; and his table covered with the most exquisite viands. In a word, *Damocles* thought himself compleatly happy; when in the midst of this entertainment, the tyrant commanded a drawn sword, of the brightest polish, to be suspended from the cieling, by a single horse-

horse-hair, over the head of this happy man. From this instant the beautiful attendants, and curious plate, no more charmed his eyes; the delicacies on the table were no longer sought after; the garlands fell down of themselves; in fine, he begged leave of the tyrant to retire, for that now he had no mind to be happy.

*Pompey* \* was wont to tell, how in his return from *Syria* having put into *Rhodes*, he had a great desire to hear the lectures of *Posidonius*; but being told that he was extremely bad of a fit of the gout, he thought he could do no less, however, than pay a visit to so renowned a philosopher. On being introduced, he saluted him in terms of the greatest respect †, and expressed his concern, that he could not have the pleasure of hearing him. *But you may*, replied the other, *for bodily pain*

\* Tuscul. II. 25.

† Pliny VIII. 30. relates the following circumstance. When *Pompey* was about to enter the house of *Posidonius*, a man renowned for his profession of philosophy, he forbade the licitor to strike the door, according to custom; and he to whom the East and West had submitted, lowered his fasces to the gate of letters.

*shall never be the cause, that a man of your rank should wait on me to no purpose. So that, though confined to bed, he entered into a grave and copious discourse on this very subject, that nothing is good, but what is honest: and when seized with most acute touches of pain, he often said, Pain, you but lose your labour; though you be troublesome, I shall never allow that you are an evil.*

Where \* is there one philosopher of a thousand, whose manners, life, and disposition, are agreeable to reason; who looks on his learning, not as a vain ostentation of science, but a rule of life; and master of his own actions, carries his doctrine into practice? Some of them are so vain and self-conceited, that it had been better they had remained in ignorance; others are avaricious, some fond of glory, and many slaves to pleasure: so that there is a strange contrariety between their life and doctrine; than which, in my opinion, nothing can be more dishonourable. For

\* Tuscul. II. 5.

should one, who professes grammar, speak with barbarous impropriety; or one, who would be esteemed a musician, sing out of tune; such blunders, in them, are so much the more gross, as being committed against the very art they profess. In the same manner, a philosopher who leads a vicious life, is the more contemptible, as being guilty of a breach of the morality he takes upon him to teach; and though he professes the art of living virtuously, yet offends in that very respect.

*Should \* I, my Titus, ease you of that pain,  
That anxious care, which fills your soul  
with grief:*

*Say, dearest friend, would this not please  
you well?*

For I may address myself to you, *Atticus*,  
in the verses spoken to *Flaminius*, by

*That man † of honour, though but small  
estate.*

\* De Senect. cap. 1. This is the *exordium*, or preface, of the dialogue on old age.

† *Ennius* is the person here meant. As to the application of these verses, it is founded on this, that *Titus* was a prænomen

Although I know for a certain truth, that you are not, like *Flamininus*,

*Both night and day harrafs'd with new alarms.*

For I am well acquainted with your moderation, and evenness of temper. I am sensible, that it is not a surname only you have brought from *Athens*, but also humanity and prudence; and yet I cannot help suspecting, that you are sometimes not a little affected with the same events as myself\*. But to offer any consolation on this head being a matter of great difficulty, it shall be deferred to another time. At present, I have thought proper to write you my Sentiments on old age. For as it, in a manner, hangs over us, or at least is fast approaching, I am desirous to alleviate its burthen, common to us both: although I know for certain, that you not only bear it, as you do every thing else, with prudence and moderation; but will

common to *Flamininus* and *Pomponius*; the latter of whom was surnamed *Atticus*, because of the long stay he had made at *Athens*.

\* The troubles of the commonwealth, during the civil wars between *Cæsar* and *Pompey*.

con-



Continue to do so. However, as I determined to write on old age, none seemed so proper as you, to whom a work, which might be of common service to us both, could be offered.

So great was the pleasure I received in composing this treatise\*, as not only freed old age of all its ailments, but even rendered it easy and agreeable. Philosophy, then, can never be extolled enough; since the man, who obeys its dictates, may live happily in every stage of life. As to its other advantages, I have already said, and shall hereafter say, a great deal. The book, which I have at present sent you, treats of old age.

I have not, indeed, like *Aristo*† of *Chius*, put what I had to offer on my subject into the mouth of *Titbonus*; (for there is little credit to be given to a fable) but into that of *M. Cato* the elder, thereby to add au-

\* Hence it is evident that *Cicero* practised what he recommended to others, viz. not to compose the *exordium*, till the body of the work was finished.

† A Stoic philosopher, who must not be confounded with another *Aristo*; who was a Peripatetic, and a native of the isle of *Cos*. For *Cicero*'s thoughts on old age, see above, p. 135, & seq.

thority to it. I introduce him making answer to *Lælius* and *Scipio*, who had expressed their admiration that he bore his age with such chearfulness. If he shall appear to reason more learnedly than is usual in his own works, let it be ascribed to his knowledge of the *Grecian* literature, which he studied with close application in his old age. But what occasion for a longer preamble? *Cato's* discourse will sufficiently explain my sentiments on old age.

Any \* man may be guilty of an oversight; but to persist in error, is the sure characteristick of a fool.

What † is liberty? The power of living as you please. Now who can be said to live in this manner, if it is not one who acts agreeably to right reason; who takes pleasure in his duty, and lives according to a plan founded on reflection; who obeys the laws not out of fear, but willingly and with respect, as being sensible that it is

\* Philippic. XII. 2.

† Paradox. V. 1.

most conducive to his happiness; who says nothing, does nothing, and thinks nothing, but with the utmost freedom and cheerfulness? All his deliberations, and every thing he undertakes, begin and terminate in himself; nor is there any thing has so much weight with him, as his will\* and judgment; even fortune itself, whose influence is said to be very great, yields to him: for as the poet wisely observes, *every man's fortune depends on his manners*. On the whole then, 'tis the wise man alone, who does nothing by force, or with regret.

We† say very properly that angry men are besides themselves, that is, are void of prudence, reason, reflection; which ought to give laws to all the other powers of the mind. Now it is necessary, either to remove out of their sight the persons against whom their fury is levelled, till they re-

\* Will, in the language of the Stoics, is only meant of the will when enlightened, and guided by reason: for if passion takes place, it is not the man, but rather something foreign to him, that wills. See Tuscul. IV. 6.

† Tuscul. IV. 36.

collect themselves; (but what is this recollection of one's self, if it be not the restoring the disturbed parts of the soul to their natural state?) or they are to be intreated and conjured to suspend their vengeance to another time, when their anger shall have subsided. But this must certainly imply a violent perturbation raised in the mind in opposition to reason. Hence it is, that the saying of *Archytas*\* is much cried up; who being highly offended at his steward, addressed him thus: *How severely should I have banded you, had I not been angry!*

*Hippias* † having arrived at *Olympia*, during the celebration of those famous games, which are held every fifth year, made his boast, in the presence of almost

\* *Archytas* having gone from *Tarentum*, the place of his birth, to *Metapontum*, where *Pythagoras* taught his philosophy, thought of nothing during his long stay there, but to profit under so great a master. At his return he found his lands in a pitiful condition, occasioned by the negligence of his steward: and it was this made him use the expression above-mentioned. On this head, see *Valerius Maximus*, lib. IV. cap. 1. Ext. 1.

† *De Orat.* III. 32.

all *Greece*, that there was no part of any art with which he was not perfectly acquainted. Nor was it the learned and liberal arts only, as geometry, music, grammar, poetry, natural history, morality, and politics; but that the ring on his finger, the cloak on his back, and the shoes on his feet, were all his own workmanship.

*Themistocles* \*, the famous *Athenian*, whom the *Greeks* esteemed a prodigy of good sense and prudence, was accosted by a learned man of the first rate; who professed to teach him the art of memory†, then first reduced to a science. *Themistocles* having asked him, what that art could do? The professor answered, it would teach him to remember every thing. On which the other replied, that he would do him a much greater favour, could he teach him to forget, rather than remember, whatever he pleased.

\* De Orat. II. 74.

† See Quintilian, XI. 2.

*Theophrastus* \*, on his death bed, is said to have reproached nature, that she had bestowed a long life on stags and crows, who could have no occasion for it; but to mankind had given a very short one, notwithstanding that it much concerned them: for had their life been longer, they might have attained the knowledge of every science, and a perfect mastery in every art. He complained, therefore, that he was snatched away by death, when these things were but just opening to his view.

All † mankind hate an ungrateful person. They look on themselves as personally injured, in the discouragement of munificence; and esteem the guilty person, the common enemy of the needy.

*Pythagoras* ‡ having gone to *Pblius* §, is said to have held a learned and eloquent

\* Tuscul. III. 28.

† Offic. II. 18.

‡ Tuscul. V. 3.

§ A city of *Peloponnesus*.

discourse with *Leon*, king of that place; who being much taken with his wit and eloquence, asked him what trade he professed? He answered that he understood no trade at all, but was a *Philosopher*. *Leon* struck with the novelty of the term, asked what Philosophers were, and wherein consisted the difference between them and the rest of mankind? *Pythagoras* made answer, that in his opinion, human life resembled that great concourse of people convened from every part of *Greece* to celebrate the solemn games: for as in them, some, by bodily exercise, contend for the glory and renown of gaining the crown of victory; the only inducement of others, was to make profit by buying and selling: but besides these, there was a third sort, more noble than either of the former, who came there neither in quest of gain or popular applause, but 'merely out of curiosity to see what passed, and how things were managed. Thus it is with mankind, they come from another life, and another state of existence\*, into this world, as it were

\* Here we have the famous dogma of *Pythagoras*, concerning the *metempsychosis*, or transmigration of souls.

from

from a foreign city to some festival solemnity. Some mind glory ; others riches ; and a few there are, who, contemning every pursuit besides, carefully study the nature of things. These call themselves *Philosophers*, that is to say, lovers of wisdom. And as in the public games, 'tis most honourable to be a spectator, free from mean selfish views ; so, in life, the study of natural knowledge, is by far the most excellent of all other professions.

F I N I S.











